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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
As technology advances, the past two decades have seen an explosion of digital data and 
every sector of the global economy is being changed by the large amount of data available. 
This has enabled a different way of making decisions that involves more empirical evidence 
rather than personal experience, intuition, or belief. Such a new practice of “basing decisions 
on the analysis of data rather than purely on intuition” has been named as data-driven 
decision making (Provost and Fawcett, 2013). The revolution from data scarcity to large-
scale data can be more thoroughly studied with the help of various data analytics methods. 
There is a desire to understand the methods and inquiry approaches that are used in 
organizations to achieve high quality, policy-relevant information (Kenett and Shmueli, 
2017). What is needed is a framework for how large-scale data can be used to understand 
the impacts of different policies and the economic consequences of related decisions. As De 
Marchi et al. (2016) have stated, the analytics themselves are most useful for evidence-based 
policy-making, which ‘‘helps people make well informed decisions about policies, programs 
and projects by putting the best available evidence from research at the heart of policy 
development and implementation” (Davies, 1999). 
Auctions play a critical role in the modern society: governments use auctions to sell 
treasury bills, mineral rights and many other assets; firms use auctions to subcontract work, 
buy services and raw materials; individuals also participate in auctions of various consumer 
products such as art, antiques, cars, or even houses (Klemperer, 1999). The Internet has 
expanded the scope and reach of auctions tremendously: by breaking the physical limitations 
such as geography, time, and space, online auctions open up vast new opportunities for 
businesses of all sizes and become an indispensable part of the new economy (Bajari and 
Hortacsu, 2004). Over the past decades, Information Systems (IS) researchers have made 
significant contributions to practical auction design by investigating different bidding 
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strategies and price dynamics in real-world auctions (e.g. Bapna et al., 2004; Kauffman and 
Wood, 2006; Goes et al., 2010; Bichler et al., 2010). Despite the great promise they hold, 
online auctions also pose many new challenges for practitioners and academics. For 
example, Bapna et al. (2001) point out that the behaviour of the different economic agents 
in auctions is heavily influenced by the online context in which they take place. Further, 
researchers have made considerable progress in the development of computational tools to 
facilitate decision making in complex auction markets (Adomavicius and Gupta, 2005; 
Adomavicius et al., 2009; Ketter et al., 2012; Mehta and Bhattacharya, 2006).  
In this thesis we focus on the merits of data analytics for decision making in 
complex auction markets from the perspective of Market Surveillance Committees (MSC) 
whose main aim is to provide independent oversight and analysis of the auctions for the 
protection of consumers and bidders by the identification and reporting of market design 
flaws, potential market rule violations, and market abuse behaviour (CAISO, 2017). Duties 
of MSCs are review of market rules, performance and trends. More explicitly MSCs shall 
review existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions, and market design elements 
and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes to the policy-maker/auctioneer. The MSC’s 
review shall include but not limited to the identification of flaws in the overall structure of 
the related markets that may reveal undue concentrations of market power or other structural 
flaws. MSCs shall review and report on market trends and the performance of the wholesale 
markets to the policy-maker/auctioneer. MSCs shall identify and notify the enforcement staff 
of instances in which a market participant’s behaviour or the behaviour of the auctioneer 
itself is suspected to constitute a market violation. In sum, the main activities of MSC can 
be summarized as follows: 1) Monitoring market efficiency (performance); 2) Monitoring 
market participants’ behaviour through their activities and transactions (detection of 
attempts to exercise market power and fraudulent behaviour); and 3) Identification of market 
design flaws (Pinczynski and Kasperowicz, 2016).  
With the proliferation of electronic trading, there are millions of events (orders, 
trades, price-quantity matches, etc.) per day and it is impossible for MSCs to detect 
suspicious activity manually. The standard way of dealing with such big data is to aggregate 
it and expressing it in summary form for the purpose of statistical analysis. Many market 
surveillance systems leverage these statistical techniques and technologies to quickly 
compare huge volumes of real-time data with historical data. Unfortunately, statistical 
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analysis alone is not sufficient to fully understand what is happening amidst market 
complexity and why it is happening. When it is supplemented with behavioural analysis, 
MSCs can understand the intent behind strategic behaviour (NASDAQ, 2017, Behavioral 
Analysis in Market Surveillance Report).  
 
Based upon the aforementioned recent developments in data analytics and the 
decision support needs of evidence-based policy-making, we raise the following research 
question:  
How can the power of data analytics be leveraged to improve surveillance of 
complex auction markets? 
1.2. Outline 
The dissertation is structured as follows. This introduction is followed by a presentation of 
the research context in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 we examine efficiency of the market by using 
parametric and semiparametric approaches for each time zone in a multi-time tariff setting. 
Then, in Chapter 4 we discuss how to manage price modelling risk via ensemble forecasts 
in a semi-transparent auction setting. In Chapter 5 we discuss how attitude and trading 
behaviour of bidders effect their price expectations in online double auctions with the 
existence of forward trading. Then, in Chapter 6 we discuss characterization, determinants 
and efficiency of strategic bidding in oligopolistic multi-unit auctions. Finally, we conclude 
our work in Chapter 7 and provide directions for future research. Figure 1.1 provides an 
overview of the structure of this dissertation. 
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Fig. 1.1: Structure of the dissertation 
 
In the following section we present a short description or a brief abstract of the contents of 
Chapters 2 through 7 of this dissertation. 
 
Chapter 2 We explain the conceptual framework, auction mechanism and regulatory 
framework for surveillance of complex auction markets.  
 
Chapter 3 - Abstract  We examine the fractal dynamics of day-ahead electricity prices 
by using parametric and semiparametric approaches for each time zone in a multi-time tariff 
setting in the framework of bidding strategies, market efficiency and persistence of 
exogenous shocks. On the one hand, we find that electricity prices have long-term 
correlation structure for the first and third time zones indicating that market participants bid 
hyperbolically and not at their marginal costs, the market is not weak form efficient at these 
hours and exogenous shocks to change the mean level of prices will have a permanent effect 
and be effective. On the other hand, for the second time zone we find that the price series 
does not exhibit long-term memory. This finding suggests the weak form efficiency of the 
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market in these hours and that marginal bidders bid at their marginal costs. Furthermore this 
indicates that exogenous shocks will have a temporary effect on electricity prices in these 
hours. These findings constitute an important foundation for policy-makers and market 
participants to develop appropriate electricity price forecasting tools and market monitoring 
indexes and to conduct ex-ante impact assessment. 
 
Chapter 4 – Abstract  There are two ways of managing market price risk in electricity 
day-ahead markets: forecasting and hedging. In emerging markets, since hedging 
possibilities are limited, forecasting becomes the most important tool to manage spot price 
risk. Despite the existence of a great diversity of spot price forecasting methods, due to the 
unique characteristics of electricity as a commodity, there are still three key forecasting 
challenges that a market participant must take into account: risk of selection of an inadequate 
forecasting method; transparency level of the market (availability level of public data); and 
country-specific multi-seasonality factors. We address these challenges by using detailed 
market-level data from the Turkish electricity day-ahead auctions, which is an interesting 
research setting in that it presents a number of challenges for forecasting. We reveal the key 
distinguishing features of this market in a quantitative way, which then allow us to propose 
individual and ensemble forecasting models that are particularly well suited to it. This 
forecasting study is pioneering for Turkey as it is the very first to focus specifically on 
electricity spot prices since the country’s day-ahead market was established in 2012. We 
also discuss applicable policy and managerial implications for both regulatory bodies, 
market makers and participants. 
 
Chapter 5 – Abstract In the presence of information asymmetry in imperfect auction 
markets, for an auctioneer it is of utmost importance to design a mechanism that gives robust 
price signals which in turn decreases bidders’ uncertainty and thus increases auction 
performance. The traditional presumption that bidders form rational expectations by 
accurately processing all available information in the online trading environment and 
forming their expectations accordingly has found mixed support. In this study we aim to 
understand how the attitude and trading behaviour of bidders impact their price expectations 
in online double auctions with the existence of forward trading. We develop a research model 
that empirically tests the impact of bidders’ attitudes on their price expectation through their 
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trading behaviour. Using a unique and extensive data set, we tested our hypotheses on real 
ex-ante forecasts, evaluated ex-post, in an electricity day-ahead auction context. This 
research is the first to take an information-based view to investigate the price expectation of 
bidders through their behaviour; with results that prompt further consideration of some of 
the conventional concepts. 
 
Chapter 6 – Abstract We conduct an empirical investigation of bidder behaviour in a 
multi-unit uniform-price auction from a centralized product market, electricity auctions, with 
the existence of oligopoly. The susceptibility of these auctions to the exercise of unilateral 
market power makes them an ideal research setting to study the determinants of oligopolistic 
behaviour and productive efficiency. Since electricity auctions are regulated, they have 
detailed market surveillance rules that must be used by the auctioneer and define the feasible 
set of bidder behaviour. However with the proliferation of electronic trading, there are 
millions of orders per hour and it is impossible to manually detect market abuse behaviour. 
Leveraging the power of big data, we propose a behavioural analytics approach to address 
the cognitive and computational limitations of MSCs in their identification of diagnostic 
flags or signals of market manipulation.  
 
Chapter 7 We revisit the most important conclusions and findings from Chapters 3 
through 6, put them in perspective, and give an outlook on future work. 
 
1.3. Declaration of Contribution 
 
Chapter 1: This Chapter was written by the author of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 2: This Chapter was written by the author of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 3: This Chapter represents the joint work of the author of the thesis, Prof. Dr. K. 
Aydogan, and D. Akgul. The author of this dissertation is the first author of this Chapter and 
has done the majority of the work. The data collection, data analysis, programming, 
algorithm implementation, testing, and writing of the paper were done by the author of this 
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thesis. The co-authors of this Chapter contributed by structuring the Chapter, providing 
significant guidance, and feedback. Without the co-authors this Chapter would not have been 
possible in its current form and quality. 
 
Chapter 4: This Chapter represents the joint work of the author of the thesis, Prof. Dr. W. 
Ketter, and Prof. Dr. E. van Heck. The author of this dissertation is the first author of this 
Chapter and has done the majority of the work. The data collection, data analysis, 
programming, algorithm implementation, testing, and writing of the paper were done by the 
author of this thesis. The co-authors of this Chapter contributed by structuring the Chapter, 
improving modelling aspects of the paper, giving it more focus by rewriting parts of the 
Chapter, providing significant guidance, and feedback. Without the co-authors this Chapter 
would not have been possible in its current form and quality. 
 
Chapter 5: This Chapter represents the joint work of the author of the thesis, Prof. Dr. W. 
Ketter, Prof. Dr. E. van Heck, and Prof. Dr. D. Bunn. The author of this dissertation is the 
first author of this Chapter and has done the majority of the work. The data collection, data 
analysis, programming, algorithm implementation, testing, and writing of the paper were 
done by the author of this thesis. The co-authors of this Chapter contributed by structuring 
the Chapter, improving modelling aspects of the paper, giving it more focus by rewriting 
parts of the Chapter, providing significant guidance, and feedback. Without the co-authors 
this Chapter would not have been possible in its current form and quality. 
 
Chapter 6: This Chapter represents the joint work of the author of the thesis, Prof. Dr. W. 
Ketter, Prof. Dr. E. van Heck, and Prof. Dr. D. Bunn. The author of this dissertation is the 
first author of this Chapter and has done the majority of the work. The data collection, data 
analysis, programming, algorithm implementation, testing, and writing of the paper were 
done by the author of this thesis. The co-authors of this Chapter contributed by structuring 
the Chapter, improving modelling aspects of the paper, giving it more focus by rewriting 
parts of the Chapter, providing significant guidance, and feedback. Without the co-authors 
this Chapter would not have been possible in its current form and quality. 
 
Chapter 7: This Chapter was written by the author of this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Research Background 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In this Chapter, we first justify the choice of this empirical setting and then introduce this 
auction market in detail. All the empirical data used in this research were obtained from a 
complex auction market, namely, the Electricity Day-Ahead (EDA) auctions. The primary 
reason for choosing the EDA auctions as the research context is that they add real-world 
complications to the decision-making process in classical auction models. They are ideal 
research settings as they require detailed information-processing and these auctions clear 
through the actions of heterogeneous power bidders with expectations and strategies that 
have major effects on auction efficiency.  
2.2. Electricity Auctions 
Electricity wholesale markets are sequential clearing mechanisms which can be divided into 
four categories: day-ahead markets, intra-day markets, balancing and reserve markets, and 
forwards and futures markets. A day-ahead market determines the electricity prices for the 
delivery of electricity the next day, and this category of markets has a position of 
prominence. The prices coming from day-ahead markets are usually accepted as a reference 
point for the other electricity markets and bilateral contracts.  
Day-ahead auctions represent a spot trading mechanism which takes place on one 
day for the delivery of electricity the next day (Figure 2.1). Market members submit their 
orders electronically, after which supply and demand are compared and the market price is 
calculated for each hour of the following day. The development of demand and supply on 
the market is completely determined by market parties themselves. Players are production 
and distribution companies, large consumers, industrial end-users, brokers and traders. All 
of these can be active as buyer or supplier. Making bids on the spot market is completely 
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electronic. The bid from buyers and sellers must be made known one day in advance. After 
the closure of the day-ahead bidding, the auctioneer provides matching and sends the result 
to the bidders.  
 
 
Fig. 2.1: Timeline of EDA auctions (Source: Weron, 2014) 
2.3. The Auction Mechanism 
Bidders can submit their orders for the next day every day until 11:30. Bids for the next day 
that are presented by bidders are used to determine the market clearing price (MCP) and 
market clearing quantity (MCQ) after collateral checking is performed and an adequate 
collateral amount is confirmed, in accordance with relevant procedures. Orders submitted to 
the auctioneer (market operator) are verified from 11:30 to 12:00. Verified orders are 
assessed between 12:00 and 13:00 using an optimization tool, and the MCP and MCQ are 
determined for every hour of that specific day. Trade confirmations, including quantities of 
bids or asks are announced to the relevant bidders each day at 13:00. Bidders can object to 
these notifications in the case of any errors regarding transactions between 13:00 and 13:30. 
The objections are evaluated from 13:00 and 13:30, and the results are then notified to 
bidders who made the objection. At 14:00, finalized prices and matched quantities for the 
24 hours of the following day are announced. Bidders can submit their bilateral contract 
notifications between 00:00 and 16:00 each day. The processes described above are normal 
processes for EDA auctions and are illustrated in Figure 2.2. If any technical problems arise 
within the EDA auction system, emergency procedures are carried out by the auctioneer.  
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Fig. 2.2: Order submission timeline for EDA auctions 
 
Bidders can submit orders hourly or daily for a particular hour or period of hours, 
or can make flexible orders. Orders are composed of quantity and price information that can 
change for different hours. Submitted order prices have centesimal sensitivity. Orders can 
be made in terms of Euro per MWh. Order volumes are submitted in terms of a Lot as an 
integer (one Lot is equivalent to 0.1 MWh). Orders can be submitted as bid and/or ask. 
Depending on the sign in front of the order quantity, the order is marked as either a bid or 
an ask (for instance, a 100 Lot indicates a bid, whereas a -100 Lot indicates an ask). A single 
order is a price and quantity schedule determined by the bidder. Basically, the bidders tell 
the auctioneer the price-quantity pair they are willing to trade for a particular hour of the 
next day. Table 2.1 demonstrates two single orders by a bidder for the first two periods of 
the day. 
Table 2.1: An example for single orders 
 
Hour 
Price (Euro)/MWh 
0 50 80 120 200 2000 
0 – 1  600 400 0 -200 -500 -1000 
1 – 2  300 300 200 0 -2000 -2000 
… … … … … … … 
12 
 
For instance, in period 1, the bidder is willing to sell 200 MWh if the clearing price 
is above 120 Euro/MWh; and willing to buy 400 MWh if the clearing price is below 50 
Euro/MWh. Each time period corresponds to an hour in the market. Single hourly orders 
have maximum 64 steps which contain 32 bids and 32 asks. The prices of single hourly 
orders must be listed in ascending order. In a single price step there cannot be valid single 
hourly orders for both bid and ask. During the formation of the supply-demand curve, the 
linear interpolation method is employed to interpolate values between two consecutive 
price/quantity steps. Minimum/maximum price limits and bid quantities are determined by 
the auctioneer. Depending on changing market circumstances, the auctioneer can update the 
minimum and maximum price limits and announce them to bidders.  
2.4. The Auctioneers’ Problem 
The auctioneer’s main goal is to plan, establish, develop, and manage the energy market 
within the market operation license in an effective, transparent, reliable manner that fulfils 
market requirements. The auctioneer aims to ensure the energy market management procures 
a reliable reference price without discriminating equivalent parties and maximizes the 
liquidity with an increasing number of market participants, product range and trading 
volume. In sum the auctioneer aims to create a transparent mechanism which provides 
reliable reference price formation and as a result actualize competitive conditions for 
investors and maximize the trading volume. 
In the idealized theory, energy and related reserve scarcity prices would provide all 
that would be needed to support a market and capture the benefits of competition. In reality, 
there are many complications in achieving the theoretical results (Hogan, 2014). The 
characteristics of the product and the technology used to produce it make bid-based 
wholesale electricity markets extremely susceptible to the exercise of unilateral market 
power (Wolak, 2010). This situation raises the need for Market Surveillance Committees 
(MSCs) whose main objective is to provide independent oversight and analysis of the 
auctions for the protection of consumers and bidders by identifying and reporting market 
design flaws, potential market rule violations, and market abuse behaviour.  
Market abuse behaviour on wholesale energy markets involves actions undertaken 
by persons that artificially cause prices to be at a level not justified by market forces of 
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supply and demand, including actual availability of production, storage or transportation 
capacity. Certain types of behaviour such as; false/misleading transactions (trading, or 
placing orders to trade, which gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the 
supply of, demand for, or price of wholesale energy products), price positioning (trading, or 
placing orders to trade, which secures or attempts to secure, by a person, or persons acting 
in collaboration, the price of one or several wholesale energy products at an artificial level, 
unless the person who entered into the transaction or issued the order to trade establishes 
that his reasons for doing so are legitimate and that transaction or order to trade conforms to 
accepted market practices on the wholesale energy market concerned), transactions 
involving fictitious devices/deception (trading, or placing orders to trade, which employs 
fictitious devices or any other form of deception or contrivance), dissemination of false and 
misleading information (giving out information that conveys a false or misleading 
impression about a wholesale energy product where the person doing this knows or ought to 
have known the information to be false or misleading) are considered as market 
manipulation (REMIT, 2011) and can amount to market abuse. 
MSCs shall report possible market abuse behaviour to the auctioneer in a timely 
manner. Based on these expert reports, the auctioneer can influence the dynamics of auctions 
by controlling the key auction parameters including the number of bid steps, the minimum 
bid price or the maximum ask price. Further, the auctioneer can also influence the bidding 
competition by disclosing or withholding extra information about market states during an 
auction (level of market transparency).  
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Chapter 3 
 
Monitoring Market Efficiency 
and Aggregate-level Bidding 
Strategy1 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In recent years most electricity markets have been restructured and in this setting, energy-
based financial products and electricity price analysis become substantially important for 
both policy-makers and market participants. After the famous California blackout in 2000, 
a significant increase in the number of studies on price forecasting was observed. 
Preliminary studies focused on the basic characteristics of electricity differed from those of 
financial assets, namely; non-storability, seasonality and inelasticity of supply/demand 
(Zachmann, 2008; Lucia and Schwartz, 2002; Geman and Roncoroni, 2006; Sensfuss et al., 
2008). Following studies focus on spikes, causing asymmetry in the underlying distribution; 
nonstationarity and mean reversion (Knittel and Roberts, 2005; Haugom et al., 2011; 
Janczura et al., 2013; Simonsen, 2003; Weron and Przybylowicz, 2000).  
Considering security of supply, another crucial feature of electricity is the intraday 
volatility arising from demand fluctuations during the course of the day. Regulatory 
authorities usually oblige the system operators to adopt multi-time tariff mechanisms in 
order to manage peak-time volatility. In these tariff settings, different rates are applied for 
the consumption at defined time zones during the day. The bills of the subscribers under this 
setting are arranged by considering their consumptions at the defined time zones and the 
                                                             
    1 This Chapter is based on Avci-Surucu, Aydogan and Akgul (2016) published in Energy Economics, 54, 77-87. Parts of 
this Chapter appeared in the following conference proceedings: 55th EWGCF, Euro Working Group for Commodities and 
Financial Modelling Conference. Ankara, TURKEY and 4th Energy Finance Conference, Erice, ITALY. 
 
16 
 
rates for these time zones with the aim of shifting the load from peak time to off-peak time 
and thereby enable the end user to manage his energy costs and allow generators to operate 
efficiently. This situation results in different incentives on generators side. Generators, with 
the ability of flexible offering, tend to adopt different bidding strategies at super peak, peak 
and off-peak times.  
Studies on analysing dynamics of day-ahead prices ignore the different characteristics 
of time zones in multi-time tariff settings and consider the daily average prices.2 However 
daily average prices do not capture the microstructure of the day-ahead market since level 
of mean reversion and volatility structure are not constant throughout the day (Huisman et 
al., 2007). Other studies consider hourly prices as a stack and ignore the fact that day-ahead 
electricity prices are determined a day before the trading day for all 24 hours, that is traders 
cannot update their information set hourly. Under this setting, information set is not constant 
throughout the day and updates over the days. Applying a classic time series approach to 
hourly day-ahead prices can be misleading from a statistical point of view. Huisman et al. 
(2007) model each hour as a separate time series through a panel data methodology and find 
the mean reversion of day-ahead prices is significantly lower over the super-peak hours 
(18:00-22:00). Thus prices are less predictable in these hours. Moreover they show there 
exists clear blocks of cross-sectional correlation between specific hours. The first block 
appears in 24:00 – 06:00, second block shows up through 6:00 to 19:00 and also there is 
very high correlation between specific two adjacent hours (between hours 20 and 21; 
between hours 15 and 16). These findings reveal the different dynamics in hourly prices but 
similar characteristics in each time zone.  
There are also emerging studies of applied mathematics in the field of electricity pricing 
and market modelling, especially, by the use of game theory, stochastic differential 
equations and mathematics supported data mining (Vasin et al., 2013; Vasin, 2014). 
However the literature on electricity price analysis focuses mostly on the features of 
autocorrelation, stochasticity and nonlinearity. Only a small number of studies analyse the 
presence and quantification of fractality (long-term correlation structure) and very few of 
                                                             
2 For a comprehensive overview, see Huisman and Mahieu (2003), Eydeland and Wolyniec (2003) and Bunn and 
Karakatsani (2003). 
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them relate these findings to basic financial concepts; namely multi-time tariff mechanism, 
market efficiency, bidding structure or policy development. 
Accurate measurement of fractality is crucial for correct statistical inference and 
forecast uncertainty (Lildholt, 2000). There are three reasons stimulating this fact. First, 
ignoring the long memory property in a series can lead to confidence intervals for a process 
mean that are too optimistic by orders of magnitude. Second, there are many important 
economic time series exhibiting long-term correlation structure (Beran, 1994). Moreover the 
potential for spurious regressions of stationary variables depend on the level of fractal noise 
(Tsay and Chung, 2000). 
Economic intuition of the presence of long memory structure in electricity prices is 
important on several fronts. First, if electricity prices are stationary in levels, shocks to 
electricity prices will have only transitory effects. On the other hand, if electricity prices are 
nonstationary, shocks to electricity prices will have permanent effects. The nature of a shock 
has implications for transmission of that shock from electricity prices to other sectors of the 
economy. If shocks to electricity prices are permanent, then the probability of transmission 
of such a shock to other sectors of the economy, where energy prices have a substantial 
impact on expenditures, would be higher than the probability of transmission of a transitory 
shock.  
Secondly, the presence of fractal noise in electricity prices can be used to capture the 
bidding strategies of market participants. In restructured electricity markets, the probability 
of setting the price each hour is not the same for all market participants, mostly because they 
have different marginal costs. Each hour, the market clearing price is determined by just one 
generator, called the marginal generator, whose bid is at the intersection of the supply and 
demand curves. Generators whose bids are higher in the merit order curve are called 
inframarginal generators. Each generator knows only the past market prices and their own 
bids. In this setting, the inframarginal generators’ strategy is to not bid higher than the 
marginal generator’s bid (Sapio, 2004). Thus, they observe and analyse past prices and offer 
their current bids according to past information. For off-peak hours, if marginal generators 
bid at their marginal costs, then there is no fractal noise. This observation allows for testing 
of firms’ bidding behaviour based on marginal cost structures. For peak hours, if there exists 
a long-term correlation in prices, we can suggest that marginal generators use the prices of 
the day and week before, which means applying hyperbolic bidding rules. Moreover this 
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observation is contrary to Fama’s (1970) weak-form efficient market hypothesis (WEMH), 
which assumes the absence of long-term correlation between price increments for any time 
scale. If markets are weak-form efficient, then market participants cannot earn excess profits 
in the presence of trading rules based on past prices or returns (Farmer et al., 2006; Eoma et 
al., 2008; Mun et al., 2008). Such a WEMH can be tested using historical data through short- 
and long-range correlations (Lillo and Farmer, 2004; Couillard and Davidson, 2005).  
Thirdly; considering the persistence of a series, the presence and degree of long-term 
correlation structure have policy implications.3 Persistence is a measure of the speed at 
which a series returns to its mean level after a shock. In the context of this research, a shock 
can be a new policy design/regulation or the introduction of an innovation to the market. In 
this sense, when the degree of persistence is small, a shock tends to have more temporary 
effects. In the case of electricity prices, deviating from the mean level of the price is not 
easy. On the one hand, it is more costly and difficult to permanently affect electricity prices 
when persistence is low. On the other hand, if the degree of persistence is high, a shock tends 
to have a more long-lasting effect. Thus, the degree of persistence of electricity prices makes 
a difference in the effectiveness of energy policies/regulations. Therefore the results of this 
study can be an input for regulatory bodies and policy-makers to make “evidence-based ex-
ante policy impact analysis” which has recently been a popular approach used by UNDP, 
EU, OECD and World Bank4.  
In this study, our aim is to investigate fractal phenomena in level electricity prices for 
each time zone separately. We focus on the essential statistical properties of fractal noise 
and identify appropriate instruments for measuring fractality in day-ahead electricity prices. 
Our paper contributes to the literature firstly by comprehensively discussing the theoretical 
characteristics of a fractal pattern and demonstrating the crucial steps of a fractal analysis 
approach adapted to capture the dynamics of electricity prices. We employ both parametric 
and semiparametric methods to benefit from their different statistical properties. Secondly, 
                                                             
3 For details, see Chen and Lee, 2007; Gil-Alana et al., 2010; Peraire and Belbuta, 2012; Apergis and Tsoumas, 
2012. 
4For details, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/evaluation/activites/doc/reports/energie/intelligent_energy_ex_ante_en.p
df https://ec.europa.eu/energy/intelligent/files/doc/2011_iee2_programme_ex_ante_en.pdf 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/povertyreduction/38978856.pdf 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPSIA/0,,contentMDK:20477296~pagePK:148956
~piPK:216618~theSitePK:490130,00.html 
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prior studies have focused on hourly price differences or daily average price differences 
rather than on level prices. This first differencing approach is a natural fit for most financial 
assets because of their nonstationary dynamics. However, this property may not exist for 
electricity prices depending on the maturity of the market, the time interval, the technology 
mix and other contaminating factors. For instance; markets with low diversity of generation, 
low maturity or non-reservoir hydro-dependence may experience many spikes which can 
affect the evaluation of the long memory differencing parameter based on returns. As stated 
by Uritskaya and Uritsky (2015) using level prices is more consistent with the original 
formulation of the parametric long memory estimation methods, like DFA. Thus, studies on 
long memory for level prices can provide useful information to improve existing models and 
to assess limitations on prediction. Lastly, previous studies have investigated either daily 
average or hourly prices. However, Alvarez-Ramirez and Escarela-Perez (2010) and 
Erzgraber et al. (2008) show that fractal properties of electricity price vary over time. 
Accordingly we introduce a new time unit based on time zones in a multi-time tariff 
mechanism considering the fact that electricity market participants have different incentives, 
risk management and forecasting approaches for each time zone. With respect to this fact 
we expect different levels of predictability of prices, efficiency of the market, bidding 
structures of market participants and permanence of shocks for each time zone.  
For this study we use a data set from Turkey where exists three time zones (Ti); T1 (day): 
6:00 – 17:00, T2 (peak): 17:00 – 22:00 and T3 (night): 22:00 – 6:00. There have been few 
empirical studies focusing on the statistical and fractal properties of electricity prices in 
Turkey because of the relative youth of electricity market restructuring. There are only two 
emerging studies on forecasting electricity prices of Turkey; Yıldırım et al. (2012) and 
Hayfavi and Talasli (2014). On the other hand Turkey has experienced the longest and most 
extensive “black out” on 31 March 2015 in the history of the Turkish Republic. This recent 
experience5 has revealed the importance of bidding structures in electricity markets and 
                                                             
5 Turkey has experienced the longest and most extensive blackout on 31 March 2015 in the history of the Turkish 
Republic. Turkish Transmission system collapsed for 10 hours due to positioning of generation plants mostly on 
the eastern part of Turkey. Nevertheless the basic reason is the formation of merit order curve and lack of 
management initiative. During the winter 2015 Turkey had high precipitation and thus the level of reservoirs 
became very high. On 30 March 2015, that is the day MOC( Merit Order Curve) was planned for 31 March 2015; 
the operators recognize that most of the hydropower enter the merit order curve, became marginal generators ( 
as defined in the manuscript; marginal generators are the ones whose bid at the intersection of the supply and 
demand curves and thus determining the hourly market clearing price) and natural  gas plants mostly located near 
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implementing hedging strategies. Thus we expect a rapid increase in the number studies on 
electricity price analysis and forecasting about the Turkish electricity market. 
3.2. Related Work 
Fractal noise has been found in most scientific fields, including physics, finance, biology 
and psychology (Hausdorf et al., 1996; Chen et al., 1997) and is still a hot topic (Barunik 
and Kristoufek, 2010; Yerlikaya-Ozkurt et al., 2014; Uritskaya and Uritsky, 2015). It is 
intermediate between white noise and brown noise and has both stability and adaptability 
properties (Bak et al., 1987). Different approaches to capture fractality exist. However, 
statistical characteristics of some nonfractal noise can resemble fractal noise, which may 
result in incorrect classification. Therefore, proper measurement of fractality in applied 
research is very difficult. One of the main objectives in measuring fractality is distinguishing 
between fractal and nonfractal noise for diagnostic checking (Stadnitski, 2012). 
Fractality of electricity prices has been the subject of a number of recent studies. Pioneer 
studies mostly attempt to detect the unit root in a series through analysing the long memory 
differencing parameter. Some of them use level electricity prices to investigate the unit root 
in their series and show that the characteristics of electricity prices are very different from 
those of financial assets (DeVany and Walls, 1999; Leon and Rubia, 2001; Atkins and Chen, 
2002; Rypdal and Lovsleten, 2013); most of them consider the characteristics of the 
electricity prices similar to financial assets and use returns as the main variable in their 
modelling and their results demonstrate that nonstationarity in electricity prices differs with 
respect to market and time framework (Weron and Przybylowicz, 2000; Weron, 2002; 
Simonsen, 2003; Norouzzadeh et al., 2007). Another branch of the literature focus on 
comparing several electricity markets in Europe and US based on their degree of long 
memory (Koopman et al., 2007; Park et al., 2006; Koopman et al., 2007; Alvarez-Ramirez 
and Escarela-Perez, 2010) and mainly find that the prices are nonstationary and that in some 
of them fractional differencing exists. 
                                                             
the Marmara region stay out of the MOC due to their relatively high marginal generation costs. Operators 
responsible for the realization of the merit order curve ignore the geographical location of the hydropower plants 
and accept / realize the output of the hourly MOCs for the next day to generate electricity at lower prices. On 
March 31, the electricity transmission system is collapsed due to the unbalancement in the transmission lines. 
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The literature most similar in spirit to ours are the ones focusing on testing basic finance 
theories through using long memory correlation structures. Uritskaya and Serletis (2008) 
compare the market efficiencies in Alberta and Mid-C markets using detrended fluctuation 
analysis and spectral exponents. Sapio (2004) finds that long-term correlation structure 
exists in electricity prices and that can be explained by bidding strategies of market 
participants. He notes that institutional setting is very important in shaping participants’ 
behaviour and illuminates the relationship between bidding rules and ways of processing 
past information. In terms of considering time of the day, Erzgraber et al. (2008) study long-
term memory in the Nord Pool market and find the memory parameter varies greatly with 
respect to the time of the day. 
3.3. Hypothesis Development 
Hypothesis-1: If marginal generators bid at their marginal costs, then the off-peak price 
does not display a fractal pattern.  
The off-peak hour strategy for generators is to bid at marginal cost (Von der Fehr and 
Harbord, 1993). If generators use the off-peak strategy and marginal cost is constant, then 
marginal generators are assumed to have no long-term memory since their own cost 
information is constant. This situation is also an indicator for Fama’s weak-form efficient 
market hypothesis. If the electricity market is efficient in weak form for each time zone, then 
prices should not have a long-term correlation structure. Hence, current prices cannot be 
predicted by using information on past prices. 
Hypothesis-2: If marginal generators use hyperbolic bidding rules, then the peak-
load price should be represented by a long memory process and the day-ahead market will 
not be efficient in weak form.   
The peak-hour strategy for generators is to bid above marginal cost (Sapio, 2004), since the 
risk of not being selected is low due to high demand. Thus, at peak load, marginal generators 
are assumed to give hyperbolically decaying weights to information by considering past 
electricity prices.  
Hypothesis-3: If shocks to electricity prices are permanent, then the price series for 
each time zone should exhibit the long memory property.  
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The presence of fractal patterns in each time zone has important implications for public 
policy design and effectiveness. First, given the strong influence of the energy sector on 
other sectors of the economy, if shocks to electricity prices are permanent, then such 
“innovations” may be transmitted to other sectors of the economy as well as to 
macroeconomic variables. Second, the fractal dynamics of electricity prices are crucial to 
the design and the effectiveness of public policies. In particular, if electricity prices exhibit 
long-term correlation structure, then related public policies will tend to have long-lasting 
effects. In contrast, if electricity prices do not suggest a fractal pattern, then such policies 
will have only transitory effects (Lean and Smyth, 2009; Gil-Alana et al., 2010; Pereira and 
Belbute, 2012; Apergis and Tsoumas, 2012).  
 
Based on our hypothesis, we propose the research model in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Fig. 3.1: Research Model 
 
3.4. Data and Preliminary Analysis 
The data used in this study consists of day-ahead prices from 00:00 on December 1, 2011 
(establishment of the GOP), through 24:00 on April 15, 2014 from the electricity market in 
Turkey, taken from the market maker (PMUM). This gives us 857 observations for each 
time zone.  
Most studies on analysing fractal dynamics of spot electricity prices take the daily 
average of hourly prices or returns. We thoroughly examine this approach by analysing the 
spectral density of hourly level electricity prices as illustrated in Figure 3.2 in which the 
most dominant cycles are observed to be approximately 8, 12, 24 and 48 hours. Thus, we 
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propose to use average price of each time zone i (PTF_Ti) since 1) we do not want to lose 
information about the microstructure of day-ahead prices, as would be the case were we to 
use daily averaging 2) previous studies considering each hour separately concludes that there 
exists a block-structured cross-correlation structure between specific hours referring to the 
time zones 3) taking average with respect to each time zone is more intuitive in the sense 
that electricity market participants have different incentives and bidding strategies for each 
time zone. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2: Raw periodogram of hourly prices from 00:00 on December 1, 2011, to 24:00 on 
April 15, 2014 with bandwidth 0,000134 
 
 
Logarithm of PTF_Ti (LNPTF_Ti) are presented in Figure 3.3 and its descriptive statistics 
and test results are illustrated in Table 3.1. 
 
 
3.5. Methodology and Results 
3.5.1. Fractal Parameters 
 
The main characteristic of a fractal noise is to remain similar when viewed at different scales 
of time or space. This implies the following statistical properties: 1) a hyperbolically 
decaying ACF and 2) a specific relation between frequency (f) and size (S) of process 
variation. Hurst (H), differencing (d), power exponent (β) and scaling exponent (α) are the 
most commonly used fractal parameters. The Hurst coefficient is the probability that an 
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event in a process is followed by a similar event, which measures the intensity of long-range 
dependence in a time series6.  
Broadly we can classify the differencing parameter estimation methods into two groups; 
parametric and semiparametric. In the parametric fractal analysis methods all the parameters 
are simultaneously estimated mostly through a likelihood function. Within the second group 
of estimators a periodogram based approach is used (Geweke and Porter-Hudak, 1983; 
Reisen, 1994; Robinson, 1995b).  
 
3.5.2. Fractal Analysis Approach 
 
As a general fractal analysis strategy, it is important to remember that none of the fractal 
parameter estimation procedures mentioned below is superior to the others (Stadnitski, 
2012). Simulation studies on fractal analysis have demonstrated that the performance of the 
various methods depends very much on aspects such as the complexity of the underlying 
process or the parameterizations (Stadnytska and Werner, 2006). As a result, comprehensive 
strategies are required to correctly estimate fractality parameters. Firstly it is very important 
to distinguish between stationary and nonstationary processes since some fractal analysis 
approaches have stationarity assumption or are more efficient for stationary processes. 
Traditionally, researchers chose the differencing parameter, d, as an integer (generally 1) to 
guarantee that the resulting differenced series is a stationary process. In our fractal analysis 
approach, we propose to check the unit root by a combination of PP and KPSS tests as 
suggested in (Bailie et al., 1996) and look for indication of fractality since unit root tests 
                                                             
6 It was first introduced by Hurst (1951) in hydrological analysis. For both white and brown noises the Hurst 
coefficient (H) is 0.5; for fractal noise, H=1. The differencing parameter is another fractal parameter, proposed by 
Granger and Joyeux (1980) and Hosking (1981, 1984). They show that if -0.5<d<0.5, then the process is covariance 
stationary and the moving average coefficients decay at a relatively slow hyperbolic rate compared with the 
stationary and invertible autoregresssive moving average (ARMA) process (Bailie et al., 1996). If 0<d<0.5, then 
the process is stationary with a finite long memory property. If 0.5≤d ≤1, then the series is nonstationary (Beran, 
1994; Brockwell and Davis, 2002). The power exponent is determined by examining the spectral density function, 
which describes the amount of variance accounted for by each frequency that can be measured. The analysis of 
power distribution represents the analysis of variance (ANOVA) in the way that the overall process variance is 
divided into variance components due to independent cycles of different length (Stadnitski, 2012). If the power 
spectrum of a set of data is plotted on a log-log scale, the logarithmic power function of fractal noise is expected to 
follow a straight line with slope -1 for pink noise. The scaling exponent (α) represents the self-similarity of pink 
noise and fractality can be expressed by the following power low: F (n) ∝ nα with α=1. If α is 1.5, then the process 
is brown noise. To summarize, the theoretical parameter values of pink noise are d=0.5, β=1, α=1 and H =1 (Warner, 
1998). 
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often lack the power to distinguish between a truly nonstationary (I(1)) series and a 
stationary series with a structural break. If the combination of unit root tests indicate fractal 
behaviour then visual detection methods can be used to ensure the existence of long memory 
in the data. After getting a first impression of long memory characteristics of the data 
visually, one can use appropriate parametric and semiparametric long memory estimation 
methods to find the degree of fractality in the data.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.3: Panel 1: Time series plot of LNPTF_T1 from December 1, 2011, to April 15, 2014. 
Panel 2: Time series plot of LNPTF_T2 from December 1, 2011, to April 15, 2014. Panel 3: 
Time series plot of LNPTF_T3 from December 1, 2011, to April 15, 2014. Note: LNPTF_Ti 
is the logarithm of average price of time zone i. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statisticsand test results. Notes: JB is the value of the Jarque-Bera 
statistic of the price residuals. Q (20) and Q2 (20) are Ljung-Box statistics for the price 
residuals and the squared price residuals for up to 20th-order serial correlation, respectively. 
*** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. ** indicates 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. * indicates rejection of the null 
hypothesis at the 10% significance level. LNPTF_Ti is the logarithm of average price of time 
zone i.  
 
 
 LNPTF_T1 LNPTF_T2 LNPTF_T3 
# of observ. 867 867 867 
Mean 5.095 5.067 4.787 
Min 4.029 4.22 3.268 
Max 7.06 6.215 5.336 
Std. dev. 0.1995 0.1591 0.2491 
Skewness 0.277 -0.1777 -1.46 
Kurtosis 18.18 8.764 7.742 
JB 8330.139*** 1204.967*** 1120.507*** 
ARCH(10) 389.2607*** 498.3533*** 480.2928*** 
Q(20) 1433.03*** 3497.096*** 1918.531*** 
Q2(20) 1362.056*** 3408.895*** 2087.08** 
 
 
3.5.2.1. Unit Root Tests 
 
There are three unit root tests commonly used to test the stationarity of a process: 1) the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, 2) the Phillips–Peron (PP) test and 3) the 
Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test. ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and PP 
(Philips, 1987; Philips and Peron, 1988) test the null hypothesis d=1 against d=0. However, 
Schwert (1987) noted that when the true generating process is an I(1) process with a large 
negative moving average coefficient, the performance of the ADF and PP tests is poor, due 
to their rejecting a unit root too often in favour of an I(0) stationary process. Thus, if we wish 
to test stationarity as a null and have strong priors in its favour, employing the ADF test may 
not be useful (Bailie et al., 1996). An empirical series with d close to 0.5 will probably be 
misclassified as nonstationary. In contrast, the KPSS test assumes that process is stationary 
(H0: d=0) (Kwiatkowski, Philips, Schmidt and Shin, 1992).  
Therefore, we use a combination of the PP and KPSS tests allowing us to determine the 
four possible outcomes of the series (Bailie et al., 1996): 1) if the PP is significant and the 
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KPSS is not, then the data are probably stationary with d ∈ (0;0.5)—strong evidence of a 
covariance stationary process; 2) if the PP is insignificant and the KPSS is significant, then 
the data may indicate having brown noise—a strong indicator of a unit root, i.e., an I(0) 
process; 3) if neither the PP nor the KPSS is significant, then the data are insufficiently 
informative regarding the long memory of the process; and 4) if both the PP and the KPSS 
are significant, then the data are not well described as either an I(1) or an I(0) process—d ∈ 
(0; 1). 
Table 3.2 presents the unit root tests for logarithm of level prices without/with a trend. 
In Table 3.2, the p-values ppp <0.01 and pKPSS <0.01 are observed for the analysed series, 
indicating that the electricity price averages for each time zone are not well described as 
either an I(1) or an I(0) process which means the differencing parameter, d, is not an integer 
but between 0 and 1.  
 
Table 3.2: Unit root tests for logarithm of level prices with and without a trend. Notes: *** 
indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. ** indicates rejection 
of the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis 
at the 10% significance level. LNPTF(Ti) is the logarithm of average price of time zone i. 
 
 LNPTF(T1) LNPTF(T2) LNPTF(T3) 
KPSS (without trend) 0.74*** 0.45*** 1*** 
PP (without trend) -427.77*** -231.55*** -240.98*** 
KPSS (with trend) 0.11*** 0.24*** 0.48*** 
PP (with trend) -16.37*** -11.59*** -11.96*** 
 
3.5.2.2. Visual Detection of Long-term Correlation Structure 
 
The second step in our proposed fractal analysis approach is to visually examine the rate of 
the series’ autocorrelation function and logarithmic power spectrum. For fractal series, we 
expect a slower hyperbolic decay of autocorrelations in autocorrelation function (ACF) 
(Beran, 1994). Figure 3.4 illustrate the ACF of the LNPTF_Ti and squared-prices for each 
time zone. There is a slow decay of the autocorrelations, and they are positive and significant 
even at high lags, which is an indicator of the finite long memory typical of fractal noise. 
Only weekly seasonality (lags 7, 14, 28) appears in the data, which means that considering 
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the average price of each time zone eliminates most of the intraday seasonality problem in 
both level prices and volatility.  
 
Fig. 3.4: Autocorrelation function of LNPTF_Ti and square of LNPTF_Ti for 28 lags. Note: 
LNPTF_Ti is the logarithm of average price of time zone i. 
 
Figure 3.5 presents the autocorrelations of first differenced price series. After taking 
the first differences of the series, most of the autocorrelations at different lags are negative, 
which is an indicator of over differencing. This plot confirms the observation made above 
regarding the existence of long-term correlation structure in level prices. As a result we use 
level electricity prices instead of first differenced prices for the following reasons: 1) the 
results presented in Table 3.2, Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 provide evidence that the price 
series do not contain a unit root and would be over differenced if we used the first differenced 
series which is an indicator for fractal behaviour; 2) in a statistical sense, level prices are 
more informative than differenced prices; 3) in the case of electricity, there are in fact no 
actual returns (as a result of first differencing) because of the nonstorability of electricity; 
and 4) the Hurst coefficient might be biased due to the expected antipersistence of the first 
differenced series. 
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Fig. 3.5: Autocorrelation function of first differenced LNPTF_Ti. Note: LNPTF_Ti is the 
logarithm of average price of time zone i. 
 
However, studies show that the sample ACF should not be used as the only visual 
tool to detect fractality. Agiakoglu and Newbold (1992) have shown that a substantial part 
of the slow decaying pattern can originate from the slow rate of convergence of the sample 
mean. Thus we also use Rescaled range (R/S) and Power spectral density (PSD) analyses to 
ensure the existence of fractality in our data. Mandelbrot and Van Ness (1968) and 
Mandelbrot and Wallis (1969) extended Hurst’s study and proposed R/S analysis. In a log-
log R/S plot, if the slope of the straight line is more than 0.5, then the series has a long 
memory property. If the slope is less than 0.5, the series is antipersistent. R/S statistic can 
detect long memory in highly non-Gaussian time series with large skewness and kurtosis 
(Mandelbrot and Wallis, 1969). It has been pointed out by Lo (1991) that R/S analysis can 
be affected by non-stationarities and spurious short-term correlations. In this study we 
employ the R/S procedure suggested by Beran (1994), Taqqu and Teverovsky (1998) and 
Taqqu et al. (1995). Figure 3.6. illustrates the R/S analysis result of average electricity prices 
for time zone T2.7  
                                                             
7 Since the appearance of the figures for the other time zones are similar, they are omitted from the text. 
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Fig. 3.6: Rescaled range analysis result of LNPTF_T2 Note: LNPTF_T2 is the logarithm of 
average price of time zone 2. 
 
The slopes are far from 0.5, which is an indicator of long memory. To eliminate the 
sample size problem of R/S analysis, we investigate the electricity price data with least 
absolute deviation (LAD) regression integrated into the aforementioned procedure to get a 
robust estimate of the long memory parameter. The results using LAD regression are 
presented in Table 3.3 and are similar to those of least square (LS) regression. We can 
conclude that the long memory parameter estimates found by R/S analysis are robust to 
outliers in the data. 
 
Table 3.3: Hurst coefficient estimates using R/S analysis. Note: LNPTF_Ti is the 
logarithm of average price of time zone i. 
 
 LNPTF_T1 LNPTF_T2 LNPTF_T3 
R/S estimate with LS 0.7616 0.8390 0.817 
R/S estimate with LAD 0.7564 0.8308 0.830 
 
 
PSD analysis is a periodogram based visualization technique which uses various data 
transformations such as detrending or filtering. The performance of PSD estimators thus 
depends greatly on the manipulations employed (Delignières et al., 2006; Stadnitski, 2012). 
If the negative slope is approximately 1 then this is an indicator for long memory. In addition 
to ACF and R/S, we apply PSD analysis to see if there is a difference between the results of 
trended and detrended data. The negative slopes (?̂?PSD) are nearly 1 for all series. The 
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logarithmic power spectrum of the series is presented in Figure 3.7 and seems to be 
compatible with the long memory property. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.7: Results of PSD analysis of all series. Logfreq denotes the logarithmic power 
spectrum of the series. Note: LNPTF_Ti is the logarithm of average price of time zone i. 
 
3.5.2.3. Fractal Parameter Estimation for Conditional Mean 
 
Lastly, after visual detection of long-term correlation structure by ACF, R/S and PSD 
analysis, we ensure the existence and degree of fractality with respect to each time zone by 
using parametric and semiparametric estimation methods. In this study we estimate the 
differencing parameter for the conditional mean through Geweke–Porter-Hudak (GPH), 
Sperio estimator (FDSperio), local Whittle estimator (FDWhittle), Detrended Fluctuation 
Analysis (DFA) and Autoregressive Fractionally Integrated Moving Average (ARFIMA). 
We adopt these methods to benefit from their different statistical properties; namely GPH’s 
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common usage and comparability with the literature, FDSperio’s usage of smoothed 
periodogram function instead of spectral density function, FDWhittle’s parametric 
efficiency and consistency, DFA’s performance for nonstationary series and ARFIMA’s 
efficiency for series consisting both long and short memory characteristics. We use the 
algorithm of Taqqu et al. (1995) to estimate GPH, algorithms of Reisen (1994) and Taqqu 
and Teverovsky (1998) to estimate FDSperio and FDWhittle correspondingly. Besides we 
use the algorithm of Peng et al. (1994) to estimate DFA and fast and accurate algorithm of 
Haslett and Raftery (1989) to estimate d in ARFIMA.  
The GPH, the oldest periodogram-based semiparametric estimator, is introduced by 
Geweke and Porter-Hudak (1983). The GPH estimator is based on the regression equation, 
using the periodogram function as an estimate of the spectral density (Geweke and Porter-
Hudak, 1983; Robinson, 1994; Taqqu et al., 1995; Lobato and Robinson, 1996).  
The FDSperio is also a periodogram-based method and was proposed in order to 
improve the GPH estimator. It takes advantage of the Reisen (1994) algorithm to estimate 
the fractal parameter d in the ARFIMA (p,d,q) model. It is based on the regression equation, 
using the smoothed periodogram function as an estimate of the spectral density.  
The FDWhittle is one of the most commonly used parametric periodogram-based 
Whittle estimators. It was proposed by Whittle (1953) and modified by Künsch (1987), 
Robinson (1995b) and Taqqu and Teverovsky (1998). One of the advances of the Whittle 
Estimator is that it is consistent and asymptotically normal for nonstationary and unit root 
cases (Phillips and Shimotsu, 2004). Whittle's method fits the parameters of a specified 
spectral density function(SDF) model to data by optimizing an appropriate function using 
an estimate of the SDF for an input time series.  
Another method we use to detect long memory is DFA which was proposed by Peng et 
al. (1994) based on the relationship F(n) ∝ nα. DFA analysis performs better for detecting 
the long memory property in nonstationary series.8 Hu et al. (2001) focus on the effect of 
trends on DFA, while Kristoufek (2010) examines finite sample properties and confidence 
intervals of DFA. In DFA, if there is a straight line with slope 0.5, then the series is white 
noise. If the slope is greater than 0.5, then the series is persistent. If the slope is less than 0.5, 
                                                             
8 See Grech and Mazur (2005) for a discussion of the statistical properties of old and new techniques in 
detrended fluctuation analysis of time series. 
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then the series is antipersistent. We apply the DFA estimator on both the trended and 
detrended data to investigate the effects of trends on detecting long memory. 
ARFIMA is the most frequently used parametric method with the ability to estimate the 
short- and long-memory parameters jointly (Reisen et al., 2001; Sowell, 1992b). Its main 
disadvantages are that it is valid only for stationary series and needs a sufficiently large 
sample size for acceptable measurement accuracy (Stadnitski, 2012; Stadnytska and Werner, 
2006). Its validness only for stationary series can lead to situations where nonstationary 
processes are classified as having long memory. The exact maximum likelihood (EML) 
method introduced by Sowell (1992a), the conditional sum of squares (CSS) approach 
proposed by Chung (1996) and the approximate method likelihood (AML) method 
introduced by Haslett and Raftery (1989) are commonly used to estimate the fractional 
differencing parameter in ARFIMA models.  
Semiparametric estimates (PSD, DFA and HurstSpec) are converted to d̂ to make the 
comparison of results clearer, and illustrated in Table 3.4. The estimates range from 0.40 to 
0.7 depending on the tariff zone, except for those of the DFA. The interpretation of fractal 
dynamics is clearer for time zones T1 and T3 since the range of the parameters is between 
0.4 and 0.6 for most of the estimators. However, the fractal estimates for time zone T2 are in 
the critical region between fractional integration and nonstationarity. We take the first 
difference of the T2 series for the sake of eliminating the potential nonstationarity in that 
series. As illustrated in Table 3.5, the T2 series does not exhibit long memory after taking 
the first difference, which indicates that electricity prices in time zone T2 do not have long 
memory. 
The deficiency of the semiparametric methods is to overestimate fractality in time series 
that contain both long- and short-range components. Due to larger biases, the precision of 
semiparametric methods is distinctly inferior to that of the ARFIMA approaches. Since the 
values obtained for T1 and T3 are all smaller than 0.6, the preceding analyses do not allow 
rejecting the hypothesis of fractality for the T1 and T3 series. Therefore, ARFIMA analysis 
appears to be appropriate for the T1 and T3 series. The comparison of different ARFIMA 
models is analysed using Akaike information criteria (AIC); a summary of the results is 
presented in Table 3.6. T1 and T3 exhibit the long-term memory property using models 
ARFIMA (0, 0.4090, 0) and ARFIMA (1, 0.3202, 0) respectively. In summary, the time 
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zones defined in the multi-time tariff mechanism are found to have different fractal 
dynamics. 
 
Table 3.4: Long memory tests for log prices in converted measures. Notes: *** indicates 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. ** indicates rejection of the 
null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 
the 10% significance level. LNPTF_Ti is the logarithm of average price of time zone i. 
 
  LM MEASURES 
 Vrb. DFA FDSperio FDGPH FDWhittle HurstSpec ModR/S 
LNPTF_T1 Pt 0.5278 0.4692 0.5020 0.4145 0.5991 1.9054* 
 Pt
2 0.5199 0.4569 0.4983 0.3959 0.5929 1.9164* 
LNPTF_T2 Pt 0.6893 0.6675 0.5292 0.5240 0.5956 1.8218 
 Pt
2 0.6846 1.1847 0.5341 0.5140 0.6020 1.8141 
LNPTF_T3 Pt 0.5652 0.4489 0.4991 0.5643 0.5756 2.2477** 
 Pt
2 0.5788 0.4637 0.5203 0.5725 0.5876 2.2541** 
 
 
Table 3.5: Long memory tests for diff-LNPTF_T2 prices in converted measures. Notes: 
DIFF_LNPTF_T2 is the first differenced LNPTF_T2. LNPTF_Ti is the logarithm of 
average price of time zone i 
 
  LM MEASURES 
 Vrb. DFA FDSperio FDGPH FDWhittle HurstSpec ModR/S 
DIFF_LNPTF_T2 Pt 0.1181 -0.2073 -0.3668 -0.47160 -0.3855 1.0462 
 
 
3.5.2.4. Fractal Parameter Estimation for Conditional Variance 
 
Studies by De Lima and Crato (1994), Ding, Granger and Engle (1993) and Harvey (1993) 
all reported the apparent presence of long memory in the autocorrelations of squared returns 
of various financial asset prices. Long memory in volatility is an indicator of uncertainty and 
risk (Kasman and Torun, 2007; Kasman et al., 2009; Barkoulas et al., 2000; Ural and 
Kucukozmen, 2011). There are different approaches to measure the long memory in 
volatility. Some of the previous studies use the square of the returns of assets as an artificial 
variable and apply semiparametric methods to this variable to find the fractal parameter for 
process volatility. However, as noted by Wright (2002), the fractal parameter d is 
underestimated when using this approach. Thus we use the parametric fractionally integrated 
generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (FIGARCH) estimator introduced 
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by Bailie et al. (1996) to eliminate the deficiency of using square of the returns. Estimation 
results are illustrated in Table 3.7. Among the FIGARCH models, we chose for consideration 
the one with the lowest AIC. The volatility of T1 and T2 does not seem to exhibit long 
memory with significant (approximately 1) d estimates, which indicates that there is an I(1) 
process in volatility and that the T3 series has a long memory property in volatility. 
 
Table 3.6: Estimation results of the ARFIMA models. Notes: μ is the time series mean. ξ is 
the fractional differencing parameter. Ln (L) is the value of the maximized Gaussian 
likelihood. JB is the value of the Jarque-Bera statistic of the price residuals. Q (20) and Q2 
(20) are Ljung-Box statistics for the price residuals and the squared price residuals for up to 
20th-order serial correlation, respectively. *** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 
the 1% significance level. ** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% significance 
level. * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% significance level. LNPTF_T i 
is the logarithm of average price of time zone i. 
 
 
 LNPTF_T1 
(0, ξ, 0) 
LNPTF_T3 
(1, ξ, 0) 
μ 5.083 4.79 
α1 - 0.33 
ξ 0.40*** 0.32*** 
ln(L) 361.74 292.39 
AIC -716.72 -571.26 
Skewness 0.38 -1.16 
Kurtosis 24.83 8.64 
JB 17214.27*** 1345.05*** 
Q(20) 305.07*** 106.18*** 
Q2(20) 114.70*** 83.52*** 
ARCH(10) 95.71*** 70.34*** 
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Table 3.7: Estimation results of the FIGARCH models. Notes: μ is the time series mean. d 
is the fractional differencing parameter. ln (L) is the value of the maximized Gaussian 
likelihood. JB is the value of the Jarque-Bera statistic of the price residuals. Q (20) and 
Q2(20) are Ljung-Box statistics for the price residuals and the squared price residuals for up 
to 20th-order serial correlation, respectively. *** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis 
at the 1% significance level. ** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level. * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% significance level. 
LNPTF_Ti is the logarithm of average price of time zone i. 
 
 
 LNPTF_T1 LNPTF_T2 LNPTF_T3 
 FIGARCH 
(1,d,0) 
FIGARCH 
(1,d,0) 
FIGARCH 
(1,d,1) 
μ = C 5.11*** 5.10*** 4.84*** 
ω =A 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 
α1 -0.14*** -0.16*** 0.11*** 
β1 - - 0.52*** 
d 0.99*** 0.94*** 0.47*** 
ln(L) 378.39 581.95 170.94 
AIC -748.79 -1155.91 -331.88 
BIC -729.73 -1136.85 -308.05 
Skewness -0.75 -0.51 -0.86 
Kurtosis 5.65 7.27 5.61 
JB 337.35*** 697.37*** 353.96*** 
Q(20) 1026.54*** 1689.58*** 956.45*** 
Q2(20) 188.50*** 8.14 15.2484 
ARCH(10) 84.67*** 3.36 5.9687 
 
Results of our hypothesis tests are summarized in Table 3.8.  
 
Table 3.8: Summary of Hypothesis Tests 
 
  
HYPOTHESES 
 
RESULTS 
H1 If marginal bidders bid at their marginal costs, then the off-peak 
price does not display a fractal pattern. 
H1 is not supported. 
H2 If market is efficient at peak time, then peak-load price does not 
display a fractal pattern.  
H2 is supported. 
H3 If shocks to electricity prices are permanent, then the price series for 
each time zone should exhibit the long memory property. 
Shocks to electricity prices not 
permanent for T1 and T3, not 
permanent for T2. 
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3.6. Concluding Remarks 
We empirically investigate three propositions considering the presence of long-term 
correlation in day-ahead electricity prices for each time zone in a multi-time tariff setting. 
The results obtained provide new information on the fractal behaviour of electricity prices 
considering different time zones. We have reached the following main conclusions: 
Analysing the fractal dynamics of electricity prices is very complicated because of 
the unique characteristics of electricity, and requires elaborate strategies. Numerous 
procedures have been developed for estimating the fractal parameters β, α, H and d. 
Approaches aimed at detecting long memory in the conditional mean and variance have been 
developed independently of each other; however, long-term correlation structure is often 
observed in both the conditional mean and variance. Thus, we investigated the presence of 
the long memory property in both the conditional mean and variance for each time zone. 
Moreover the crucial steps of a fractal analysis approach customized to capture electricity 
price dynamics are demonstrated elaborately.  
Considering time zones in electricity price analysis is very intuitive and important. 
Our results suggest that the fractal dynamics of electricity are different for each time zone. 
Long-memory parameters are found to be significantly different from zero for the 
conditional mean, indicating long-term dependence for time zone 1. This confirms the 
proposition that at peak load, marginal generators may give hyperbolically decaying weights 
to information by considering the prices of a day/week before. We also show that the T3 
price series has a long memory property in both level and volatility. T2 price series, however, 
does not have long memory in either level or volatility. It is nonstationary but mean 
reverting.  
Implications of the propositions can be different for each time zone. Positive and 
significant fractional differencing coefficients of the mean for the T1 series suggest that 
marginal generators exhibit hyperbolic information processing, which supports Proposition 
1. Further, since there exists long-term correlation structure, future prices are predictable 
from past prices, and the market is not efficient in weak form in the T1 time zone. This 
structure also indicates that exogenous shocks/innovations can have permanent effects on 
prices. Thus, the effectiveness of price policies for T1 is expected to be high.  
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Interpretation of the long-term correlation structure is different for the T3 time zone, 
where the demand for and price of electricity is low. In this time zone, only the base load 
power plants (thermal, hydropower plants without dams, and renewable) offer to the market. 
To rank along the merit order curve, base load power plants are expected to offer at their 
marginal costs. Since demand is uncertain, participants face a trade-off between submitting 
a high but risky bid, and a safer but potentially less profitable low bid. If marginal generators 
bid at their marginal costs, they are expected not to bid hyperbolically and not to have long 
memory. However, we find that off-peak fractional differencing coefficients are 
significantly greater than zero, which can be taken as evidence that bidding above marginal 
cost occurs even off-peak. This finding further suggests that the market is not efficient in 
weak form and that future prices are predictable from past prices. Moreover, exogenous 
shocks can have permanent effects on prices.  
T2 is the peak-load time zone, where demand is very high and the probability of not 
being on the merit order curve is very low, even for high bids. Thus, at peak load, marginal 
generators would be expected to give hyperbolically decaying weights to information by 
considering the prices of a day/week before. However, our findings suggest that the T2 price 
series does not display a long memory property in either level prices or volatility. This 
finding suggests that marginal generators do not consider past information in their bidding 
processes and offer at their marginal costs. Further, since long-term correlation structure 
does not exist, future prices are not predictable from past prices, and the market is weak-
form efficient in T2. This finding also indicates that innovations to the market can have 
temporary effect for the T2 time zone. 
3.7. Suggestions for Future Research 
Developing approaches more robust to skewed distributions for the conditional mean would 
provide an opportunity on relaxing the normality assumption. Developing new electricity 
market monitoring indexes considering the time zones would result in interesting policy 
implications. Furthermore considering the fractal dynamics of electricity prices at different 
time scales, one would reduce the prediction confidence intervals. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Managing Price Modelling 
Risk with Ensemble 
Forecasting9 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Electricity day-ahead (EDA) auctions play a central role for the sustainability of electricity 
markets since they reveal the reference price for all market participants. In emerging 
markets, since the number and variety of hedging tools are limited, for market participants 
accurate forecasting becomes the most essential tool for managing spot price risk. On the 
other hand designing a market with a proper transparency level is one of main 
responsibilities of the policy-makers to let market participants generate reasonable forecasts 
using public information.  
Especially after the well-known California crisis in the 2000s, the number of studies on 
day-ahead price forecasting increased substantially, as the need for such studies became 
apparent (e.g. Borenstein, 2002; Borenstein and Bushnell, 2000; Borenstein et al., 2002). 
Since the storability of electricity is limited, electricity prices reveal characteristics that 
                                                             
9Parts of this Chapter appeared in the following conference proceeding:  
Avci, E., Bunn, D.W., Ketter, W. & van Heck, E. (2017). An Ensemble Approach to Forecast Electricity Day Ahead 
Auction Prices: Experiences from the Turkish Market. Institute for Operations Research and the Management 
Sciences (INFORMS). Houston, Texas, United States. 
Avci, E., van Heck, E. & Ketter, W. (2017). Forecasting prices in electricity day-ahead auctions: An overview of the 
Turkey market. In 5th International Symposium on Environment and Energy Finance Issues (ISEFI-2017), Paris, 
FRANCE. 
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differ from other commodities and present specific forecasting challenges. Studies focus first 
on the basic characteristics of electricity, namely non-storability and inelasticity of 
supply/demand (Geman and Roncoroni, 2006; Lucia and Schwartz, 2002), and then examine 
spikes, nonstationarity and mean reversion (Haugom et al., 2011; Knittel and Roberts, 2005). 
However there are still three challenges that needs to be dealt with in electricity price 
forecasting (Weron, 2014).  
The first one is a methodological issue, the risk of selection of an inappropriate 
forecasting model.  Although various individual forecasting methods are suggested in the 
literature, none of them has been proven to be superior (Chen and Bunn, 2010; Weron, 2014), 
and the performance of individual models depends on the periods being considered and the 
characteristics of market (Aggarwal et al., 2009). To compensate for the weaknesses of each 
individual method, the combined forecasting approach was developed (Crane and Crotty, 
1967; Bates and Granger, 1969). The main advantage of combining forecasts is not that the 
ex-post performance of best ensembles are better than that of best individuals, but that it is 
less risky to ensemble forecasts than to select ex-ante one individual forecasting method 
(Hibon and Evgeniou, 2005). Although ensemble approach has been well-studied in other 
contexts (Stock and Watson, 2004; Timmerman, 2006), the number of combined forecasting 
studies relating to electricity markets is limited (Weron, 2014). The existing studies are 
mostly on electricity load forecasting (e.g. Bunn, 1975, 1977; Taylor, 2010). In the context 
of day-ahead price forecasting, leading point forecasting studies are, Bordignon et al. (2013) 
and Nowotarski et al. (2014), both of which are of mature electricity markets (the UK and 
Nord Pool). The recent few studies (e.g. Maciejowska et al., 2016; Gaillard et al., 2016; 
Maciejowska and Nowotarski, 2016) focus on probabilistic forecasting and are from the 
results of the GEF2014 probabilistic forecasting competition in which US zonal prices are 
used. One of the main findings of these papers is that analysis of different market conditions 
can provide important insights in terms of comparing individual and ensemble models.  
Second challenge is a more market-specific one which is the appropriate selection of 
exogenous variables (e.g. Keles et al., 2016), since the quality and availability of public data 
(transparency level of the market) and their influence on price may differ depending on the 
market studied (Aggarwal et al., 2009; Von der Fehr, 2013). Including exogenous variables 
(e.g. demand) generally increases the accuracy of price forecasts. However, when the 
number of exogenous variables is increased, the probability of data quality issues and access 
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problems can increase, and may lead to even worser price forecasts. Therefore, in devising 
a sound process for selecting variables the features of the market need to be taken into 
account. 
The last challenge is catching market-specific multi-seasonality (e.g. Janczura et al., 
2013) characteristics of the spot price. Multi-seasonality is defined as having simultaneously 
daily, weekly and annual components. The annual seasonality is more difficult to detect, as 
it is masked by more irregular patterns, and it is often ignored in studies as it is generally 
believed to add complexity to already parsimonious models (Weron, 2014; Nowotarski and 
Weron, 2016). The problem of daily seasonality is solved by either taking daily averages or 
modelling each hour separately (Misiorek et al., 2006; Karakatsani and Bunn, 2008, 2010). 
Since predictability level (and thus market efficiency) of electricity prices can change over 
the course of the day, choosing forecasting models by considering fractal properties is very 
important (Avci-Surucu et al., 2016). The dual-calendar effect is another factor that 
influences prices in countries which follow both the Hijri and Gregorian calendars for 
holidays (De Livera et al., 2011).  
In this research our aim is to examine the performance of carefully selected individual 
and ensemble models in the emerging EDA market of Turkey. It provides several challenges 
for forecasters. First, since it is an emerging market, hedging possibilities are limited, 
forecasting becomes the foremost important tool to manage spot price risk for power agents. 
As stated in Hong (2015), even one percent decrease in short term price forecasting error 
could result in a hundred thousands of profit per year for a medium sized utility. Even worse, 
as in most of the emerging markets, there is no information transparency platform from 
which market participants can obtain relevant data easily and use them in order to decrease 
their forecast errors. This makes the Turkey DAM a semi-transparent one in terms of 
information dissemination10. Secondly, there is no nuclear power plant and therefore it will 
eases the horizontal shift of the base load in the hourly merit order curve. Third, there is no 
gas forward market as gas prices are regulated by the government, therefore it is more 
difficult to catch the trend seasonality by calculating the marginal costs of bidders. Fourth, 
the observance of multiple religious holidays in Turkey means that dual-calendar seasonal 
                                                             
10 Details about the transparency level is given in Section 3.  
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effects can be found and this situation complicates modelling seasonality component. Lastly, 
bids by the state-owned hydropower plants (PP) have a crucial impact on the shape of the 
merit order curve, therefore appropriate selection of the exogenous variables relating to 
supply stack characteristics becomes vital. Thus, our main research question is How to 
manage price modelling risk via ensemble forecasting in the Turkish EDA auctions'. In sum, 
we aim to develop well-performing ensemble forecast models for an emerging market and 
compare their performance with alternative individual models. This will enable us to address 
some of the shortcomings of existing ensemble modelling studies, specifically the 
inadequate handling of trend seasonality component, the inappropriate selection of 
exogenous variables when one considers the relationships that exist between price and 
system constraints, and the methodological similarity of the individual models they have 
considered. We contribute to the energy economics literature on both theoretical and 
practical dimensions. Firstly, regarding the variety and type of individual models, ours is 
one of the first studies to include a long-term seasonality component for ensemble forecasts 
and to provide evidence of their performance. Secondly, since all of the previous ensemble 
forecasting studies of electricity price are from well-developed markets (such as the UK and 
Nord Pool) and ours is the first to look at a developing market with a semi-transparent 
structure, our findings may be informative for market participants and policy-makers in other 
developing markets with similar transparency features. Lastly, this forecasting study is also 
pioneering in terms of the Turkish electricity market since it is the very first to examine EDA 
auction prices after the establishment of the Day-Ahead Market (DAM) in 2012.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly explain the 
theoretical framework of the individual and ensemble models that we adopt for this study. 
Section 3 illustrates the conceptual background related to general processes and fundamental 
drivers of the clearing price in day-ahead auctions. Section 4 describes the data and its 
temporal properties, Section 5 explains the theoretical framework and presents the results, 
and Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of the findings and suggestions for future 
research. 
 
 
43 
 
4.2. Theoretical Framework 
We consider three classes of individual models; econometric time series, artificial neural 
networks and seasonality models; which are chosen by virtue of their suitability for catching 
the specific features of the price dynamics of EDA auctions and also for minimizing the 
methodological similarities between them guided by the previous literature. We aim to 
understand how their forecasting performance changes according to the particular electricity 
market. We derive our ensemble models by using equally weighted means which has been 
highly advocated (Makridakis et al., 1998; Stock and Watson, 2004). All the models (both 
individual and ensemble) are executed with a set of explanatory variables which are carefully 
selected from the literature due to their fundamental relation with auction mechanism of the 
day-ahead markets and their correlation with the clearing price (Karakatsani and Bunn, 
2008; Nan, 2009).  
 
4.2.1. Exogenous Variables Affecting Auction Prices 
 
The selection of exogenous variables is a crucial step for developing forecasting models. 
Market characteristics, nonstrategic uncertainties, other stochastic uncertainties, behavioural 
indices, and temporal effects are main classes of input variables effecting electricity prices 
(Karakatsani and Bunn, 2008). Historical electricity prices (e.g. price lags of 1–7, 14, 21, 28 
or 364 days) are the most extensively used variable. Due to its strong correlation with price, 
demand is the next most often used input variable. There are different approaches to using 
demand in the models, namely demand forecasts made by Independent System Operator 
(ISO) (e.g. Nan, 2009; Bordignon et al., 2013), in-house demand forecasts (e.g. Georgilakis, 
2006; Mandal et al., 2006) and historical demand data (e.g. Weron, 2006). Since storage of 
electricity is limited, variables that indicate stochastic uncertainties (e.g. system constraints) 
can be very useful for modelling the spikes or extreme conditions. Reserve margin (the 
difference between available capacity and demand) (Eydeland and Wolyniec, 2003; Harris, 
2006) and reserve margin ratio (the ratio of demand divided by available capacity, and is 
also an indicator of safe functioning of power system) (Anderson and Davison, 2008; Cartea 
et al., 2009; Davison et al., 2002; Maryniak, 2013; Maryniak and Weron, 2014) are two of 
the most commonly used system capacity constraint variables. Another possible explanatory 
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variable is temperature as it is strongly correlated to demand (Mandal et al., 2006; Guo and 
Luh, 2003, 2004). However, if demand can be forecasted accurately, the explanatory power 
of temperature can be ignored considering the data quality and accessibility issues. The 
marginal costs of market participants affect their bidding strategies and shape (i.e., 
steepness) of the merit order curve. Thus natural gas and oil prices have also been used to 
explain prices (Guo and Luh, 2003, 2004; Gao et al., 2000; Zhang and Luh, 2005; Bordignon 
et al., 2013). Importance level of these exogenous variables for electricity prices may change 
according to the market design and characteristics, and their effect may be limited (Weron, 
2014). For the UK market, for example, whilst Bordignon et al. (2013) find demand and gas 
price to have significant effects on the UK spot electricity prices. Maciejowska (2014) finds 
these fundamental variables to have only minor effects. Therefore optimal selection of 
exogenous variables depends on the characteristics of the market, the type of model used, 
data access11, heuristics, and experience of the modeller12.  
 
In this research, to select the appropriate exogenous variables we follow the approach 
of Weron (2006, 2014), Karakatsani and Bunn (2008) and Bordignon et al. (2013), and use 
only publicly available explanatory data even though we also have access to insider 
information. We have three reasons for this; first, we are looking at how these methods are 
used by energy experts in the market and policy-makers; second, it allows us to compare our 
forecast accuracy results with the previous studies; and third, although we have access to 
insider information (the level of all dams with reservoirs, forecasted geospatial temperatures) 
we prefer not use these data, due to the data being of poor quality and not available until 
relatively late (usually not before the gate’s closure in the day-ahead market). From these 
variables we chose the ones which have been most widely used in the literature and which 
are most relevant for the Turkish electricity market. We run each model with and without 
exogenous variables to see the effect of adding explanatory variables on performance. The 
exogenous variables (X) used in the models are summarized in Table 4.1. 
 
 
                                                             
11 For a detailed discussion, see Weron (2014) and Aggarwal et al. (2009). 
12 For a detailed discussion, see Amjady and Hemmati (2006). 
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Table 4.1: Exogenous variables used in the models 
 
Variables Description Notation and lags 
Forecasted demand (d) Day-ahead demand forecast published by the 
system operator  
𝑑𝑡−𝑗 (j=0, 1, 2, 3, 7, 14, 21, 
28) 
Margin (m) Available capacity (generation, surplus) – demand 
forecast 
𝑚𝑡−𝑖 (i=0, 1, 2) 
Day-specific dummy Three dummy variables for Saturday, Sunday and 
Monday, separately 
𝐷𝑠𝑎𝑡, 𝐷𝑠𝑢𝑛, 𝐷𝑚𝑜𝑛 
Holiday dummy  Dummy variable for official and religious holidays 𝐷ℎ𝑜𝑙 
 
 
4.2.2. Individual Forecasting Methods 
 
In the following subsections, we briefly explain the parametric and nonparametric methods 
that are adopted in this reserach for generating individual forecast models. 
 
4.2.2.1. Econometric Time Series Models 
 
Econometric time series methods forecast the current price by using a mathematical 
combination of historical prices and/or historical or current values of exogenous variables. 
Although these methods are not good for spiky periods, they perform well in terms of 
capturing the general patterns in electricity price data (Weron, 2014). 
 
(Seasonal) ARMA models (SARMA) 
If the dependence on the past prices is likely to occur at certain seasonal lag s, it is 
appropriate to introduce autoregressive and moving average polynomials that identify with 
the seasonal lags. The resulting seasonal autoregressive moving average model is ARMA 
(P;Q)s, which can be written as Φ𝑃(𝐵
𝑠)𝑥𝑡 = Θ𝑄(𝐵
𝑠)𝜔𝑡 , where Φ𝑃(𝐵
𝑠)𝑥𝑡 = 1 − Φ1B
s −
Φ2B
2s − ⋯ − Φ𝑝B
Ps, and Φ𝑄(𝐵
𝑠)𝑥𝑡 = 1 + Φ1B
s + Φ2B
2s + ⋯ + Φ𝑄B
Qs are the seasonal 
autoregressive operator and the seasonal moving average operator of orders P and Q, 
respectively, with seasonal period s. SARIMA models are most often used as a benchmark 
in electricity price literature. The following AR formula gives a general expression of the 
model structure adopted in this study: 𝑝𝑡 =  ∅1𝑝𝑡−1 +  ∅2𝑝𝑡−2 + ∅3𝑝𝑡−3 + ∅4𝑝𝑡−7 +
∅5𝑝𝑡−14 + ∅6𝑝𝑡−21 + ∅7𝑝𝑡−28 + 𝜓1𝑑𝑡 + 𝜓2𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝜓3𝑑𝑡−2 + 𝜓4𝑑𝑡−3 + 𝜓5𝑑𝑡−7 +
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𝜓6𝑑𝑡−14 + 𝜓7𝑑𝑡−21 + 𝜓8𝑑𝑡−28 + 𝛿1𝑚𝑡  + 𝛿2𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝑚𝑡−2 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑠𝑎𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐷𝑠𝑢𝑛 +
𝛾3𝐷𝑚𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼1𝐷ℎ𝑜𝑙  where 𝑝𝑡−𝑖 denotes the i
th lag of the clearing price which represents the 
autoregressive effects of the previous days, 𝑑𝑡−𝑖 is for the i
th lag of the demand forecast 
where i=0 represents the demand forecast for the next day. 𝑚𝑡−1 is for the i
th lag of margin 
variable where i=0 represents the planned margin for the next day. 𝐷𝑠𝑎𝑡 , 𝐷𝑠𝑢𝑛 , 𝐷𝑚𝑜𝑛 are 
dummy variables for days Saturday, Sunday and Monday to consider the weekly seasonality. 
The dummy variable 𝐷ℎ𝑜𝑙  refers to the official and religious holidays in the whole data set. 
The orders of our models are identified through Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
investigation of the residual diagnostics.  
 
4.2.2.2. Artificial Intelligence (AI) Models 
 
AI methods model price processes using non-parametric approaches. Due to their flexibility 
and their ability to handle complexity and non-linearity they have been preferred by many 
authors (e.g. Catalao et al., 2007; Pino et al., 2008; Vahidinasab et al., 2008) for short-term 
price forecasting. Despite their popularity for individual modelling, there is still an open 
question for their performance in emsemble models (Keles et al., 2016) with and without 
exogenous variables. We use the nonlinear autoregressive exogenous (NARX) AI method 
which have been proposed by Lin et al. (1996). These recurrent networks also have very 
good learning capabilities and generalization performance (Weron, 2014) and have shown 
that they can greatly improve performance on long-term dependency problems. They relate 
the current value of a time series both to past values of the same series and to current and 
past values of the exogenous variables. NARX can be written implicitly as 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐹 ( 𝑦𝑡−1, 𝑦𝑡−1, 𝑦𝑡−3, ⋯ , 𝑢𝑡 , 𝑢𝑡−1, 𝑢𝑡−2, 𝑢𝑡−3, ⋯ ) + 𝜀𝑡,  
where 𝑢 are the exogenous variables and 𝜀 is the error term. The function F is a neural 
network. An NAR (p,P,k)m model has inputs (𝑦𝑡−1, 𝑦𝑡−2, ⋯ , 𝑦𝑡−𝑝, 𝑦𝑡−𝑚, 𝑦𝑡−2𝑚, 𝑦𝑡−𝑝𝑚) and 
k neurons in the hidden layer. For this model we use a feed-forward single layer algorithm 
NARX.  
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4.2.2.3. Seasonality Models 
 
Adequate treatment of seasonality in electricity prices is of utmost importance for 
developing sound forecasting models (Janczura et al., 2013; Lisi and Nan, 2014) There are 
different approaches to modeling seasonality such as piecewise constant/sinusoidal 
functions and wavelets. A failure to acknowledge seasonality or to handle it appropriately 
can significantly reduce the accuracy of the model (Ketter et al., 2009; 2012; De Livera, 
2011). For short term electricity price forecasting; although daily and weekly components 
have been taken into account, long-term component has been neglected due to the general 
belief that it adds unnecessary complexity to already parsimonious models (Weron, 2014). 
However, recently Nowotarski and Weron, 2016 have shown that taking the LTSC 
component into account in short term electricity price forecasting can significantly improve 
the model performance and create a natural opportunity to include them in ensemble 
forecasts. This can be done in a number of ways; polynomial and sinusoidal regression, 
polynomial kernel regression, linear regression and smoothing splines, filters, state space 
models etc. (for details see Hydman et al., 2002; De Livera, 2011; Lisi and Nan, 2014). After 
a thorough review of this extensive literature we adopt two of the recently developed, state 
space based models, namely Exponential smoothing state space (ETS) and Trigonometric 
Box-Cox Transformed ARMA errored Seasonal (TBATS) models, by virtue of their ability 
for handling complex seasonal patterns existing in electricity prices.  
Hydman et al. (2002) have expanded earlier work by Ord et al. (1997) on special types 
of innovation state-space models which underlie exponential smoothing models and have 
developed a new and more general set of methods which bring exponential smoothing into 
the same class as ARMA models. These are known as exponential smoothing state-space 
models (ETS). For this research we utilise the algorithm of Hydman et al. (2002) to estimate 
the parameters of our ETS models. 
Commonly used seasonality models, single seasonal exponential smoothing 
(Makridakis et al., 1982; Makridakis and Hibon, 2000; Snyder, Koehler, and Ord, 2002) and 
second seasonal Holt–Winters (Taylor, 2003) methods cannot catch complex seasonal 
patterns such as non-integer seasonality and calendar effects, or time series with non-nested 
seasonal patterns. The nonlinear versions of the state space models can be unstable, as they 
have infinite forecast variances beyond a certain forecasting horizon, and analytical results 
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for the prediction distributions are not available (Akram et al., 2009). Thus we use the 
TBATS algorithm, introduced by De Livera et al. (2011), which is developed as an 
alternative estimation method to allow for non-integer seasonality and calendar effects, or 
time series with non-nested seasonal patterns; and handle a wider variety of seasonal 
patterns.  
 
4.2.3. Ensemble models 
 
The idea of ensemble forecasts was developed by Reid (1968, 1969) and Bates and Granger 
(1969), and has been extensively studied (e.g. Bunn, 1975, 1977; de Menezes et al., 2000; 
Timmermann, 2006; Altavilla and De Grauwe, 2010; Clark and McCracken, 2009). The idea 
behind ensemble forecasting techniques is straightforward: individual models have their own 
weaknesses and none of them is superior to the others. Ensemble forecasting enables us to 
compensate for the weaknesses of individual models. In general, an ensemble forecast 
including a set of K competing spot price predictors (?̂?𝑡
(1)
, … . , ?̂?𝑡
(𝐾)) can be written as: 
?̂?𝑡
(𝐶) = 𝑓 (?̂?𝑡
(1)
, … . , ?̂?𝑡
(𝐾);  𝜔 ) where 𝑓 is a generic function and ω is a parameter vector. 
Using linear functions, this expression can be written as ?̂?𝑡
𝐶 =  ∑ 𝜔𝑘  ?̂?𝑡
(𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1 . In general, 
weights 𝜔𝑘 can be constant or time-varying, 𝜔𝑡−𝑘. Several studies have shown that, due to 
the effect of finite-sample error in estimating the combining weights, an equally weighted 
mean is often the best choice (Clemen, 1989; Makridakis and Winkler, 1983; Smith and 
Wallis, 2009; Stock and Watson, 2004). Although ensemble forecasts have generally been 
shown in theoretical studies to outperform the individual methods (e.g. Chen and Yang, 
2007) they have not stood out in the context of electricity markets. The first ensemble 
forecasting studies in electricity markets were done by Bunn (1985) and Bunn and Farmer 
(1985), looking at load forecasting provided a theoretical discussion of the merits of 
ensemble modelling. Smith (1989) provides empirical evidence to show the superiority of 
forecast combinations of ARMA models over the individual ARMA models. Taylor and 
Majithia (2000) find that the performance of ensemble models differs with respect to the 
time of the day.  
The literature on ensemble modelling for electricity price forecasting is very rare. As 
far we know, there have been only three studies; Nan (2009), Bordignon et al. (2013) and 
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Nowotarski et al. (2014). Nan (2009) is the pioneer study in this area. She examines the UK 
market prices and uses 19 individual models which are derived from four basic models; 
namely linear regression, ARMAX, time-varying regression and Markov regime switching 
models. The author then selects subsets of individual models through using model 
confidence set and encompassing approaches. Her ensemble models outperform the 
individual ones in most cases. In a follow up study, with the same data set, Bordignon et al. 
(2013) examine the performance of ensemble models against five individual models; linear 
regression, ARMAX, time-varying regression and two Markov regime switching models 
and conclude that most ensemble models perform better than individual ones. Nowotarski et 
al. (2014) as an extension of these two studies, increased the number of considered markets 
(to Nord Pool, EEX and PJM), time periods and individual models (to AR- and mean 
reversion based) and similarly find supporting evidence for the outperformance of ensemble 
models. However they show that the performance of combined forecasts may differ with 
respect to the market considered and periods.  
In this study we aim to develop well-performing ensemble forecast models for an 
emerging market and compare their performances with competing individual models 
addressing some short comings of existing ensemble modelling studies. First, we increase 
the variety of considered individual models to minimize the methodological similarity 
between them. We extend the set of individual models to seasonality methods; which have 
not been considered by the prior literature; in virtue of their potential to describe some 
specific characteristics of electricity prices. We adopt ETS and TBATS seasonality models 
to take into account inadequate handling of trend-seasonality component and to deal with 
the complex multi-seasonality in electricity prices. Second we conduct the analysis 
following the literature which has found that price volatility, fractality, market efficiency, 
predictability of prices, costs and operational constraints differ for each hour/hour block 
during the course of a day (Shahidehour et al., 2002; Huisman et al., 2007; Avci-Surucu et 
al., 2016). Focus of the previous studies are on testing the performance of ensemble models 
for each hour separately (e.g. Huisman et al., 2007) or taking daily averages (e.g. Bunn, 
2004; Bunn and Karakatsani, 2003) . We rather stayed focus on the market efficiency and 
predictability of prices in a day and provide important insights on the performance of our 
models considering three different tariff time-zones – namely T1 (day): 06:00–17:00, T2 
(peak): 17:00–22:00, and T3 (night): 22:00–06:00, leading to three sets of parameters for 
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each day. Third, most of the previous studies are from well-developed markets; namely UK, 
Nord Pool and PJM. We extend these studies to an emerging market which has different 
price characteristics in terms of seasonality, spikes and fractality level. Thus we believe that 
our findings can be informative for the market participants/policy-makers in other 
developing markets with similar characteristics (e.g. share of renewables, natural gas etc.). 
Lastly, while testing the additional gains from ensemble modelling approach we also test the 
additional benefit from including exogenous variables considering the fundamental relations 
between price and system constraints through using a complete and big data set.  
4.3. Conceptual Background 
4.3.1. General Principles of the Market 
 
The general principles and processes of the DAM in Turkey is similar to most European 
electricity markets. Between 2012 and 2015 DAM was operated by Electricity Market 
Financial Reconciliation Centre (PMUM), and is currently operated by the Istanbul Energy 
Exchange (EXIST). Prices and volumes are determined each hour on a daily basis. Power 
plants are ranked on the basis of their bid prices, and a merit order curve is thus formed. The 
general shape of a supply stack in Turkey is demonstrated in Figure 4.1. In day-ahead 
auctions marginal generators are the ones that determine the clearing price. In Turkey, since 
the demand side is not actively managed, understanding the shape and order of plants in the 
supply stack is crucial for understanding price formation in this market.  
 
4.3.2. Information Transparency Level of the Market 
 
Until September 2015 information on the market-specific variables was made available by 
the Market Financial Settlement Centre (PMUM), then Istanbul Energy Exchange (EXIST) 
took over this responsibility and now disseminates both forecasted (ex-ante), real-time and 
realized (ex-post) data through its Market Transparency Platform in a timely manner. DAM 
related information revealed through the transparency platform and its details are illustrated 
in Tables 4.A.1 and Table 4.A.2. As can be observed from these tables, until the beginning 
of 2016 information transparency level of the market is low which can be defined as semi-
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transparent. EDA prices in our sample (January 2012-December 2015) were comprised of 
aggregation of expectations of market participants making decisions in such a transparency 
level. Thus to imitate the real decision-making setting of power agents, we utilize from only 
public data released during that time period.  
 
 
Fig. 4.1: Approximate supply stack on a sample day; 24/03/2015 (Source: Garanti Bank)13 
 
4.3.3. Fundamental Drivers of EDA Clearing Price in Turkey 
 
Changes in the supply and demand characteristics, market architecture and/or ownership 
structure can affect the dynamics of the clearing price in uniform-price auctions (Petrella 
and Sapio, 2012; Glachant and Saguan, 2007) and lead to structural breaks in the series. In 
this section we investigate these characteristics in the Turkish day-ahead market to 
understand whether there have been any structural breaks in the price series between 2012 
and 2015. The capacity mix in Turkey is not particularly well balanced and is mostly based 
                                                             
13   Transfer of operational rights (TOOR) provides for the transfer of operational rights relating to public assets 
(in this case the power generation and distribution assets of TEK, TEAŞ and TEDAŞ) to private management, 
along with new investment by the private sector, for the duration of the TOOR contract.  Build, operate and 
transfer (BOT) provides for the transfer of the asset to the State at the end of the contract period. Build, Own 
and Operate (BOO) which includes the transfer of the power stations to TEAŞ at the end of the contract period 
was withdrawn in order to reduce legal uncertainties and thereby improve the bankability of the projects. 
Autoproduction provides for the ownership and operation of power plants by industrial companies, primarily for 
their own electricity needs. 
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on fossil fuels, which constituted 67.7% of the total generation in 2015. Natural gas is the 
major fuel in electricity generation (38.6%), followed by coal (28.3%), and some fuel oil 
(0.8%). The capacity mix in Turkey can change year on year, owing to the seasonality of 
hydroelectric supply and availability of old lignite plants. Currently, generation activities are 
carried out by three parties: EUAS, private generators and auto-producers. In 2012, the share 
held by EUAS and its affiliates was 42% of the total installed capacity. In 2015 this state-
owned share decreased to 28% with a portfolio of hydroelectric and lignite power plants. 
IPPs and BOT, BOO and TOOR utilities are responsible for most of the power generation 
and hold 70% of the total capacity. The important issue here is that the privatized EUAS 
power plants were those that had not generally been marginal generators in the merit order 
curve. Therefore we can confidently state that there has not been any major change in 
industry structure that has led to a structural break in the price series.  
 
4.3.4. Electricity Price Forecasting Studies in Turkey 
 
There is an absence of substantial research on electricity price forecasting in Turkey and 
those studies that do exist are in the form of PhD theses or conference proceedings and 
represent the period before the day-ahead market was established. Hayfavi and Talasli 
(2014) model logarithmic daily average spot prices for electricity as the sum of a 
deterministic function and a multi-factor stochastic process. They do not use any exogenous 
variables. Their data interval runs from December 2009 to July 2011, which was the Day-
Ahead Plannning period and does thus not reflect the market regulations and conditions of 
the day-ahead market currently operating in Turkey. Yildirim et al. (2012) use dynamic 
regression, CMARS and RCMARS to forecast the next day’s electricity prices. They do not 
use any exogenous variables in their models. For their training data they use only one month 
of data because of the limitations in their RCMARS method, thus the validity of their results 
is questionable in the context of electricity markets. Kölmek and Navruz (2013) use ANN 
and AR methods to forecast the electricity prices with a training data interval running from 
December 2009 to November 2010. For the ANN model they use historical day-ahead 
prices, demand forecast, bilateral contact, and available capacity as exogenous variables, 
however, they do not use any exogenous variables for the AR model. The authors compared 
these two methods with respect to MAPE and conclude that performance of the ANN method 
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is higher than that of the AR. This study is valuable in the sense that it is the first published 
paper which uses ANN for electricity price forecasting in Turkey. However, it has some 
deficiencies. First, their data is from the day-ahead planning period and does not represent 
the current electricity market conditions. Second, they compare these two methods, one with 
exogenous variables and one without. It is known that models with exogenous variables tend 
to perform better than the ones without them, thus the validity of their performance 
comparison is also questionable.  
Unlu (2012) has studied the linear relationship between temperature and day-ahead 
electricity prices using a data set of 35 days. He investigate in particular the seasonality and 
predictability issue in temperature. In the final stage, in which linear models (AR and ARX) 
and 30 days training data are used, he attempts to predict the electricity price for the next 
five days. The drawback of this study is that it takes no account of the well-known nonlinear 
relationship between temperature and electricity prices, and thus concludes that there is no 
relationship between these two variables. From the studies undertaken up to now, it is very 
difficult to understand the general characteristics of electricity prices in Turkey and the 
driving factors behind them since all the studies use data sets from the day-ahead planning 
period, the training sets are not large enough for the results to be generalizable, and all have 
some methodological deficiencies.  
Ozyıldırım and Beyazit (2014) forecast the day-ahead electricity prices using linear 
regression and radial basis function with a data set from the period 2010-2013. They found 
that the out-of-sample performance of RBF is slightly better than that of linear regression. 
They use hourly MCP without logarithmic transformation and integration. Their exogenous 
variables are MCP lags, temperature, square of temperature (to deal with the nonlinearity 
issue) and hourly, daily, monthly, and holiday dummies. By using graphs and descriptive 
statistics, they showed that hourly MCP have distinct clusters with respect to time zones.  
 As far as we know the only study that reflects current market conditions is Taysi et al. 
(2015). They forecast MCP using SARIMA and ANN methods with exogenous variables: 
historical prices and calendar dummies. They showed that the performance of these two 
methods is very similar. The crucial deficiency of this study is that it uses 1, 2, 3, 4 lagged 
MCP as exogenous variables. This issue has been well-studied in the energy economics 
literature and has been found to run counter to the electricity market mechanism. Thus the 
models in this study cannot be implemented in real life since bidders do not know the prices 
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up to 24 hours ahead. Our examination of the literature on the Turkish electricity market 
shows that there are no electricity price forecasting studies that reflect current market 
conditions and mechanisms.  
4.4. The Data 
The data set used in this study consists of hourly day-ahead auction clearing price time series 
from the Turkey Electricity Market. The sample starts on 1 January 2012 and ends on 27 
December 2015 providing a total of 34.944 hourly observations. This period covers the time 
after the DAM in Turkey was established and does not have any significant structural 
changes in the market mechanism and auction design, until the launch of the Market 
Transparency Platform at the EXIST. The time series data set were obtained from the 
General Directorate of Energy Affairs at the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 
without any missing values or doubled values. Although in the literature some studies (e.g. 
Weron 2006) advocate the substitution of outliers with arithmetic averages of some 
neighbour values or the general mean, we intentionally did not pre-process the data set in 
terms of outliers to see the real performance of the artificial intelligence and seasonality 
models.  
 
4.4.1. Summary of Descriptives 
 
We conduct our analyses considering three tariff time zones T1 (day): 06:00–17:00, T2 
(peak): 17:00–22:00, and T3 (night): 22:00–06:00 where each time series has 1456 
observations. Figure 4.2 illustrates plots of each series and Table 4.2 gives summary 
statistics for each time zone. T3 series has the highest standard deviation and skewness, but 
the lowest mean. T1 and T2 series have similar statistical characteristics.  
 
4.4.2. Stationarity, Long-term Correlation and Predictability 
 
We investigate stationarity and predictability level of price series through their fractal 
dynamics since accurate measurement of fractality is crucial for correct statistical inference 
and forecast uncertainty (Lildholdt, 2000). We adopt the approach of Baillie et al. (1996) to 
check the unit root by a combination of PP and KPSS tests and look for indication of 
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fractality since unit root tests often lack the power to distinguish between a truly 
nonstationary (I(1)) series and a stationary series with a structural break. If the combination 
of unit root tests indicate fractal behaviour then one can use appropriate long memory 
estimation methods to find the degree of fractality in the data.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2: Time series plot of market clearing price with respect to three tariff time zones 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for three tariff time zones 
 
Variables Min. Max. Range Median Mean Var. Std.dev Skewn. Kurt. 
logPriceT1 3.53 7.06 3.53 5.13 5.09 0.05 0.22 -0.98 15 
logPriceT2 3.74 6.21 2.47 5.06 5.05 0.04 0.19 -0.66 6.8 
logPriceT3 1.79 5.38 3.58 4.82 4.75 0.11 0.33 -2.7 16 
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There are three unit root tests commonly used to test the stationarity of a process: 
1) the AugmentedDickey-Fuller (ADF) test, 2) the Phillips– Peron (PP) test and 3) the 
Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test. However if we wish to test stationarity 
as a null and have strong priors in its favour, employing the ADF test may not be useful 
(Baillie et al., 1996). An empirical series with d close to 0.5 will probably be misclassified 
as nonstationary. Therefore, we use a combination of the PP and KPSS tests allowing us to 
determine the four possible outcomes of the series (Baillie et al., 1996): 1) if the PP is 
significant and the KPSS is not, then the data are probably stationary with d ∈ (0;0.5)—
strong evidence of a covariance stationary process; 2) if the PP is insignificant and the KPSS 
is significant, then the data may indicate having brown noise—a strong indicator of a unit 
root, i.e., an I(0) process; 3) if neither the PP nor the KPSS is significant, then the data are 
insufficiently informative regarding the long memory of the process; and 4) if both the PP 
and the KPSS are significant, then the data are not well described as either an I(1) or an I(0) 
process—d ∈ (0; 1).  
Table 4.3 presents the unit root tests for logarithm of prices. As can be observed 
from the PP and KPSS values, price series for each time zone are not well described as either 
an I(1) or an I(0) process which means the differencing parameter (d) is not an integer but 
between 0 and 1. We estimate this differencing parameter through Geweke–Porter-Hudak 
(GPH) and Local Whittle estimator (Whittle). We adopt these methods to benefit from their 
different statistical properties; namely GPH’s common usage and comparability with the 
literature, Whittle’s parametric efficiency and consistency. As can be seen from Table 4.3, 
each price series has different fractal dynamics. T1 tariff zone has the lowest differencing 
average value (0.372) which indicates that it has the highest long-term correlation and prices 
in this tariff zone are the most predictable. T3 price series has the highest fractal value 
demonstrating that predictability level of prices in this tariff zone are the lowest. This 
confirms the proposition that at peak load (here T1 and T2), marginal generators give 
hyperbolically decaying weights to information by considering the prices of a day/week 
before (Sapio, 2004). At off-peak load, if marginal generators bid at their marginal costs, 
then there is no fractal noise, as we observed in the night tariff time zone T3.  
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Table 4.3: Unit Root results for logarithm of prices in three tariff time zones. Notes: PP null 
hypothesis: non-stationary, KPSS null hypothesis: stationarity. Avr. Fract.value is the 
average of the PP, KPSS, GPH and Whittle estimates for the corresponding row. *** 
indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. ** indicates rejection 
of the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis 
at the 10% significance level. 
 
 
Variables PP KPSS GPH Whittle Avr.Fract.value 
logPriceT1 -1259.6** 0.302* 0.450 0.295 0.372 
logPriceT2 -440.81** 0.476* 0.428 0.492 0.460 
logPriceT3 -345.2** 0.857** 0.477 0.567 0.522 
 
4.4.3. Multi-seasonality 
 
Multi-seasonality and complexity of the long-term correlation structure in electricity prices 
are two of the most important challenges for forecasters. Multi-seasonality is mainly shaped 
by the variation in demand. The daily cycle refers to variations between day and night and 
during the different points in the day. This daily variation in prices reflects the working 
habits of the population. To remove intra-day seasonality, it is possible to model each hour 
(or half-hour) of the day separately, as different commodities (Ramanathan et al., 1997; 
Guthrie and Videbeck, 2002) or by taking daily averages. However it has been shown that 
daily average prices do not capture the microstructure of the day-ahead auctions since the 
level of mean reversion, volatility structure and predictability (fractality) level in clearing 
prices are not constant throughout the day (Huisman et al., 2007; Avci-Surucu et al., 2016). 
Following the approaches of the aforementioned studies, for our modelling purposes we use 
the average price for each tariff time zone since first, we do not want to lose information 
about the microstructure of day-ahead prices, as would be the case were we to use daily 
averaging. Second, previous studies that have considered each hour separately conclude that 
there is a block-structured correlation between specific hours resembling the time zones. 
Third, taking average with respect to each time zone is more intuitive in the sense that 
electricity market participants have different incentives and bidding strategies for each time 
zone.  
The intra-week variability is also non-negligible. The load profile for Saturday and 
Sunday is generally lower than for the weekdays; this feature is called the weekend effect. 
Similar to the findings of Weron (2006), our results indicate that price characteristics for 
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Monday are different from those of other weekdays. There are two approaches in the 
literature to eliminate the intra-week seasonality; omitting the weekends and developing 
models only for weekdays (e.g. Bordignon et al., 2013) or introducing dummies for the 
weekends (and some of the days which have different characteristics from those of the rest 
of weekdays) (e.g. Weron and Misiorek, 2008). We follow the approach of the latter studies 
and introduce daily dummy variables for Saturday, Sunday and Monday.  
 Electricity prices also contain strong seasonal fluctuations (annual cycle), reflecting 
the use of lighting and heating in winter and the growing use of air conditioning in summer. 
To consider the effects of different profiles on official and religious holidays (calendar 
effects), we include holiday dummies for each of these days. This approach is commonly 
used in the electricity price forecasting literature as an alternative to removing these days. 
 
4.4.4. Selection and Description of Exogenous Variables 
 
Historical market clearing prices are the lagged values of MCP which are determined by 
means of the ACF and PACF graphs of electricity prices with respect to time zones. 
Forecasted demand is the hourly demand forecasts published each day by TEIAS for the 
next physical day. The prices strongly reflect the level of demand with very high peaks in 
winter and summer, especially during high-demand load periods. In the literature, for the 
demand variable, there are different approaches. Some researchers (e.g. Bordignon et al., 
2013) use forecasted demand published by the TSO and its lagged values, while others 
(Weron, 2006) use the forecasted demand by the TSO for the next day’s demand and take 
the realized load values for the lagged values. There are three types of information published 
on the webpage of the National Load Dispatch Centre: historical load data, forecasted load 
schedule and real-time load consumption. Since market participants are making their price 
forecasts based on forecasted demand and the merit order curves are aggregations of 
individual price expectations, we would expect there to be a higher correlation between price 
and forecasted demand. When we analyse the training data, as presented in Table 4.4, the 
correlation between price and forecasted demand is 0.604, which is slightly higher than the 
correlation between price and realized demand. Thus we choose to use forecasted demand 
data and its lagged values as one of the exogenous variables. Reserve Margin is the 
difference between the demand forecast and the Daily Production Program (The generation 
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values with respect to the settlement delivery point which a settlement aggregation entity 
(SAE) expects to realize in the following day and notifies the market operator at the 
beginning of day-ahead balancing stage, according to the obligations of the balance 
responsible party to which the SAE is attached). It can be seen from Table 4.4 that there is a 
significant relationship between margin and MCP, with a correlation level of 0.151. Natural 
gas prices have been used as an exogenous variable especially for markets in which there 
are natural gas exchanges and the share of natural gas in electricity production is high. Some 
of the previous studies utilize the daily forward gas as the forecasted gas price. However, 
when we analyse the training data, the price of natural gas has increased very slightly. Also 
there is no natural gas market in Turkey, and the price of natural gas is regulated by the 
government rather than randomly determined by a liberalized market. Thus we do not use 
the price of natural gas as an exogenous variable.  
 
Table 4.4: Correlation table for the exogenous variables. Notes: **Correlation is 
significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
 
 MCP For. Demand Margin Demand 
MCP 1    
Forecasted Demand .604** 1   
Margin -.151** -.515** 1  
Demand .602** .987** -.476** 1 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Data Partition 
 
For model validation purposes, the whole data set (January 1, 2012–December 31, 2015) is 
divided into two parts. The first part, training (in-sample) set, covering the period January 
1, 2012–December 31, 2014, is used only for regressor selection and model building. The 
remaining period, test set, (January 1, 2015– December 30, 2015) is used for out-of-sample 
forecast evaluation. Following the previous literature (e.g. Weron and Misiorek, 2008) all 
the series (clearing prices and exogenous variables) are considered using a logarithmic scale 
to obtain a more stable variance and have the opportunity to make our results comparable 
with the previous studies.  
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4.5.2. Experimental Framework for Comparing Forecast 
Accuracies 
 
4.5.2.1. Accuracy Measure 
 
We adopt the most commonly used accuracy measure (Weron, 2014) in the electricity 
pricing literature; the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE);  
𝑀𝐴𝑃𝐸 =  
100
𝑛
∑ |
𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝?̂?
𝑝𝑡
|
𝑛
𝑡=1
 
to compare the results of our models since we do not have any negative prices in our data 
set. It is important to note that we also got the results with Mean Square Error (MSE), Root 
Mean Square Error (RMSE) and Mean Absolute Error(MAE), however since results are 
similar, we omit them to save from space. 
 
4.5.2.2. Criteria for Comparing Model Performance 
 
We compare performance of the models according to three criteria. In the first criteria we 
adopt an ex-post approach in which we use out-of-sample MAPE values to compare the 
models. In this criteria, we take ARMA as the benchmark model and compare the 
performance of the individual and ensemble models within themselves. In the second 
criteria, we compare the ex-post performance of the best individual (BI) model with that of 
the best ensemble (BE) based on their out-of-sample MAPE values.  Although this criteria 
has been commonly used in the literature, it has also been criticized for not being a realistic 
forecasting setting. In the third criteria, we adopt a more realistic approach and decide the 
BI and BE based on in-sample MAPE values (ex-ante), then compare their performances 
using their out-of-sample MAPEs.  
 
4.5.2.3. Test for Statistical Significance 
 
To evaluate competing forecasting models, we use the Diebold-Mariano (DM) (Diebold and 
Mariano, 1995) test which verifies the existence of statistical significant difference between 
forecasting accuracy of two models. The test statistic is based on the loss differential dt which 
we take in this study as week-ahead forecast errors. The two-sided DM test evaluates the 
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accuracy of the competing forecasting models by testing the null hypothesis, (H0 : dt = 0), 
indicating there is no statistical significant difference between the compared two forecasting 
models. The alternative hypothesis is that the two forecasts have different levels of accuracy.  
 
4.5.3. Forecast Accuracy Comparison  
According to Criteria-1 
 
4.5.3.1. Accuracy Comparison of Individual Models 
 
Our findings are summarized in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. Table 4.5 presents the summary of 
individual models with the lowest forecast errors according to in-sample MAPE values. 
NARX outperforms other competing individual models in most of the cases (96%). T3 and 
T1 tariff time zones have the highest and lowest MAPE values, respectively. This is an 
expected result and can be explained by T3 having the lowest long-term correlation and T1 
having the highest. 
Table 4.6 illustrates summary of individual models with the lowest forecast errors 
according to out-of-sample MAPE values and their related DM test statistics according to 
Criteria-1. As can be observed from the table, especially for T2 and T3 series, dominant 
outperformance of NARX is replaced by ARMA-based and seasonality models. Similar to 
the results of Table 4.4, in most of the cases T3 has the highest MAPE values. Performance 
of ARMA is the one of the worst among the other competing individual models. Its MAPE 
value is the lowest in only 5 out of 48 cases (11%). NARX model has the lowest MAPE 
value in 14 out of 48 cases (30%) (mostly in T1 time zone), however accuracy difference is 
statistically significant in only 2% of them. ARMAX is the second best performer and 
outperformed the other individual models in 26% of the cases with a 5% ratio of significant 
cases. ETS, NAR, ARMA and TBATS are the following outperforming models with 15%, 
12%, 11% and 6% outperforming cases respectively. In sum, according to DM test, ARMA 
can be outperformed significantly in 15% of the cases. Models with exogenous variables 
generally perform better than models without exogenous variables. This finding is in line 
with the previous literature and arises because of the high cross-correlation between demand, 
margin and price. Further this result also shows the appropriate selection of our input 
variables.  
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Table 4.5: Summary of individual models with best performance according to in-sample 
MAPE 
 
 
WEEK 
NO 
T1 
training 
MAPE 
(in) 
T2 
training 
 
MAPE 
(in) 
T3 
training 
 
MAPE 
(in) 
MAX 
MAPE  
(in) 
MIN 
MAPE 
(in) 
Winter1 NARX 0. 145 NARX 0.250 NARX 0.449 T3 T1 
Winter2 NARX 0.149 NARX 0.257 NARX 0.467 T3 T1 
Winter3 NARX 0.138 NARX 0.248 NARX 0.451 T3 T1 
Winter4 NARX 0.133 NARX 0.237 NARX 0.445 T3 T1 
Spring1 NARX 0.139 NARX 0.219 NARX 0.481 T3 T1 
Spring2 NARX 0.135 NARX 0.240 NARX 0.453 T3 T1 
Spring3 NARX 0.135 NARX 0.220 NARX 0.477 T3 T1 
Spring4 NARX 0.130 NARX 0.223 NARX 0.476 T3 T1 
Summer1 NARX 0.172 NARX 0.265 NARX 0.496 T3 T1 
Summer2 NARX 0.178 NARX 0.275 NARX 0.593 T3 T1 
Summer3 NARX 0.180 NARX 0.285 NARX 0.309 T3 T1 
Summer4 NARX 0.180 NARX 0.279 NARX 0.310 T3 T1 
Autumn1 NAR 0.074 NARX 0.325 NARX 0.636 T3 T1 
Autumn2 NARX 0.192 NARX 0.312 NARX 0.660 T3 T1 
Autumn3 NAR 0.123 NARX 0.315 NAR 0.182 T2 T1 
Autumn4 NARX 0.180 NARX 0.285 NARX 0.676 T3 T1 
 
4.5.3.2. Accuracy Comparison of Ensemble Models 
 
Table 4.7 presents the summary of ensemble models with the lowest forecast errors 
according to in-sample MAPE values. ARMAXNARX outperforms other competing 
ensemble models in all of the cases (100%). T3 and T1 tariff time zones have the highest 
and lowest MAPE values, respectively. This is an expected result and can be explained by 
T3 having the lowest long-term correlation and T1 having the highest.  
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Table 4.6: Summary of individual models with best model performance (out-of-sample 
MAPE) and Diebold-Marino statistics and p values (second row) according to Critera-1. 
Notes: *** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. ** indicates 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. * indicates rejection of the null 
hypothesis at the 10% significance level. 
 
 
Table 4.8 illustrates summary of ensemble models with the lowest forecast errors 
according to out-of-sample MAPE values and their related DM test statistics according to 
Criteria-1. As can be observed from the table, especially for T2 and T3 series, dominant 
outperformance of ARMAXNARX is replaced by ensemble seasonality models such as 
ARMAXETS and ARMAXTBATS. Similar to the results of Table 4.7, in most of the cases 
T3 has the highest MAPE values. According to DM test results, these accuracy differences 
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are statistically significant in only in 9 out of 48 cases (19%). 45% of these cases are in the 
T3 zone indicating that for T3 price series, usage of ensemble seasonality models could be 
useful to increase forecast accuracy.  
 
Table 4.7: Summary of ensemble models with best model performance (according to in-
sample MAPE)  
 
WEEK 
NO 
T1-training MAPE 
(in) T2-training 
MAPE 
(in) 
T3-training MAPE 
(in) 
MAX 
MAPE 
(in) 
MIN 
MAPE 
(in) 
Winter1 ARMAXNARX 0.605 ARMAXETS 0.049 ARMAXNARX 1.326 T3 T2 
Winter2 ARMAXNARX 0.603 ARMAXNARX 0.715 ARMAXNARX 1.344 T3 T1 
Winter3 ARMAXNARX 0.591 ARMAXNARX 0.710 ARMAXNARX 1.342 T3 T1 
Winter4 ARMAXNARX 0.578 ARMAXNARX 0.704 ARMAXNARX 1.332 T3 T1 
Spring1 ARMAXNARX 0.578 ARMAXNARX 0.698 ARMAXNARX 1.324 T3 T1 
Spring2 ARMAXNARX 0.574 ARMAXNARX 0.698 ARMAXNARX 1.322 T3 T1 
Spring3 ARMAXNARX 0.575 ARMAXNARX 0.700 ARMAXNARX 1.343 T3 T1 
Spring4 ARMAXNARX 0.578 ARMAXNARX 0.704 ARMAXNARX 1.350 T3 T1 
Summer1 ARMAXNARX 0.674 ARMAXNARX 0.780 ARMAXNARX 1.566 T3 T1 
Summer2 ARMAXNARX 0.672 ARMAXNARX 0.783 ARMAXNARX 1.624 T3 T1 
Summer3 ARMAXNARX 0.685 ARMAXNARX 0.791 ARMAXNARX 1.499 T3 T1 
Summer4 ARMAXNARX  0.687 ARMAXNARX 0.791 ARMAXNARX 1.493 T3 T1 
Autumn1 ARMAXNARX 0.696 ARMAXNARX 0.835 ARMAXNARX 1.745 T3 T1 
Autumn2 ARMAXNARX 0.692 ARMAXNARX 0.839 ARMAXNARX 1.751 T3 T1 
Autumn3 ARMAXNARX 0.700 ARMAXNARX 0.847 ARMAXNARX 1.762 T3 T1 
Autumn4 ARMAXNARX 0.699 ARMAXNARX 0.834 ARMAXNARX 1.749 T3 T1 
 
 
ARMAXNARX model has the lowest MAPE value in 12 out of 48 cases (25%) (mostly 
in T1 time zone), however accuracy difference is statistically significant in only 16% of 
them. ARMAXETS is the second best performer and outperformed the other individual 
models in 21% of the cases with a 2% ratio of significant cases. ARMAXTBATS, 
ARMANAR, TBATSNAR and ETSNAR are the following outperforming models with 
15%, 11%, 11% and 8% outperforming cases respectively. In sum, according to DM test 
with 5% significance level, ARMA can be outperformed significantly in 19% of the cases, 
mostly for the T3 time zone. Models with exogenous variables generally perform better than 
models without exogenous variables.  
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Table 4.8: Summary of ensemble models with best model performance (out-of-sample 
MAPE) and Diebold Marino statistic and p values (second row) according to criteria1. Notes: 
*** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. ** indicates 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. * indicates rejection of the null 
hypothesis at the 10% significance level. 
  
 
 
4.5.4. Forecast Accuracy Comparison  
According to Criteria-2 
 
Our findings according to Criteria-2 are summarized in Table 4.9. In order to interpret the 
table, for example in T1-Winter1, ‘4-12’ means comparing the BI model 4 with BE model 
12. As can be observed from the table, the difference between the BI and BE is statistically 
significant in 9 out of 48 cases (19%). 70% of these significant cases are in the T2 zone. 
However BE model outperforms the BI in only 3 out of 9 significant cases (30%). These 
results indicate that, looking from an ex-post performance evaluation, using ensemble 
models does not increase price forecast accuracy significantly. On the contrary for the peak 
time load time (T2), in most of the cases, BI models significantly outperforms BEs.  
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Table 4.9: Summary of ensemble models with best model performance (out-of-sample 
MAPE) and Diebold Marino statistic and p values (second row) according to criteria2. Notes: 
Model no (1)ARMA (2)ARMAX (3)NAR (4)NARX (5) ETS (6)TBATS (7)ARMANAR 
(8)ARMAXNARX (9)ARMAETS (10)ARMAXETS (11)ARMATBATS 
(12)ARMAXTBATS (13)ETSNAR (14)TBATSNAR (15)ARMATBATSETS 
(16)ARMATBATSNAR (17)HYBRIDALL. *** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis 
at the 1% significance level. ** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level. * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% significance level. 
 
WEEK NO T1 DMTEST T2 DMTEST T3 DMTEST 
Winter1 4-12 
-0.536 
0.610 
3-7 
-3.693*** 
0.000 
1-9 
-1.821 
0.118 
Winter2 4-10 
1.881 
0.108 
4-13 
-0.539 
0.590 
1-7 
-0.782 
0.463 
Winter3 2-12 
-0.696 
0.512 
5-14 
0.806 
0.421 
2-12 -0.665 
0.530 
Winter4 3-8 
2.521** 
0.045 
4-8 
0.015 
0.987 
1-7 
1.165 
0.287 
Spring1 3-14 
-0.888 
0.408 
4-14 
-3.452*** 
0.001 
4-13 
-1.926 
0.102 
Spring2 3-8 
0.839 
0.433 
4-7 
1.615 
0.110 
3-8 
0.752 
0.480 
Spring3 4-8 
-0.909 
0.398 
5-10 
-5.712*** 
0.001 
6-12 
0.692 
0.514 
Spring4 4-13 
-0.195 
0.851 
6-10 
4.451*** 
0.001 
4-13 
1.220 
0.268 
Summer1 4-8 
0.011 
0.991 
1-11 
-0.602 
0.552 
5-10 
0.712 
0.502 
Summer2 2-14 
0.624 
0.555 
2-10 
-1.229 
0.264 
1-12 
-7.670*** 
0.000 
Summer3 2-8 
1.007 
0.352 
4-8 
2.767** 
0.0325 
2-10 
-2.718** 
0.034 
Summer4 5-10 
1.113 
0.308 
5-10 
0.668 
0.528 
5-13 
-0.225 
0.829 
Autumn1 2-12 
0.734 
0.469 
2-8 
-2.192** 
0.037 
3-13 
-1.436 
0.201 
Autumn2 2-12 
-0.616 
0.56 
1-15 
0.437 
0.677 
2-10 
-0.952 
0.377 
Autumn3 2-8 
-0.522 
0.619 
2-10 
0.227 
0.827 
4-7 
0.021 
0.984 
Autumn4 4-8 
0.417 
0.690 
6-11 
1.314 
0.236 
5-8 
0.205 
0.843 
 
4.5.5. Forecast Accuracy Comparison  
According to Criteria-3 
 
Our findings according to Criteria-3 are summarized in Table 4.10. As can be observed from 
the table, the difference between the BI and BE is statistically significant in 18 out of 48 
cases (38%). 45% of these significant cases are in the T2 zone. BE model outperforms the 
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BI in 14 out of 18 significant cases (75%). These results indicate that, looking from an ex-
ante performance evaluation, using ensemble models increase price forecast accuracy 
significantly in 30% of the cases. In the remaining 70% of the cases, there is no statistical 
significant difference between forecast accuracies of BI and BEs. Thus for a power market 
participant, looking from a more realistic ex-ante decision-making approach, using ensemble 
forecasting is useful to manage electricity price modelling risk.  
 
Table 4.10: Summary of ensemble models with best model performance (in-sample MAPE) 
and Diebold Marino statistic and p values (second row) according to criteria3. Note: Model 
no (1)ARMA (2)ARMAX (3)NAR (4)NARX (5) ETS (6)TBATS (7)ARMANAR 
(8)ARMAXNARX (9)ARMAETS (10)ARMAXETS (11)ARMATBATS 
(12)ARMAXTBATS (13)ETSNAR (14)TBATSNAR (15)ARMATBATSETS 
(16)ARMATBATSNAR (17)HYBRIDALL. *** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis 
at the 1% significance level. ** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level. * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% significance level. 
 
 
WEEK NO T1 DMTEST T2 DMTEST T3 DMTEST 
Winter1 
4-8 -1.2854 
0.246 
4-10 6.405*** 
0.001 
4-8 -1.247 
0.258 
Winter2 
4-8 1.2982 
0.241 
4-8 -7.252*** 
0.001 
4-8 -0.129 
0.901 
Winter3 
4-8 4.1369*** 
0.006 
4-8 6.819*** 
0.001 
4-8 0.766 
0.472 
Winter4 
4-8 2.1307* 
0.077 
4-8 0.015 
0.987 
4-8 1.992* 
0.093 
Spring1 
4-8 -0.727 
0.494 
4-8 -3.585*** 
0.001 
4-8 -2.610** 
0.040 
Spring2 
4-8 0.272 
0.794 
4-8 -5.305*** 
0.001 
4-8 -0.265 
0.799 
Spring3 
4-8 -0.90 
0.398 
4-8 -1.402 
0.165 
4-8 1.843 
0.115 
Spring4 
4-8 0.011 
0.991 
4-8 -0.116 
0.908 
4-8 -0.065 
0.950 
Summer1 
4-8 0.011 
0.991 
4-8 2.373** 
0.025 
4-8 0.234 
0.822 
Summer2 
4-8 1.873 
0.110 
4-8 2.767** 
0.032 
4-8 4.004*** 
0.007 
Summer3 
4-8 1.458 
0.195 
4-8 2.767** 
0.032 
4-8 2.878** 
0.028 
Summer4 
4-8 1.796 
0.122 
4-8 1.272 
0.250 
4-8 4.779*** 
0.003 
Autumn1 
3-8 2.684** 
0.012 
4-8 1.220 
0.232 
4-8 3.089** 
0.021 
Autumn2 
4-8 0.684 
0.519 
4-8 1.256 
0.255 
4-8 1.501 
0.183 
Autumn3 
3-8 2.736** 
0.034 
4-8 0.762 
0.474 
3-8 0.387 
0.711 
Autumn4 
4-8 0.417 
0.690 
4-8 1.001 
0.355 
4-8 0.261 
0.802 
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4.6. Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Work 
In this Chapter we examine the relative forecasting performances of six promising individual 
models and ensemble models derived from them through equal weighting scheme in a semi-
transparent EDA market. Although ensemble models are well studied in other contexts, the 
number of these studies are very limited for the electricity markets. Previous studies are from 
mature electricity markets (UK, Nord Pool and PJM) and variety of individual methods used 
for the ensemble models in them are limited. Following the main findings of these studies; 
namely performance of ensemble models are different for different market conditions, time 
periods and model combinations; we develop well-performing ensemble forecast models for 
an emerging market, Turkey, and compare their performance with alternative individual 
models according to three benchmark criteria. This enables us to address three forecasting 
challenges which have been encountered in the previous ensemble modelling studies, 
specifically the inadequate handling of trend seasonality component and varying market 
power over the course of a day, the inappropriate selection of exogenous variables when one 
considers the relationships that exist between price and system constraints, and the 
methodological similarity of the individual models they have considered.  
We addressed the following research question: How to manage price modelling risk via 
ensemble forecasting in the Turkish EDA auctions? 
We compare performance of the models according to three criteria. In the first criteria, 
we take ARMA as the benchmark model and compare the performance of the individual and 
ensemble models within themselves according to both in-sample and out-of-sample MAPE 
values. In the second criteria, we compare ex-post performance of the best individual (BI) 
model with that of the best ensemble (BE) based on their out-of-sample MAPE values. In 
the third criteria, we adopt a more realistic approach and decide the BI and BE based on in-
sample MAPE values (ex-ante), then compare their performances using their out-of-sample 
MAPEs.  
According to Criteria-1, regarding the individual models, we find that although NARX 
outperforms other competing individual models in most of the cases (96%) with respect to 
in-sample MAPE; for out-of-sample MAPE, dominant outperformance of NARX is replaced 
by ARMA-based and seasonality models. However, according to DM test with 5% 
significance level, ARMA can be outperformed significantly in only 15% of the cases. 
69 
 
Regarding the ensemble models, considering in-sample MAPE, ARMAXNARX 
outperforms other competing ensemble models in all of the cases (100%). For out-of-sample 
MAPE, dominant outperformance of ARMAXNARX is replaced by ensemble seasonality 
models such as ARMAXETS and ARMAXTBATS. According to DM test with 5% 
significance level, ARMA can be outperformed significantly in only 19% of the cases, 
mostly for the T3 time zone. According to Criteria-2, the difference between the BI and BE 
is found to be statistically significant for 19% of cases. 75% of these significant cases are in 
the T2 zone. These results demonstrate that, looking from an ex-post performance 
evaluation, using ensemble models does not increase price forecast accuracy significantly. 
According to Criteria-3, which is the most realistic decision-making setting among the other 
two criteria, we find that the difference between the BI and BE is statistically significant for 
30% of the cases. BE model outperforms the BI for 65% of these significant cases. These 
results indicate that, looking from an ex-ante performance evaluation, using ensemble 
models increase price forecast accuracy significantly in 30% of the cases. In the remaining 
70% of the cases (after subtracting BI significant cases), there is no statistical significant 
difference between forecast accuracies of BI and BEs. Thus for a power agent, looking from 
a more realistic ex-ante decision-making approach, using ensemble models can be very 
useful to manage price modelling risk. Thus our findings support the additional benefits of 
ensemble forecasts especially according to an ex-ante (more realistic) decision-making 
setting and in line with the previous findings indicating ensemble modelling is less uncertain 
and more accurate than the ex-ante best individual model. 
 
4.6.1. Managerial and Policy Implications 
 
For a power agent, using ensemble models can be useful to manage electricity market 
price risk and lead to better decisions on corporate risk management.  
Electricity price forecasts are used by power agents as one of the main input variables 
for evaluating their corporate risk levels (Conejo et al., 2010; Shahidehpour et al., 2002). In 
forecasting, uncertainty is reflected in the forecast error and the source of risk arises from 
the unobservability of full information set underlying the individual forecasts which could 
be differently affected by statistical properties of the related price series (Timmerman, 2006). 
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Therefore using ensemble forecasting could mitigate this risk related to decision making of 
a power agent (Bunn, 1985).  
Considering fractal dynamics of price could improve decision making of power agents.  
We find that for both individual and ensemble models, in most of the cases T3 (night 
tariff time zone) has the highest MAPE values. This can be explained by the lower 
predictability level of this price series compared to T1 and T2, and the stronger impact of 
seasonality factors on demand during the night. Thus if fractal dynamics of price is 
prominently different for some time zones during the course of a day, ensemble modelling 
is less risky than individual models in terms of the risk of selection of an inappropriate 
individual forecasting model. Further, choosing ensemble models based upon the fractal 
dynamics of each time zone could improve power agents forecast accuracy. 
Increasing transparency level of the market through disseminating data on primary 
resource based available installed capacity and planned generation schedules could 
enhance predictability level of prices, especially for off-peak load periods.  
We find that models with exogenous variables generally perform better than models 
without exogenous variables. This finding is in line with the previous literature and arises 
because of the high cross-correlation between demand, margin and price. Further this result 
also shows the appropriate selection of our input variables. On the other hand we find that 
T3 price series has lowest level of predictability and no long-term correlation indicating that 
marginal bidders bid at their marginal costs (Sapio, 2004). This means if a power agent 
attempts to forecast the prices for off-peak hour, s/he needs prior information on primary 
resource based available installed capacity (the active power capacity that a generation unit 
can provide to the system) and final daily production program (firm-level) to understand the 
possible future supply stack for each hour and estimate technology of the marginal generator.  
 
4.6.2. Suggestions for Future Work 
 
In emerging markets, from which most of them are semi-transparent, since market data is 
very limited for price forecasting, market participants tend to utilize from international data 
provider consultancy firms to get information which is not public. The type of data they seek 
for is usually on the planned generation schedules of large firms, dam level of some state-
owned hydropower plants (for Turkey case), primary resource based available installed 
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capacity and final daily production program (firm-level) and matching quantities(ex-post) 
on the hourly merit order curve. We call this type of data private (not insider) since it does 
not include any firm-level confidential data. Since most of the market participants do not 
have this information, the ones that have it can make a more fundamental analysis of the 
market, improve their forecast accuracies and beat the market. Based on this point of view, 
it would be interesting to examine the worth of this information to market participants 
considering the improvement in forecast accuracy of models (both individual and ensemble).  
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Appendix 4.A. 
Table 4.A.1: Data related to day-ahead auctions in Turkey. Note: Settlement aggregation 
entity (UEVCB): Active electric energy generating or consuming entities which are defined 
by market participants so that the settlement calculations can be made for each market 
participant. 
 
Class Type Name Abbr. Definition 
Gen. Planning Daily production 
program 
DPP  The generation values with respect to 
settlement delivery point which a settlement 
aggregation entity anticipates to realize in the 
following day and notifies the market operator 
at the beginning of day-ahead balancing stage, 
according to the obligations of the balance 
responsible party to which it is attached. 
Final daily 
production program 
FDPP  The generation or consumption values which a 
settlement aggregation entity expects to realize 
in the following day and notifies the system 
operator at the opening of the balancing power 
market according to the obligations of the 
balance responsible party to which it is 
attached and the result of day-ahead balancing 
Available installed 
capacity  
AIC  The active power capacity that a generation 
unit can provide to the system 
Real-time Real-time generation RGT  Hourly resource-based power generation 
Ex-post Injection quantity  
(settlement volume) 
IQ  Hourly injection of aggregate energy of the 
injection units (UEVCB)1 through a settlement 
period (In terms of the settlement delivery 
point, the reading values of the meters in the 
settlement aggregation entity configuration 
will be used as a basis in settlement 
calculations) 
Demand Forecast Demand forecast  DemFor The hourly consumption forecasts published 
on a daily basis for the next physical day 
Real-time  Consumption  Hourly real-time consumption 
Ex-post Withdrawal quantity   Hourly withdrawal of aggregate energy of 
withdrawal units through a settlement period 
Eligible customer 
withdrawal quantity 
(settlement 
withdrawal volume) 
 - 
Withdrawal quantity 
under supply 
liability  
 - 
Price Planning Interim market 
clearing price 
IMCP  Temporary hourly energy price which is 
determined within the objection period with 
respect to bids that are cleared according to 
total supply and demand 
Real-time Market clearing 
price 
MCP  Hourly energy price that is determined with 
respect to bids that are cleared according to 
total supply and demand 
Ex-post Trade value  Hourly aggregate of cleared bids and offers 
Price independent 
offer 
 Hourly aggregate of offer quantity at 0 
TL/MWh 
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Price independent 
bid 
 Hourly aggregate of bid quantity at 2,000 
TL/MWh 
Supply/demand MOC Hourly merit order curve 
Bid quantity   Hourly and block bid(purchase) quantity at 0 
TL/MWh 
Offer quantity   Hourly, block and flexible offer(sale) quantity 
at 2,000 TL/MWh 
Block bids  Aggregate quantity of cleared block bid that 
covers a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 24 
hours 
Block offers  Aggregate quantity of cleared block bid that 
covers a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 24 
hours 
Matching quantity   Hourly aggregate quantity of cleared bids  
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Table 4.A.2: Dissemination details for day-ahead auction data 
 
 
Name Responsible 
Institution  
Period 
of  
Time 
Publish  
Time 
Detail Public  
from 
DPP  TEIAS Hourly D-1 Firm1-level Aggregate-level: 
2011 
Firm-level: 2016 
FDPP  TEIAS Hourly D-1 Firm-level Aggregate-level: 
2011 
Firm-level: 2016 
AIC TEIAS Hourly D-1 Firm-level Aggregate-level: 
2011 
Firm-level: 2016 
RGT TEIAS Hourly Real-time Primary-
resource-
based 
2016 
IQ  TEIAS Hourly D+1 Primary-
resource-
based 
Aggregate-level: 
2011 
Primary-resource-
based:2016 
Demand Forecast  TEIAS Hourly D-1 Aggregate 2011 
Consumption TEIAS Hourly Real-time Aggregate 2016 
Withdrawal quantity TEIAS Hourly D+S Aggregate 2016 
Interim Market 
Clearing Price 
EXIST Hourly D-1 Aggregate 2016 
Market Clearing 
Price 
EXIST Hourly D-1 Aggregate 2011 
Trade value EXIST Hourly D-1 Aggregate 2011 
Price independent 
offer 
EXIST Hourly D-1 Aggregate 2016 
Price independent bid EXIST Hourly D-1 Aggregate 2016 
Supply/Demand EXIST Hourly D-1 Aggregate 2014 
Bid quantity  EXIST Hourly D-1 Aggregate 2016 
Offer quantity  EXIST Hourly D-1 Aggregate 2016 
Block bids EXIST Hourly D-1 Aggregate 2016 
Block offers EXIST Hourly D-1 Aggregate 2016 
Matching Quantity  EXIST Hourly D-1 Aggregate 2014 
1Firm represents the settlement aggregation entity in the day-ahead auctions. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Agent-Level Determinants of 
Price Expectation Bias in 
Online Double-Sided 
Auctions14 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Information Systems researchers have made significant contributions to practical auction 
design (e.g. Kauffman and Wood, 2000; Bapna et al., 2001; Goes et al., 2012) and the 
development of computational tools to facilitate decision making in complex auction 
markets (Adomavicius and Gupta, 2005; Adomavicius et al., 2009; Ketter et al., 2012; Mehta 
and Bhattacharya, 2006). This body of work has given rise to the interdisciplinary research 
area of smart markets (McCabe et al., 1991). The primary goal of smart market research is 
to develop theoretically guided computational tools to understand the characteristics of a 
complex trading environment and to facilitate decision making in these settings (Bichler et 
al., 2010). Although information technology has been one of the most crucial drivers of 
smart market development, research containing the behavioural elements of economic 
agents participating in these markets, with policy implications for well-functioning real 
sector markets, has been slow to appear. 
                                                             
14 Parts of this Chapter appeared in the following conference proceedings: 
Avci, E., Bunn, D.W., Ketter, W. & van Heck, E. (2017). Managing Market Price Risk through Forecasting and 
Hedging: The effects of Market Informedness and Risk Aversion. In Commodity and Energy Markets Conference, 
Oxford, UK. 
Avci, E., Bunn, D.W., Ketter, W. & van Heck, E. (2017). Price Forecast Accuracy of Trading Agents in Electricity 
Markets: The Role of Market Informedness, Risk Aversion, and Trading Behavior. In 40th IAEE International 
Conference, Singapore. 
Avci, E., Bunn, D.W., Ketter, W. & van Heck, E. (2018). Determinants of Price Expectation Bias in Online Double 
Auctions Commodity Markets Winter Workshop, Nantes, France. 
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The assumption that agents can (rationally) predict the values of market outcomes 
is frequently made in economic analysis (e.g. Stoneman and Ireland, 1983; Choi and Thum, 
1998), but how these economic agents obtain their knowledge or form their expectations are 
issues which are usually out of scope in these theoretical contexts. However, the expectations 
and the behaviour of bidders have crucial roles in creating actual market outcomes (e.g. 
Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Au and Kauffman, 2003; Easley et al., 2010) and these 
expectations in real markets are heavily influenced by the online auction context within 
which they take place (Bapna et al., 2001; Kambil and Van Heck, 2002). Imperfections in 
the auction design can distort the price signals and alter the trading behaviour of market 
participants so that they will seek a satisfactory solution instead of an optimal one. 
Information asymmetry is a crucial market imperfection (e.g. Clemons and Thatcher, 1997; 
Clemons, 2007; Dawson et al., 2010) which may be reduced by means of well-functioning 
institutional information-aggregation and -dissemination mechanisms, i.e. information 
feedback platforms.  
Previous research has shown the importance of the presence of information 
feedback mechanisms (e.g. Zhu, 2002, 2004; Arora et al., 2007; Soh et al., 2006; 
Adomavicious et al., 2012; Strecker, 2010) and the type/amount of information that is 
provided to bidders through transparency platforms (e.g. Koppius, 2002; Granados et al., 
2005, 2008, 2010; Watson et al., 2010) on bidders’ expectations. However, the traditional 
presumption that bidders form rational expectations by accurately processing all available 
information in the online trading environment and forming their expectations accordingly 
(Muth, 1961) has found mixed support in the empirical literature since in practice boundedly 
rational bidders experience limits in processing information (Tisdel, 1996). Thus, whilst a 
market regulator can make an online auction fully transparent by publishing all transaction-
level data in a Transparency Platform making it costless to the bidders, nevertheless they 
may not use all the information in this platform. They value information based on their 
preferences (Helwig, 1980) which are mostly shaped by their risk aversion levels (Lavella, 
1968; Hilton, 1981; Bickel, 2008; Abbas et al., 2013). This practical fact leads us to make a 
distinction between information transparency level (of a market) and informedness (of a 
bidder): 
Information transparency, defined as the availability and accessibility of market 
information to its participants (Zhu, 2004), is usually deemed to be valuable for the whole 
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supply chain. This is because it helps improve its allocative efficiency (e.g. Cachon and 
Fisher, 2000; Lee et al., 2000; Patnayakuni et al., 2006). In contrast, various studies 
demonstrate that more information transparency is not always better (e.g. Koppius, 2002; 
Von der Fehr, 2013; Yang et al., 2015) since there can be a form of information saturation, 
after which more information to bidders does not further increase the auction performance. 
Also, it could enhance behavioural biases or confuse agents by adding complexity to relevant 
information. And furthermore, requiring bidders to reveal private information may lead to 
behaviour which is intended to conceal or distort information, or alternatively facilitate 
collusive behaviour in repetitive contexts.  
Informedness, on the other hand, is the degree to which bidders know and have 
access to complete, reliable, and timely information (Li et al., 2014). We add one more 
aspect to this definition which is the usage level of this accessible information for predicting 
the related market outcome. That is, since bidders in most of the online auctions (B2B, B2C, 
multi-unit, combinatorial etc.) are highly heterogeneous (e.g. Bapna et al., 2004; 
Adomovicious et al., 2012; Lu et al., 2016), their utilisation (trading behaviour/strategy) of 
accessed information may be different. In fact, this diversity of information processing and 
expectations has motivated the widespread use of prediction markets in many applications 
of forecasting (e.g. Forsythe et al., 1991; Chen and Plott, 2002; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006; 
Van Bruggen et al., 2010) and the informational role of forward trading (Grossman 1977, 
1978; Helwig, 1980; Friedman, 1982; Forsythe et al., 1984; Admati, 1991; Antoniou and 
Holmes, 1995; Redl et al., 2009).  
In this Chapter we focus on an online double auction in the context of forward 
trading; namely the Electricity Day-Ahead (EDA) auction. EDA auctions provide an ideal 
research setting, as they require detailed information-processing and these auctions clear 
through the actions of heterogeneous bidders with expectations that have major effects on 
auction performance and efficiency. We draw upon the behavioural finance literature on 
predicting expectations from behaviours and behaviours from attitudes (Ajzen and Fishbein, 
1970) and upon the judgement and decision-making literature for understanding expectation 
biases in markets (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), in order to provide an evidence-based 
analysis. We develop a research model to empirically test the impact of bidders’ attitudes 
(informedness and risk aversion) on their price expectations (forecast accuracy) through 
their trading behaviour (forecasting and forward trading). Furthermore, situational factors 
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such as the type of company and its strategic position would also impact these effects. The 
research theme in general is therefore to understand the determinants of price expectation 
formation by market participants in online auctions that provide forward trading platforms. 
Simply put, we attempt to address various aspects of the general question: How does the 
attitude and trading behaviour of market participants influence their price expectations in 
online auctions, as revealed through their forecasts and trading? We tested our hypotheses 
on real ex-ante forecasts, evaluated ex-post, using a unique and extensive data set consisting 
of 158 professional power market participants.  
We contribute to the growing literature on (1) information transparency and 
revelation policies in online (Zhu, 2002, 2004; Arora et al., 2007; Soh et al., 2006; 
Adomavicious et al., 2012; Strecker, 2010) and specifically, in day-ahead auctions (Ray and 
Cashman, 1999; van der Fehr, 2015); (2) the effect of amount of information feedback 
(Granados et al., 2005, 2008, 2010; Watson et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2015) and bidders’ 
heterogeneity/behaviour (Bapna et al., 2004; Adomovicious et al., 2012; Lu et al., 2016) on 
their trading decisions/strategies; and (3) informational role of forward/prediction markets 
(Grossman, 1977, 1978; Forsythe et al., 1984; Antoniou and Holmes, 1995; Redl et al., 2009; 
Chen and Plott, 2002; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006; Van Bruggen et al., 2010). 
We show that the informational role of forward trading is the most important factor 
that decreases bidders’ expectation biases and that more information does not always lead 
to more rational (less biased) expectations. Further our results indicate that risk aversion 
does not play a major role in the trading decisions of power bidders. On the other hand, our 
control variables, including bidder type and strategic positioning in the market, had 
significant impacts, particularly on forecast accuracy and forward trading. This suggests that 
in monitoring and promoting efficient and competitive market outcome, regulators may need 
to look at more subtle measures of auction design than simple concentration metrics.  
In summary, this study reveals that whilst informedness level does not have a 
directly significant impact on price forecast accuracy and as a consequence a policy of 
making more data public (or complete information policy) via the market transparency 
platforms (e.g. Arora et al., 2007) may not increase agents’ understanding of price formation; 
rather, it is more crucial to improve the functioning and depth of the forward markets. 
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss previous 
research and develop some research hypothesis. Section 3 presents empirical results and 
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Section 4 concludes the paper with a summary of the findings, implications for practice and 
suggestions for future research. 
5.2. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis 
Development 
After various well-publicised market failures, it is evident that a well-functioning market 
needs to go beyond an appropriate auction design (Borenstein, 2002) and depends critically 
on the expectations of bidders involved (Krishna and Perry, 1998) since market price is the 
aggregation of bidders’ individual expectations. Whilst the rational expectations theory 
implies that bidders should use all the information available to them in forming their price 
expectations, translating this into an efficient auction design usually assumes homogeneity 
in availability and thereby often ignores bidders’ different levels of informedness (Muth, 
1961). Further, as a pure economic theory without behavioural aspects, this theory is silent 
about the effect of bidders’ risk attitude and cognitive biases in their price expectations. 
However, in seeking to develop empirical insights from real auctions we cannot assume that 
all bidders are risk-neutral, homogenous and cognitively unbiased. Furthermore, to 
investigate expectations (cognitive biases) through revealed behaviour, we need an 
appropriate construct and for this we focus upon trading activities. We characterize trading 
by forecasting and hedging (through forward contracts).  
Because of the distinctive characteristics of electricity (e.g. limited storability and 
physical delivery requirements), price expectation formation and trading behaviour in EDAs 
are complex and challenging (Borenstein, 2002; Bunn, 2004). EDA auctions and forward 
markets are the two main online auction places in which the formation of reference prices 
occurs. Day-Ahead auctions provide a spot trading mechanism which takes place on one day 
for the delivery of electricity the next day. Participants with bids and offers submit their 
orders electronically into order books, after which aggregate supply and demand are 
compared and the auction clearing price is calculated for each hour of the following day by 
the auctioneer. Forward trading, in contrast, is generally undertaken through brokers as 
“over-the-counter”.  
Electricity spot price dynamics create high price volatility (Stoft, 2002) and so, as 
a consequence, bidders will generally seek to achieve accurate price forecasting and/or use 
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forward contracts to hedge the risk. To the extent that forward markets in theory manifest an 
equilibrium in expectations and risk aversion amongst bidders with heterogeneous needs for 
hedging spot price uncertainty, there will usually be a substantial behavioural pricing 
component (beliefs) in electricity forward markets, as reflected by sustained risk premia 
(Redl and Bunn, 2013).  
In the general forecasting literature there are a multitude of studies on identifying 
factors influencing forecast accuracy. Some of them examined the effects of different 
company characteristics such as firm size ( Small, 1980; White, 1986; Dalrymple, 1987), 
firm age (Dalrymple, 1975) and industry (Rothe, 1978; Mentzer and Cox, 1984; Peterson, 
1990); some of them focus on the characteristics of the forecasting process such as the time 
horizon (Small, 1980; Mentzer and Cox, 1984), forecast level (White, 1986), team based 
forecasting (Kahn and Mentzer, 1994), technique (Dalrymple, 1975; Small, 1980), 
sophistication of techniques (Mentzer and Cox, 1984b), number of forecasting methods used 
(Small, 1980; West, 1994), use of forecast combinations (Dalrymple, 1987) and use of 
consultants (Dalrymple, 1987). The majority of surveys found that larger firms achieved 
more accurate forecasts than smaller firms (Small, 1980; White, 1986; Dalrymple, 1987). 
Firms that utilised a greater number of forecasting techniques (Small, 1980; West, 1994) and 
prepared their forecasts for more applications (McHugh and Sparkes, 1983) also reported a 
better forecast performance. Adoption of more sophisticated techniques resulted in accuracy 
gains (Mentzer and Cox, 1984b). Pan et al. (1977) found that firms which desired greater 
accuracy utilised techniques that they thought were more sophisticated. A final stream of 
literature has looked at what can be done to improve/assist the forecasting task. Sanders 
(1992) and Sanders and Manrodt (1994) indicate better data, greater management support 
and better training improves the forecasting process. Better data about the industry, 
customers, competition and the economy were also identified in the study conducted by 
Rothe (1978).  
 
5.2.1. Forecasting Behaviour 
 
We focus on the behavioural determinants of performance (accuracy) by power market 
participants whose fundamental inputs for their decisions may change according to the 
forecasting approach they use (Bunn, 2004; Eydeland and Wolyniec, 2003; Weron, 2006). 
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The advanced use of forecasting techniques is one of the critical selection/specification 
issues in the forecasting process, and it usually affects the expectation bias (Ketter et al., 
2012). Since the related literature (Mentzer and Cox, 1984b; Small, 1980; West, 1994) 
mostly finds a positive relation between the sophistication of the forecasting methods and 
forecast accuracy (as measured for example ex-post by mean absolute error, or mean 
absolute percentage error), we propose as a working hypothesis that:  
H1: Power bidders’ use of advanced forecasting techniques is positively related to 
their forecast accuracy. 
 
5.2.2. Hedging Behaviour  
 
The forward curve derives future prices from the balance of observable trades in the forward 
market. In general, forward curves result from the willingness-to-contract by traders today 
for power to be produced or delivered in the future. For a storable energy commodity such 
as oil or gas, there is a theoretical link between spot prices and forwards through the cost of 
carry and convenience yield (Geman, 2006), but with electricity having limited storability, 
the conventional view is that forward prices result from market expectations adjusted by a 
market risk premium (Redl and Bunn, 2013). This is another reason why the choice of 
electricity for this study on expectations is particularly appropriate. Furthermore, in 
immature (“incomplete”) power markets the risk premium may also incorporate some 
illiquidity risk, as manifest by high bid-ask spreads, and concerns about insufficient market 
depth to transact substantial spot trades. With this in mind, we have chosen to analyse an 
important, well-functioning, but still maturing power market, that of Turkey, to feature this 
distinction between forecasting and forward hedging, whereupon market informedness is 
likely to be influential. 
Related literature regarding the informational role of forward trading began with 
Grossman’s studies (Grossman, 1975, 1977, 1978) which defined forward markets as places 
where information is exchanged and where people who collect and analyse information 
about future states of the world can gain an advantage in information gathering. He finds 
that for commodities with forward markets, the volume of forward trading (extent of 
hedging) is directly related to how poorly current and futures prices predict the future spot 
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price, relative to how well various exogenous variables (available information) predict the 
future spot price. Danthine (1978) examines the informational role of forward prices and the 
relationship between forward and spot prices in a setting in which not all relevant 
information is contained in the past data but some can be obtained through forward prices. 
Foryste et al. (1984) show that a forward market can increase the speed with which 
information is made public through price transactions and this increases market efficiency.  
The informational role of forward trading is even more important in electricity 
markets since bidders who are actively trading on the forward/OTC markets have a better 
understanding of the price for forward power. Forward curves are related to various 
fundamentals (fuel market prices, demand, regulations, technology mix, plant outages, etc.) 
and as a synthesis of market insight on these underlying factors, the forward curve is often 
considered the best forecast (EFET, 2015). Thus, it is critical to consider the informational 
role of forward trading on price expectation formation. Based on the discussion above we 
propose that:  
H2: Power bidders’ advanced use of forward trading is positively related to their 
forecast accuracy.  
 
5.2.3. Factors Affecting Forecasting Behaviour  
 
Although considerable empirical research has focused on the bidder-level determinants of 
forecasting practices, not all issues have received equal attention. While variables such as 
size (Small, 1980; White, 1986; Dalrymple, 1987) and industry type (Rothe, 1978; Mentzer 
and Cox, 1984b; Peterson, 1990) have been systematically linked to some aspects of 
forecasting practice (e.g. use of consultancy, sophistication of methods, diversity of 
forecasting techniques), information-based linkages (e.g. data sources utilised) have been 
left unexplored (Winklhofer et al., 1996).  
Market informedness is a key issue in the functioning of electricity markets, as with 
any smart market. Previous research on electricity markets has focused much more on 
market mechanisms (Borenstein and Bushnell, 2000; Joskow and Kahn, 2002; Bushnell et 
al., 2008) and incentives (Hogan, 1998; Micola et al., 2008; Ito, 2014). Research related to 
market informedness in electricity markets is scarce and has only recently started to gain 
importance after the introduction of advanced trading platforms and the electronic 
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dissemination of relevant, large-scale data (Ketter et al., 2016). As far as we know the only 
study on this theme is by Von der Fehr (2013) which approaches the issue from a regulatory 
perspective and discusses the possible effects of the EU Regulation on the Submission and 
Publication of Data in Electricity Markets (SPDEM) and on wholesale energy market 
integrity and transparency (REMIT). He argues that, for market performance, more 
information is not always better; indeed, more information may undermine market 
performance by facilitating behaviour that is not cost efficient, and/or aims at exercising 
market power and/or establishes and maintains collusion. Moreover, he emphasizes that 
ensuring accurate price forecasts and sound reference price signals does not require general 
access to information at a very detailed level or with a high degree of immediacy. As far as 
we know, there is no study related to behavioural and attitudinal determinants of power 
bidders’ price expectations. If the more informed bidders exercise this advantage on the spot 
market, then it is plausible that they would use more advanced forecasting methods. Thus, 
we test that;  
H3A: Power bidders’ market informedness level is positively related to their use of 
more advanced forecasting techniques. 
The research investigating the role of bidders’ risk perceptions on the forecasting 
process is mainly informed by prediction markets which can be defined as designed futures 
markets to predict outcomes. Manski (2004, 2006) analyses the relationship between the 
bidders’ expectations and the realized price with risk neutral traders in a prediction market. 
He finds that there can be substantial forecast errors, but when risk aversion is taken into the 
formulation, as in Gjerstad (2005), the forecasts do not differ significantly from the realized 
market prices. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) provide a formal model that includes Manski's 
(2006) as a special case. They show that while prediction market prices typically aggregate 
participants' information into useful forecasts, several features may undermine the efficacy 
of these forecasts, with the extent of risk aversion being one of them. The theoretical models 
of Gjerstad (2005) and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2005, 2007) also support a view that the 
participant's degree of risk aversion and beliefs are key parameters driving the equilibrium 
price in prediction markets. These findings indicate that the interpretation of prices in 
prediction markets (that is price forecast accuracy) requires knowledge on participants' risk 
preferences.  
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On the other hand, studies show that risk aversion can also affect individual’s 
information gathering behaviour since this activity can be considered as a close substitute 
for hedging against certain types of risks (Willinger, 1989). However, the sign of the 
relationship has not been well-determined. In situations where hedging opportunities are 
restricted (e.g. liquidity constraints of the forward market), more risk averse bidders can 
have a tendency to gather more information. On the other hand if information gathering also 
involves risks and uncertainties, then risk aversion may decrease information gathering 
behaviour (Freixas and Kihlstrom, 1984). We note from studies in prediction markets that 
risk averse bidders tend to gather more information, and therefore based on the discussion 
above we test that:  
H3B: Power bidders’ risk aversion is positively related to their use of advanced 
forecasting techniques. 
 
5.2.4. Factors Affecting Hedging Behaviour  
 
Prior empirical studies tend to assume that all market participants have access to the same 
information. In Grossman’s models (Grossman, 1976, 1978), the aggregation of information 
into price formation depends only on the statistical properties of the information vector and 
is independent of bidders’ preferences. However, how information is processed is known to 
be a subjective process (Helwig, 1980). Following von der Fehr (2013), we consider the 
market informedness of a bidder as a factor related to hedging behaviour. For the case of 
electricity markets, it is not self-evident that greater informedness will lead to more hedging 
activity, since bidders may use this to act more profitably on the spot market where market 
power effects can be greater. We explore this in the next working hypothesis:  
H4A: Power bidders’s market informedness level is positively related to their use 
of advanced hedging. 
There is a substantial literature on the determinants of the hedging behaviour of 
trading firms. However, this literature focuses mainly on the relation between firm value and 
the extent of hedging in the framework of the classic Modigliani Miller paradigm, with its 
many extensions. Pioneering studies on this include Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), 
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), and Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993). Stulz (1984) 
studied the effect of managers’ risk aversion on the usage of hedging instruments and found 
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that risk averse managers are more likely to use hedging. Tufano (1996) examines hedging 
activities in the gold mining industry and finds that the use of commodity derivatives is 
negatively related to the number of instruments and positively related to the value of stock 
held by managers and directors. In an empirical asset market, Michailova (2010) investigates 
the effect of risk aversion on trading behaviour and find no significant relation.  
For electricity markets, Sanchez et al. (2009) examine theoretically the strategy 
selection of heterogeneous power bidders and find that with risk aversion on the demand 
side, hedging is a response to spot price volatility. However, Lien (2001) examines the effect 
of risk aversion on hedging through a modified constant-absolute-risk-aversion utility 
function and finds that risk aversion has no effect in an unbiased forward market. Similarly, 
Mattos et al. (2006) find that the impact of risk aversion on hedging decisions appears to be 
small, and it diminishes as risk aversion increases. Thus, we test the null hypothesis that;  
H4B: Power bidders' risk aversion is not related to their use of hedging. 
 
5.2.5. Factors Affecting Risk Aversion 
 
Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory has become one of the most important 
concepts in analysing the behaviour of bidders in today's markets. According to prospect 
theory, the larger the disutility of a loss compared to the utility of an equivalent gain forces 
decision makers to weight losses more than gains. Many studies confirm this hypothesis 
(Payne et al., 1984; Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Shefrin and 
Statman, 1985). Olsen (1997a, 1997b) examines the results of surveys of professional 
investment managers’ risk perceptions and finds that managers do exhibit loss aversion in 
practice. Following this, Kalayci and Basdas (2010) find that Swiss power bidders were even 
more loss averse compared to the investment portfolio managers in Olsen (1997b). While 
these studies have enhanced our understanding of prospect theory, both attempt to explain 
the differences in bidders’ risk attitude through demographic variables such as gender, age, 
professional experience and influence. However, in this Chapter we take a more corporate 
perspective and consider, as control variables, the bidders’ strategic positioning in the market 
namely; size, portfolio diversity, market power and type of participation license, as possible 
factors affecting their attitude. 
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5.2.6. Control Variables 
 
Power bidders are very heterogeneous with respect to their strategic positioning in the 
market and thus they may have different incentives for their trading behaviour and attitude. 
Therefore, we included the most important strategic positioning variables in our models to 
account for these effects. Those variables include size, portfolio diversity, interaction of size 
and portfolio diversity, and type of participation license.  
A number of studies investigated the effect of size on decision making. In the 
forecasting literature; Dalrymple (1987), Peterson (1990), and Sanders and Manrodt (1994) 
examined the differences between the adoption of forecasting techniques by small vs. large 
firms. They find small firms use subjective and extrapolation methods more than large firms, 
whereas large companies use more sophisticated quantitative techniques more often. In the 
literature there are different definitions of firm size. Since our focus is on electricity price 
expectations we define the size of a bidder as their daily electricity trading volume. Here it 
is important to distinguish a bidder’s size and its market power. A large-sized bidder may 
not necessarily be a bidder with market power. For example, a generator with substantial 
baseload facilities may not be engaged in price setting. Nevertheless, as a control variable, 
firm size may be important for the hypotheses related to market informedness and risk 
aversion. 
In electricity markets bidders have different types of power plants in their portfolio, 
namely; river type, canal type, reservoir, dam, wind, solar, natural gas, biogas, biomass, fuel 
oil, lignite, imported coal, anthracite, geothermal, nuclear, landfill gas, naphtha. Bidders 
with less diversified portfolios may have less private information about the fundamental 
drivers of future electricity prices; while bidders with more diversified portfolios may have 
more insider information about the underlying supply situations such as water constraints, 
weather effects, impending plant outages, etc. Thus, bidders with more diversified portfolios 
are expected to be more informed and less risk averse. 
We use the control variable interaction of size and diversity as a proxy for market 
power since if a generator has both high trading volumes and high diversity, the probability 
of having market power is very high. In imperfect electricity markets, if players have market 
power, there will be information asymmetry, and therefore each bidder’s expectation for the 
spot may differ. Thus, consistent with the existing literature we consider a bidder to have 
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more market power if it is more diversified. The case is not so obvious with risk aversion 
since risk aversion can increase with increasing volume, but decrease with increasing 
diversity. Further if market informedness is linked to market power, then dominant players 
may prefer to exercise it in the spot market. 
5.3. Research Methodology 
Based on the discussion above we conceptualised the research constructs and influences for 
testing as the Proposed Conceptual Model shown in Figure 5.1. "Market Informedness" and 
"Risk Aversion" are considered to be two attitudinal properties of bidders, which may 
influence how they approach market risk through their trading behaviour by relying upon 
"Forecasting" or "Hedging", and this in turn may affect the forecast accuracy of their price 
expectations. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.1: Proposed Conceptual Model  
 
The above hypotheses were tested by analysing a sample of cross-sectional data 
(Appendix 5.A) from the Turkish Electricity Market which is a large, liberalized, 
technologically diversified and liquid market attracting substantial investment and operating 
a day-ahead auction in a way that is similar to most power exchanges around the world. 
Furthermore, it suits our research purposes in several respects because substantial quantities 
of power are traded both on the spot and forward markets, and there is a diversity of market 
participants in terms of experience and potential informedness due to it being a relatively 
new market and not having an official transparency platform at the time we conducted this 
study. The energy exchange in Turkey, Energy Exchange Istanbul (EXIST), operates the 
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wholesale power markets (day-ahead and intraday) and provides the settlement services for 
the transactions made in these markets. The Transmission System Operator (TEIAS) 
operates the real-time balancing power and ancillary services markets. Trading and risk 
management instruments are developed and operated by Borsa Istanbul (BIST). The day-
ahead market operated by EXIST now covers about 30% of Turkey’s electricity supply, and 
like most spot markets, provides the underlying reference price for derivatives including the 
forward contracts.  
For this study, we acquired the support of Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources (MENR) and Turkish Electricity Transmission Company (TEIAS). We targeted 
the whole population of firms actively trading in the day-ahead market having obtained the 
contact details of the relevant trading mangers through an official request by the MENR. We 
undertook the survey via a web-link. We received 258 surveys, of which 158 were fully 
completed, providing a satisfactory 30% response rate and a sufficiently large sample for 
testing the research hypotheses. This unique data set gives us the ability to research a 
maturing market in a detailed fashion. Using this unique data set, this study is the first to 
take an information-based view to study the trading behaviour of bidders and their price 
expectations in a real sector market.  
 
5.3.1. Instrument Development  
 
A self-administered questionnaire was designed on the basis of the framework discussed in 
the previous section and in consultation with official administrators and executives in some 
of the leading private companies. The instrument was validated in three stages. In the first 
stage, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 22 traders and the dimensions of the 
construct were determined. Then in the second stage 33 traders provided interviews and 
preliminary questionnaire responses. This information together with indications from the 
research literature resulted in the construction of an initial set of 30 questions that reflected 
various aspects of the factors affecting the behaviour of power traders. In the final stage, 33 
responded to the pilot study. To guarantee content validity (Cronbach, 1971: Smith, 1996), 
we asked these respondents to screen the 30 questions for those that did not appear consistent 
with the construct and identified dimensions. This permitted us to eliminate five that were 
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either ambiguous or unreliable resulting in an instrument with 25 questions. Then, 20 energy 
experts from the Ministry evaluated this reduced set. Particularly, the dimensions were 
explained to 10 of the energy experts, who were asked to evaluate the questions for their 
applicability to the respective dimensions. The other 10 experts were presented with the 
items but were not given an explanation of the dimensions. They indicated for each question, 
what the perceived item would measure. Questions that were misclassified were eliminated. 
As a result, 24 questions remained. 
There were eight parts in the survey. The introduction outlined the objectives of the 
study, possible benefits / risks of participating to the study and how the participant’s personal 
information would be used. Then, the first survey part is about the bidder-level information 
which includes the license type, ownership structure, type of plants in firm’s portfolio, 
average daily trading volume, types of risk they consider while determining firm strategies 
and the risk management practices in their firm. The second part attempts to measure the 
risk attitude of the respondent, in our case the person who is responsible for electricity 
trading in the firm. Third part is about general risk management operations of the firm 
regarding the day-ahead market, electricity price forecasting, OTC market, bilateral 
agreements, intraday market and demographic information of respondent. The respondents 
were asked to answer to five-point Likert scales mostly ranging from “very unimportant” 
(coded as 1) to “very important” (coded as 5), and a few ranging from “very useful” to “not 
useful at all”. We also collected participant and demographic data about the respondents and 
their firms. Although such information could perhaps have revealed the identity of the firm 
or respondent, we informed the respondents that all of their information and company’s 
information would be kept confidential at every phase of this research and that all responses 
would only be presented in aggregated form and only for academic research purposes.  
 
5.3.2. Measurement of Variables 
 
A bidder's price expectation formation has been defined and measured in many different 
ways. In this research we are interested in price forecast accuracy as measured by a single 
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item15 in which the respondents were asked at the end of 2015 what their yearly average 
electricity price forecast would be for the next year (2016) and this was then compared to 
the actual outcome price at the end of 2016. Thus, we waited a full year to evaluate the 
results and thereby ensure a valid ex-ante forecast and ex-post accuracy measure. 
Bidders’ trading behaviour is characterized in two dimensions: (1) hedging and (2) 
price forecasting behaviour. In the previous studies hedging behaviour has been defined and 
measured in different ways. We are interested in the extent of forward trading that bidders 
use for electricity trading. This variable was measured by a single item which asked 
respondents the percentage of electricity they hedged via forward trading for electricity 
sale/purchase. Accordingly, it was coded as 1 (0%-25%) to 4 (75%-100%). For the price 
forecasting behaviour, six items from the survey were used to construct a categorical 
variable. Respondents were asked to rate each of the methods listed in terms of their 
usefulness in forecasting electricity prices. The listed methods are independent forecasts 
(from consultancy firms), forecasts from internal modelling, and OTC/Forward Curves. 
Each item is on a 4-point Likert scale, 1=very useful, 4=not useful at all. This measure is 
used as a proxy for advanced use of forecasting techniques and calculated as the sum of 
dummy variables assigned for each item.  
Bidders’ attitude has been measured in two dimensions: (1) risk aversion and (2) 
market informedness. The measurement of risk aversion was adopted from Olsen (1997b) 
and Kalayci and Basdas (2012). Thus, we use six items from the survey to construct a 
categorical variable to measure the risk aversion of power traders. Respondents were asked 
to rate each of the risk attitudes listed in terms of their importance. The listed risk attitudes 
are the chance of incurring a large loss relative to what is expected, the chance that the 
portfolio will earn less than the minimum needed to meet the performance target, the overall 
variability in the portfolio return over time, the chance that the portfolio will earn less than 
what is expected, the chance that the portfolio will earn less than it has historically and the 
chance of having the same portfolio value. Each item is on a 5-point Likert scale, 1=not 
important at all, 5=very important. Market informedness has been defined and measured in 
different ways in previous studies, especially in the e-commerce literature through 
                                                             
15 A single item measure is acceptable if the construct is unambiguous, unidimensional and directly accessible to 
respondents (Wanous et al., 1997).  
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measuring the market informedness level of e-consumers about a new product, website etc. 
(e.g. Li et al., 2014). In this research, we are interested in the market informedness level of 
bidders about a product whose demand is inelastic and for which the price depends much 
more on the environmental factors. In this case the information level of a power bidder (or 
is forecasting algorithm) would be crucial for the forecast performance. 16 items (which 
were chosen by thorough literature review and expert views) were used to construct a 
categorical variable. Respondents were asked to indicate their usage of the listed variables 
and rate them in terms of their importance to develop a reasonable price forecast for their 
electricity contracts. The listed variables are market clearing price, system marginal price, 
hourly load, hourly Bilateral Agreement (BA) amounts, system purchase amount, system 
sale amount, exact daily production plan, weather forecasts, wind power forecasts, solar 
power forecasts, hydropower reservoir quotas, river flow rates, cost of delay, out of order/ 
in maintenance plant information, hourly merit order curve, BA prices learned from the 
market, BA prices of large producers, OTC forward price curve, hourly electricity prices in 
the neighbour countries and exchange rate. Each item is on a 5-point Likert scale, 1=not 
important at all, 5=very important.  
The strategic positioning of the bidders has been characterized in four dimensions: 
(1) size (2) portfolio diversity and (3) interaction of size and portfolio diversity (4) type of 
license. Size was measured by a single item in the survey from which the respondents were 
asked how much electricity they trade daily. For measuring the portfolio diversity, 
respondents were asked what kind of plants they have in their portfolio. Respondents who 
have one type of facility in their portfolio are coded as 1 (undiversified), up to three 
technologies are coded as 2 (semi-diversified) and more than three technologies are coded 
as 3 (highly diversified). Type of license has been measured by a single item from which the 
respondents were asked under what type of electricity market participation licence they 
operate. The listed license types and coding are: 1 (generator) 2 (auto producer16) 3 
                                                             
16 The auto producer category refers the ownership and operation of power plants by industrial companies, 
primarily for their own electricity needs. Although there had been auto producer plants in Turkey before 1984, 
they were used mostly in state-owned sugar factories and cogeneration plants and were governed through special 
regulations. The 1984 law, and subsequent regulations in 1994–99 allowing companies to set up jointly-owned 
plants, triggered widespread investment in auto production facilities. About 2,300 MW of auto-generation 
capacity was installed by 2001. Although not envisioned at the time of the 1984 Law, these plants played an 
important role in the development of Turkey’s electricity market two decades later. Later they started selling their 
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(incumbent retailer) 4 (distributor) 5 (retailer). Since type of license is a categorical 
(nominal) variable, it is encoded into four dummy variables with the reference type being 
retailer. The variables’ names and measures are summarized in Appendix 5.A.  
The major descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in Table 5.1. Even 
though the scales are ordinal, the summary measures indicate that a sufficiently reasonable 
spread was obtained to facilitate subsequent regression analysis. 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
(1)size 153 2 1 3 1.6 .8 
(2)portfolio diversity 153 2 1 3 1.7 .9 
(3)size * portfolio diversity 153 8 1 9 3.2 2.8 
(5)risk aversion 153 4 1 5 3.7 .7 
(6)market informedness 153 99 0 99 64.8 18.4 
(7) use of advanced hedging 153 3 0 3 2.3 .9 
(8)use of advanced forecasting 152 100 0 100 40.4 33.9 
(9)forecast error 153 90 0 90 21.7 15.9 
 
The Pearson correlations derived from the sample are summarized in Table 5.2 and here it 
is worth noticing the distinctly different intercorrelations for the use of advanced forecasting 
and hedging, suggesting that they are indeed separate approaches to facing price risk 
uncertainty. This is very reassuring for the basic research motivation in this Chapter. 
Furthermore, risk aversion and market informedness are significantly correlated as 
postulated and indeed market informedness is correlated both with size and portfolio 
diversity one might expect. More subtle analysis is undertaken by multivariate regressions, 
as described below.  
5.4. Data Analysis and Results 
Non-response bias was checked by four tests (Straub and Nance, 1990). In the first three 
tests, size, portfolio diversity, and type of utility characteristics of the group were compared 
for the full mail-out targets and respondents. No significant differences were found. In a 
further test, early and late respondents were compared and again there were no significant 
                                                             
generation in the market and bought electricity for their own use from distribution companies at the lower, 
government-controlled tariff. 
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difference. Thus, we conclude that our sample is not systematically biased and the results 
are generalizable to our population. 
 
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics and correlations. Notes: *** Correlation is significant at the 
0.001 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
1Since type of license is a categorical variable with five levels and it is encoded into four dummy variables.  
 
We used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression17 to test our hypotheses and 
estimate the model for bidders’ forecast accuracy, trading behaviour, market informedness 
and risk aversion. We encoded the type of participation license into four dummy variables 
since it is a five category variable. To understand the effect of the control variables (bidders’ 
strategic positioning) we estimated all models in two phases. In the first phase, only control 
variables were entered into the model. In the second phase, all variables were entered into 
the model. For models 4 and 5 since we used only control variables as independent variables, 
we constructed one model for each dependent variable (risk aversion and market 
informedness). For the other models, the first model is the one with only the control variables 
taken as independent variables; and the second model is constructed with the independent 
variables taken according the relevant hypothesis. Through this approach we can 
discriminate the effect of control variables from attitudinal and behavioural ones. We 
                                                             
17 We used OLS regression since it is a limited-information statistical method which estimates each parameter 
equation separately. Thus, it is relatively robust to misspecification. On the other hand, structural equation 
modelling including classical path analysis is a full information technique which has the advantage that the 
estimation of each parameter utilizes the information provided by the entire system (Long, 1983) but the 
disadvantage that estimation of each parameter can be affected by mis-specification in other parts of the model. 
Thus, we aim to make our study robust to mis-specification issues through using the less structured nature of OLS 
multiple regression.  
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constructed the models 5 to 1 sequentially by following the logical flow implied our 
Proposed Conceptual Concept (Figure 5.1). The results of the regression estimations are 
summarized in Table 5.3 and the results of testing each working hypothesis are summarized 
in Table 5.4.  
 
Table 5.3: Results of regression analyses of research hypotheses. Notes: Since type of 
license is a categorical variable with five levels, it is encoded into four dummy variables. 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 
0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Our results (Table 5.3) reveal significant findings in the context of information 
systems, behavioural finance and energy policy. In particular, it has identified surprising but 
plausible relationships between trading bidders’ attitudes, behaviour and price expectations.  
H1& H2: Firstly, we hypothesized that bidders’ price forecast error is negatively 
related to their advanced use of forecasting techniques and hedging. Quite surprisingly, our 
results (Model 1.2) indicate that power bidders’ advanced use of forecasting techniques is 
not related to their spot price forecast accuracy. Therefore H1 is not supported. Our 
categorical measure for advanced use of forecasting is defined as the sum of three dummy 
variables which is encoded for internal modelling, consultancy and OTC/Forward curve 
usage. Based upon this result, we made further analysis for each of the dummy variables and 
find a significant relation only between the OTC/Forward curve usage and forecast accuracy 
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which supports our second hypothesis related to informational efficiency of forward trading. 
This finding is in line with the studies comparing the results of prediction market results 
which have demonstrated that prediction (electronic) markets can provide better forecasts 
than even the most popular forecasting companies (e.g. Forsythe et al. 1991; Chen, Fine, and 
Huberman, 2003; Pennock et al., 2002). This indicates the information power of prediction 
markets which is a similar market aggregator to forward markets. Thus, although individuals 
have biased expectations (cognitive biases) about the future prices, in aggregate most of the 
biases will be eliminated through averaging and thereby reflected on the forward curve. It 
follows, therefore, that if individuals use the forward curve then their expectations should 
be more accurate. Thus, we observe that the advanced use of hedging is indeed negatively 
related to price forecast error supporting H2 (Model 1.2, coefficient= -.288 at P<0.001). 
Hedging activity uses the forward curve as reference and this provides a consistent 
interpretation. 
H3: We hypothesize in H3A that a power bidder’ market informedness level is 
positively related to his/her use of more advanced forecasting techniques. Our results 
indicate that, from Model 2.2, that market informedness has indeed a significant positive 
impact on advanced use of forecasting techniques (coefficient= .350 at P<0.001). But, H3B 
proposes that higher risk aversion is associated with more advanced use of forecasting 
techniques. We do not find significant support for this. Risk aversion itself, in Model 5, is 
not related with any of the control variables. On the other hand we can observe from Model 
4 that marked informedness is positively and significantly related to risk aversion. So, the 
implications could be that more risk averse bidders are more informed. But market 
informedness is the more significant driver in the use of advanced forecasting techniques. 
H4: For forward trading we found no significant relation with either market 
informedness or risk aversion. It is quite plausible that more informed power bidders do not 
engage in forward trading because they prefer to exercise their informational advantage by 
forecasting prices for the spot market. This is consistent with a positive significant 
coefficient for market informedness in model 2.2 (coefficient= .350 at P<0.001), which 
relates to the use of advanced forecasting. Thus, risk aversion appears to increase marked 
informedness (Model 4, coefficient=.155, P<0.05) and the market informedness can increase 
the use of advanced forecasting for spot price activity (but in the end does not apparently 
increase forecast accuracy). 
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Finally, we observe some participant specificities. Firstly, the dummy variable for auto-
producer has a significant negative coefficient (Model 2.2, coefficient= -.236, P<0.01) 
suggesting that they use less advanced forecasting techniques compared to retailer-bidders. 
This is quite intuitive since auto-producers are the power plants that generate electricity for 
their own holdings and do not trade on the spot very frequently.  
We observe surprisingly that there is a significant and positive relationship between the 
control variable dummy for generator and spot price forecast error (Model 1.1, 
coefficient=.195, P<0.05). That is, generator-bidders have less accurate price forecasts 
compared to retailer-bidders. One possible special explanation for this could be that in our 
population there exist some generators with public ownership. These generators can be 
thermal, hydroelectric or natural gas and they sell their electricity directly to TETAS 
(Electricity Trading and Contracting Corporation of Turkey) for a predetermined fixed price. 
Thus, they do not need to forecast the prices. The existence of these type of generators may 
have decreased the overall forecast accuracy of the generators in the sample. Furthermore, 
we also see in Model 3.2 that there is a significant and negative relation (coefficient=.327, 
P<0.001) between being a generator-bidder and use of advanced hedging; and well – in other 
words they are less inclined to hedge. This seems to support an explanation that some of 
them are insulated against the market. It could also be suggested that by having these 
arrangements they are behaving like hedging companies, albeit through public ownership.  
Our results show that there is a significant and positive relation between the control 
variables size*diversity and use of advanced hedging. One possible interpretation is that 
these are large companies with predefined corporate risk limits and therefore their risk 
management and compliance requirements may necessitate extensive hedging, or it may be 
that these generators are better able to engage in specially tailored forward contracts to meet 
market needs through OTC trading.  
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Table 5.4: Summary of Results 
 
Hypothesis Hypothesis Description  Expected 
Sign 
Results 
H1 Advanced use of forecasting  forecast accuracy (+) Not Supported  
H2 Advanced use of forward trading  forecast accuracy (+) Supported 
H3A Market informedness  Advanced use of forecasting (+) Supported 
H3B Risk aversion  Advanced use of forecasting (+) Not Supported 
H4A Market informedness  Advanced use of hedging (+) Not Supported 
H4B Risk aversion  Advanced use of hedging (.) Supported 
 
5.5. Summary and Conclusions 
5.5.1. Theoretical Implications 
 
In considering the use of market information to confront future price risks, either by acting 
upon more accurate forecasts or by hedging through forward contract, we have sought to 
identify the effects of informedness and risk aversion. Based on the empirical results, a 
revised conceptual model of influences is displayed in Figure 5.2, which has several subtle 
new insights beyond the initial considerations displayed in Figure 5.1.  
 
 
Fig.5.2: Revised Conceptual Model 
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The key findings are as follows: 
Informational role of forward trading is the most important factor that decreases 
bidders’ expectation biases. 
We characterized power bidders’ price expectation by their price forecast accuracy 
and trading behaviour by the advanced use of forecasting and forward trading. As 
summarized in Table 2, forecast error is most significantly and negatively related to the 
advanced use of forward trading, and surprisingly the advanced use of forecasting techniques 
has no significant relationship with the accuracy. These findings indicate the importance of 
the informational role of forward trading on decreasing bidders’ expectation biases in online 
auctions. 
More information does not always lead to more rational (less biased) expectations.  
 Bidders’ informedness is positively and significantly related to their use of more 
advanced forecasting techniques; however, surprisingly, informedness is not significantly 
related to forecast accuracy. This suggests that in situations where forward trading is possible 
and effective, more information does not always lead to better electricity price forecasts. 
This appears to have some implications for the value of increased transparency initiatives 
and is consistent with the doubts expressed by von der Fehr (2013). 
Risk aversion does not play a major role in trading decisions of power bidders 
The effect of power bidders’ risk aversion levels on their forecasting or forward 
trading behaviour is not significant, and this is in line with the previous empirical studies. 
This suggests that risk aversion does not play a major role in trading decisions of power 
bidders. On the other hand, our study suggests that bidders are risk averse, supporting the 
findings of Kalayci and Basdas (2010) and Olsen (1997b) on prospect theory, and risk 
aversion is positively influential on informedness.   
In addition, our control variables, including bidder type and strategic positioning in 
the market, had significant impacts, particularly on forecast accuracy and forward trading. 
This suggests that in monitoring and promoting efficient and competitive market outcome, 
regulators may need to look at more subtle measure of auction design than simple 
concentration metrics.  
More generally, this Chapter makes several contributions to the research on online 
auction design, behavioural finance and energy. With regard to the behavioural literature on 
examining price expectation formation and rational expectations hypothesis in experimental 
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and real markets, we empirically test the impacts of a bidder’s trading behaviour on their 
price expectations. Our studies provide evidence suggesting the informational efficiency of 
forward trading on decreasing the biases in price expectations. Bidders using advanced 
hedging, and trading frequently on the forward markets, can develop more rational and 
accurate forecasts. With regard to the conventional research theme that mainly seeks to 
explain trading behaviour via risk-aversion and prospect theory, we extend these studies by 
adding the bidder informedness variable. Furthermore, the indication from our results is that 
whilst bidder informedness is dependent upon risk aversion, it is bidder informedness that 
more significantly influences the use of advanced forecasting. Thus, the research presented 
in this Chapter is among the first to take an information-based view to study the trading 
behaviour of bidders and highlights the role of informedness.  
 
5.5.2. Managerial Implications 
 
With regard to its energy policy and auction design research contributions, the incorporation 
of behavioural elements into the analysis of auction design, beyond the usual market 
structure considerations, is an important theoretical contribution and reveals a more accurate 
description of the relationship between auction design and bidders’ expectations. Market 
makers employ various interventions to respond to the market imperfections that occur when 
bidders are mis-/under informed or unsophisticated. An increasing number of market 
transparency platforms are recent examples of these attempts (eg REMIT in EU electricity 
trading). "Regulating for rationality", i.e. intervening to cure or overcome cognitive error, 
has novel challenges for regulators (Schwartz, 2015), but difficulties exist because 
cognitive-based regulatory interventions are often poorly-grounded. A particular concern is 
that bidders suffer from numerous cognitive biases, but not every bidder suffers from the 
same ones. Current market theory cannot prescribe how these biases interact within a bidder 
and how markets aggregate differing biased bidders’ expectations. Nevertheless, by 
providing a better understanding of bidders’ expectation biases, research will help policy-
makers design more effective policy instruments to promote the design of efficient forward 
markets in particular. For energy regulatory bodies, in particular, developing an 
understanding of power bidders’ expectations and trading behaviour may assist them to 
initiate interventions which improve the allocation of resources to better disseminate high 
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quality market information. This study reveals that whilst informedness level does not have 
a direct significant impact on price forecast accuracy and therefore making more data public 
via the market transparency platforms may not increase bidders’ understanding of price 
formation; rather, it is more crucial to improve the functioning and depth of the forward 
markets.  
Finally, as with all empirical research, there are questions of generalizability and 
replication. Whilst the details and control variables have been specific to an electricity 
market, the conceptual model can in principle be applied to other smart markets. The key 
elements of forecast accuracy, forward contracting, market informedness and risk aversion 
are quite general.  
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Appendix 5.A. Measurement of Variables  
                     Variables Measurement Items  Coding 
 
Bidders’ 
performance 
Bidders’ 
predictive 
accuracy 
What is your yearly average 
electricity price forecast for the next 
year? (2016) 
Coded as the difference 
between the predicted price 
and the actual yearly (2016) 
avr price. 
Variable type: numeric 
Bidders’ 
behaviour 
Hedging 
behaviour 
What percentage of electricity usage 
do you hedge by OTC/Forward 
markets? 
 
Coded as extent of hedging 
Variable type: numeric 
Forecasting 
behaviour 
Please rate each of the methods 
listed below in terms of their 
usefulness in forecasting electricity 
prices: 
-Independent forecasts(From 
consultancy firms) 
-Forecasts from internal modelling 
-OTC and derivative price curves 
Each item is on a 4-point 
likert scale, 1=very useful, 
4=not useful at all 
Coded as sum of the dummy 
variables corresponding to 
each item 
Variable type: categorical 
Bidders’ 
attitude 
Risk aversion Please rate each of the risk attitudes 
listed below in terms of their 
importance on a scale of 1-7 
Risk Attitudes: 
-The chance of incurring a large loss 
relative to what is expected. 
-The chance that the portfolio will 
earn less than the minimum needed 
to meet the performance target  
-The overall variability in the 
portfolio return over time. 
-The chance that the portfolio will 
earn less than what is expected. 
-The chance that the portfolio will 
earn less than it has historically. 
-The chance of having the same 
portfolio value 
 
Each item is on a 7-point 
likert scale, 1 = not important 
at all, 7 = very important 
Measured as the average of 
six items  
Variable type: categorical 
Market 
informedness 
To develop a reasonable view of 
market price for electricity 
contracts, please indicate your usage 
of the below variables and rate them 
in terms of their importance to your 
company. 
Variables:  
-MCP  
-SMP 
-Hourly Load 
-Hourly BA(Bilateral Agreement) 
Amounts 
-System Purchase Amount 
-System Sale Amount 
-Exact Daily Production Plan 
-Temperature Forecasts 
-Wind Power Forecasts 
-Solar Power Forecasts 
Each item is on a 5-point 
likert scale, 1 = not important 
at all, 5 = very important 6= 
cannot access/get this data 
Coded as sum of the used 
variables  
Variable type: numeric 
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-Hydro Reservoir Quatos 
-River flow rates 
-Cost of delay (COD) 
-Out of order/ In maintenance plant 
info. 
-Hourly Merit Order Curve 
-BA Prices learned from the market 
-BA prices of large producers 
-OTC forward price curve 
-Hourly electricity prices in Balkans 
-Exchange rate 
-Other (Please indicate) 
Strategic 
positioning 
Size How much electricity do you trade 
daily? 
Coded as 1: small 2: medium 
3: large 
Portfolio 
diversity 
What kind of plants are in your 
portfolio? [Please tick all relevant 
boxes] 
-River type 
-Canal type 
-Reservoir 
-Dam 
-Wind 
-Natural Gas 
-Biogas 
-Fuel oil 
-Lignite 
-Imported coal 
-Anthracite 
-Geothermal 
-Landfill gas 
-Naphtha 
-Other (Please indicate)  
Count the total number of 
plants in their portfolio 
Coded as 1 (undiversified), 
up to three utilities are coded 
as 2 (semi-diversified) and 
more than three utilities are 
coded as 3 (highly 
diversified) 
Type of licence What is your type of participation 
license in the Turkish Electricity 
Market? [Please tick all relevant 
boxes]. 
-Generator 
-Auto producer 
-Incumbent retail 
-Distributor 
-Retailer 
Coded as (1) Generator 
(2)Auto producer (3) 
Incumbent retail 
(4)Distributor (5)Retailer 
Encoded into four dummy 
variables with retailer 
variable being the benchmark 
case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Characterization, 
Determinants and Efficiency 
of Bidding in Electricity 
Auctions18 
 
6.1 Introduction 
With advancements in information technologies, online auction markets have been 
introduced (Kambil and van Heck, 2002) providing the necessary institutional framework to 
facilitate online trading. Bidder-level data has revealed the existence of significant 
heterogeneity in bidders’ strategies (e.g. Kauffman and Wood, 2006; Hortacsu and Puller, 
2008; Bapna et al., 2004, 2009; Goes et al., 2010, 2012; Lu et al., 2016) leading to different 
economic consequences. Those studies have raised the need for more complex stylization of 
supply function equilibrium models and have given rise to theory-driven empirical work on 
auctions (Hortacsu, 2011). Further they introduced large and complex trading-data sets at 
the bidder level which brings challenges, particularly for auctioneers, on understanding the 
determinants and productive efficiency of observed trading behaviour/strategy 
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 2000). In this chapter we focus on an online multi-unit uniform-price 
auction with the existence of oligopoly; namely the Electricity Day-Ahead (EDA) auctions. 
The susceptibility of these auctions to the exercise of unilateral market power makes them 
                                                             
18 Parts of this Chapter are accepted for the following conferences: 
Avci, E. (2018). Characterization, Determinants and Efficiency of Strategic Behavior in Multi-unit Auctions: 
Evidence from Electricity Markets. In 41st IAEE International Conference, Groningen, the Netherlands. 
Avci, E. (2018). Understanding strategic bidding in oligopolistic multi-unit auctions. In SCECR (Statistical Challenges 
in E-Commerce) 2018, Rotterdam, the Netherlands.  
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an ideal research setting to study the determinants of oligopolistic behaviour and productive 
efficiency (Wolak, 2010). Since electricity auctions are regulated they have detailed market 
surveillance rules that must be used by the auctioneer specifying precisely how market-
clearing prices are determined and defining the feasible set of market participant actions, i.e. 
accepted market practices (REMIT, 2011). Thus there are Market Surveillance Committees 
(MSCs) whose main aim is to provide independent oversight and analysis of auctions for the 
protection of consumers and bidders by the identification and reporting of market design 
flaws, potential market rule violations, and market abuse behaviour (CAISO, 2017). Market 
abuse behaviour in electricity auctions involves actions undertaken by persons that 
artificially cause prices to be at a level not justified by market forces of supply and demand, 
including actual availability of production, storage or transportation capacity (REMIT, 
2011).  
With the proliferation of electronic trading, there are millions of events (orders, 
trades, price-quantity matches etc.) per day (big data sets) and it is impossible to detect 
suspicious activity manually. The standard way of dealing with such big data is to aggregate 
it and expressing it in summary form for statistical analysis. Many market surveillance 
systems leverage these statistical techniques and technologies to quickly compare huge 
volumes of real-time data with historical data. Unfortunately, statistical analysis alone is not 
sufficient to fully understand what is happening amidst market complexity and why it is 
happening. When it is supplemented with behavioural analytics, MSCs can understand the 
intent behind these strategic behaviours (NASDAQ, 2017, Behavioural Analysis in Market 
Surveillance Report).  
The goal of the research presented in this Chapter is to demonstrate how a 
behavioural analytics approach can be used to address the cognitive and computational 
limitations of MSCs in their detection of manipulative behaviour.  
We adopt a three-stage analysis approach (Bapna et al., 2004). In the first stage, 
we use an inductive, data-driven approach to characterize strategic behaviour. We develop 
initial constructs before developing our hypotheses. The initial challenge was to identify 
observable classification variables that could be obtained from our EDA auction data set. In 
addition, we want to work with extrinsic variables that could subsequently be used by the 
MSC to monitor the market abuse behaviour. Therefore, we are not interested in measuring 
intrinsic bidder attributes like risk profile that could not be altered by modifying the 
105 
 
mechanism. We introduce five hourly classification variables- number of orders (for both 
bid and ask), maximum bid price, minimum ask price, ask price and supply withholding 
ratio- to characterize bidders’ behaviour in double sided multi-unit auctions. Note that the 
introduction of these hourly classification variables is a novel contribution to the 
characterization of bidding strategies in multi-unit uniform-price auction markets. Given that 
bidders participating in EDA auctions differ by size, forward commitment, generation 
technology and portfolio diversity, our novel classification variables can help us to better 
relate the observed bidding behaviour with the business profiles and needs of different 
bidders. The second stage is intended to explain why bidders choose different bidding 
strategies through using an econometric model. Drawing upon prior literature related to firm 
behaviour in electricity auctions, we identify four bidder-level factors that are critical to 
bidders’ strategic choices: forward commitment, size, type and diversity. To test our 
hypotheses, we develop an explanatory model of bidders’ strategic choices, using 
multinomial logistic regression (MNL). In the last stage, we analyse outcome efficiency and 
winning likelihood of each strategy.  
The research presented in this Chapter makes several important contributions. 
Firstly, it is the first to characterize bidding strategies adopted by professional bidders in 
oligopolistic multi-unit auction markets. As such, it complements two previous studies by 
Bapna et al. (2004) and Lu et al. (2016) that empirically investigate bidder heterogeneity 
through applying the three-stage analysis to B2B and B2C auctions. In particular, our finding 
that despite bidders’ extensive experiences there are still theoretically meaningful and 
empirically robust clusters of bidding strategies challenges the conventional view that 
bidders’ strategies will eventually converge as they gain experience over time. Second, while 
most of the auction research in information systems and marketing has looked into bidding 
behaviour in online spot markets without the existence of oligopoly and forward markets. 
We investigate a centralized product market with the existence of oligopolistic firm 
behaviour and forward markets. This allows us to empirically test the effects of size and 
forward commitment on firm’s choice of strategy, complementing and supporting the 
findings of Wolfram (1998), Wolak (2003), Hortacsu and Puller (2008), Bunn et al. (2015) 
and Hortacsu et al. (2017). Our study also contributes to the literature on how electricity 
supplier-bidders formulate their offers (e.g. Fabra and Reguant, 2014). Fourth, by analysing 
the economic impacts of bidding strategies, our study sheds new light on price dispersion in 
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auction markets. Finally, this work relates to the literature that studies differences in 
productivity across firms (e.g. Syverson, 2004; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).  
6.2. Theoretical Background 
6.2.1. Bidder Heterogeneity 
 
Traditionally, auctions have largely been studied from the game-theory perspective. Bidders 
are assumed to be homogeneous and adopt the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy (McAfee 
and McMillan, 1987; Milgrom, 1989; Myerson, 1981). When studying auctions, researchers 
use a Bayesian Nash model of bidding to “invert” bids to estimate valuations and then 
conduct counterfactual experiments to predict market outcomes under alternative auction 
formats (Hortacsu et al., 2017). However with the proliferation of electronic trading, the 
availability of bidder-level big data sets have made the assumptions behind these strategic 
equilibrium models questionable (Ariely and Simonson, 2003; Bajari and Hortacsu, 2004). 
This highlights the necessity of further developing explanaitons of real-life bidding 
behaviour. For example, using transaction data from Yankee auctions, Bapna et al. (2004) 
identify five different bidding strategies that result in different winning likelihoods and 
consumer surplus. They also discuss the promises of such bidder taxonomy in guiding the 
development of user-centric bidding agents and facilitating real-time auction calibration. A 
more recent study by Lu et al. (2016) extends the research on bidder taxonomy to B2C 
auctions and finds that bidders’ choice of bidding strategies is contingent on their budget 
constraints, demand and transaction cost. However, most of the empirical research on 
bidding behaviour has exclusively focused on B2C and B2B auctions where bidding 
activities are predominantly associated with willingness-to-pay (WTP) in a one-sided 
demand elastic context. A natural question arises: does the observed heterogeneity in B2B 
and B2C auctions still exists in an oligopolistic multi-unit auction setting and lead to bidders’ 
having an incentive to overstate their costs associated with providing a large quantity of the 
good (Wilson, 1979; Back and Zender, 1993; Ausubel and Cramton, 1998) or withholding 
their good from the market (Cramton, 2004)?  
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6.2.2. Strategic Bidding in EDA Auctions 
 
After the well-known California blackout in the 2000s, it is understood that some of the 
bidders were able to exercise strategic bidding and this led to abundant research to improve 
the understanding of bidder strategies leading to such million-dollar losses for the 
government and consumers. The first stream of studies (between 1996 and 2004) can be 
divided into two in terms of defining market power, as described below.  
(1) Identifying strategic bidding at market-level: finding evidence of strategic 
bidding through analysing the actual market outcome (market clearing price (MCP), or in 
some studies, system marginal price) and estimating a competitive market counterfactual by 
considering the technological specificities of suppliers in the supply stack (e.g. Wolfram, 
1999). This approach is less vulnerable to the arguments of coincidence, bad luck, or 
ignorance that may be directed at analysis of the actions of a specific generator (Borenstein 
et al., 2002). However it is less informative about the specific manifestations of non-
competitive bidding behaviour for different bidders (Tashpulatov, 2015). Also it captures all 
inefficiencies in the market, some of which may not be due to market power, including bad 
judgment and confusion on the part of some generators or market making institutions. For 
example, if low-cost generators are systematically held out of the merit order curve due to 
an inefficient dispatch algorithm, then that would impact the estimate of market power.  
(2) Identifying strategic bidding at bidder level: finding evidence of strategic 
bidding through analysing the bid price and the estimated marginal cost of each bidder to 
detect behaviour that can affect MCP (e.g. Wolfram, 1998; Bushnell and Wolak, 1999; 
Wolak, 2003; Puller, 2001; Borenstein et al., 2002). Keeping in mind that our main objective 
is not understanding strategic bidding at the market level, our study is in line with the second 
approach due its possible merits in terms of behavioural market monitoring. The most 
influential study in this stream is Wolfram (1998) which was one of the first to consider 
strategic bidding and heterogeneity in EDA auctions. She finds evidence of strategic bidding 
by comparing bidders’ bid price and their estimated marginal cost (composed of fuel price 
and efficiency index) and shows that significant heterogeneity exists within bidders through 
using mark up (the difference between MCP and bid price (not bid function)) as a dependent 
variable and available MWh below, unit capacity (declared installed capacity), bid impact, 
daily average predicted demand as independent variables in her ordinary least squares (OLS) 
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regression equations. She finds the larger supplier submits higher bids for similar plants. The 
(previous) Chair of the California MSC authored the first study to provide a direct link 
between the observed pattern of balancing prices and the bidding behaviour that produced 
those prices by examining information available to the MSC (Sheffrin, 2001). She examines 
bid data in the balancing auctions of the ISO and aims to understand whether bidders’ 
behaviour was responsible for raising prices above competitive levels. Her data set includes 
individual offer functions, bilateral and power exchange schedules from generation units and 
unit specific heat-rates for generation-level scheduled outages. She observed five bidding 
strategies: (1) no withholding; (2) full output at high mark-up; (3) physical withholding with 
no mark-up for bids submitted; (4) physical withholding used in combination with 
significant bid mark-ups; and (5) economic withholding. The similarity between these two 
empirical settings is the presence of large suppliers and the lack of liquidity in the market.  
The main drawback of these studies is that all of them ignore the functionality 
properties of the bid function but rather focus on the bid price. Thus they are not very 
informative in terms of the characterization of bidders' behaviour. Further, bidders are very 
few in number and there is little generation diversity of bidders in their considered markets 
which precludes observing a real heterogeneity. In addition they consider markets where 
bidders are required to report their start-up costs and marginal costs with their bid price 
which makes calculating mark up (the difference between MCP and bid price) 
straightforward and unbiased. However in most of the EU power markets, bidders submit 
only bid functions without any requirement for reporting marginal costs. This type of bidding 
necessitates novel identification approaches which are based only on the observed (realized) 
bid function.  
 
6.2.3. Importance of Characterizing the Bid Function for 
Understanding Strategic Bidding 
 
The other group of studies which consider the realized bid functions as actual market 
outcomes (Wolak, 2003; Hortacsu and Puller, 2008) consider strategic bidding as bidding 
above best response bidding and attempt to find evidence of oligopolistic firm behaviour 
through comparing realized bid function, and optimal bid function based on ex-post 
estimated marginal costs. Wolak (2003) investigates bidding behaviour in the Australian 
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EDA auctions (in which most of the participants in this market own multiple generators), 
through using cost function recovering techniques. He finds increasing, convex, marginal 
cost curves and argues that this may be the result of generators’ having sold significant 
amounts of forward contracts and thus hedging against unit outages. Because of the 
enormous financial risk associated with losing a single generator in real time combined with 
the inability to quickly bring up another unit in time to meet this contingency, generation 
unit owners apply a large and increasing opportunity cost to the last one third to one quarter 
of the capacity of each single generator (Partial Bidding). This study is one of the first that 
emphasizes the importance of partial bidding and forward commitments on market 
outcomes. Hortacsu and Puller (2008) is the first to investigate heterogeneity among a 
considerable number of bidders (30 bidders). Their data set is from the Texas balancing 
energy market (ERCOT) and they develop benchmark bid functions that maximize profits 
based on a distribution of realizations of residual demand and a firm's generation costs. They 
find that smaller bidders submit bids at offer prices higher than optimal (steeper bids). They 
suggest that this could be the result of institutional complexities in entering the auction, and 
fixed cost of establishing a sophisticated trading system which inhibits small bidders from 
constructing informed bid functions (less steep bid functions). However these two studies 
suffer from rationality and mutually consistency assumptions which may break down in real 
auction markets since bidders that compete in the same market can vary substantially along 
a number of dimensions such as size, sophistication and management staff. A very recent 
study, Hortacsu et al. (2017), using the same data in Hortacsu and Puller (2008), use a 
cognitive hierarchy model that allows for bounded rationality of bidders and find that there 
is significant heterogeneity across firms in terms of strategic sophistication (closeness of a 
bidder’s offer function to the assumed best response offer function) and larger bidders have 
higher levels of sophistication (indeed, in other words, larger firms submit less steep 
functions) confirming the results of Hortacsu and Puller (2008).  
 
6.2.4. Data-driven Approaches 
 
 
Hu et al. (2005) adopt a graphical approach to analyse the shapes of bids in the Australian 
National EDA. They find diversity in bidders’ bidding strategies, partially related to their 
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generation technologies, sizes and locations. They find that large suppliers have the ability 
to set and/or push market prices higher and display tendencies to withhold their capacities 
during peak periods. Zhang (2009) investigates generators' bidding behaviour in the New 
York EDA auction through manually dividing the generators into clusters based on the 
highest price of their bid. She finds that grouping choices are persistent, and generators in 
higher-priced groups tend to withhold their capacity strategically to push up market prices. 
Bosco et al. (2012) investigate strategic bidding in the Italian EDA auctions (13+ bidders). 
They find that forward contract commitments strongly improve the adaptability of existing 
theoretical models of bidding behaviour to the data generated in electricity markets. Bunn et 
al. (2015) examines the offer prices submitted to the British market by four coal-fired plants. 
They used bid data with price (lowest offer price) as a dependent variable and demand, 
reserve margin, system buy price, gas and coal price, dark spread, closing price of the day 
ahead market, loss of load probability, a measure of uncontracted output as exogenous 
variables. They show that among the factors affecting this heterogeneity (size, vertical 
integration, portfolio asset management and information asymmetry) only size is statistically 
significant.  
All of the data-driven studies in EDA auctions have many drawbacks. First, their 
sample is not representative in terms of diversity of firms. All of them focus on only suppliers 
ignoring the other types of players in the market. Second, since they consider suppliers, they 
can only analyse the offer curve. However day-ahead markets are well known for their 
double auction mechanism. That is a generator can have incentive to buy electricity up to a 
certain price level (i.e., maximum bid price). Thus analysing only offer prices of suppliers 
is like telling half of the story. Third, the number of firms/bidders are very limited due to 
lack of data or complexity of querying big data sets. Fourth, they conduct their analyses by 
taking the multi-dimensional bid function as a single point such as lowest offer price or 
maximum offer price. Therefore they are missing the rich shape of the bid function. 
Data-driven literature in other auction markets (e.g. Bapna et al., 2004; Goes et al., 
2012; Lu et al., 2016) show that bidder heterogeneity is best determined by considering 
different aspects of shape of bid function such as total number of order steps, number of 
bid/ask steps, maximum/minimum bid price/quantity, maximum/minimum offer 
price/quantity, bid-ask spread etc. Therefore to eliminate these drawbacks, we adopt the 
empirical research framework of Bapna et al. (2004), Goes et al. (2012) and Lu et al. (2016). 
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6.3. Conceptual Background 
Electricity wholesale markets are sequential clearing mechanisms which can be divided into 
four categories: day-ahead markets, intra-day markets, balancing and reserve markets, and 
forwards and futures markets. Among electricity markets, the day-ahead market, which 
determines the electricity prices for the delivery of electricity the next day, has a position of 
prominence. The prices coming from day-ahead markets are usually accepted as a reference 
point for the other electricity markets and bilateral contracts.  
Bidders can submit orders hourly or daily for a particular hour or period of hours, 
or they can make flexible orders. Orders are composed of quantity and price information that 
can change for different hours. Submitted order prices have centesimal sensitivity. Orders 
can be made in terms of Turkish Lira per MWh. Order volumes are submitted in terms of a 
Lot as an integer (one Lot is equivalent to 0.1 MWh). Orders can be submitted as bid and/or 
ask. Depending on the sign in front of the order quantity, the order is marked as either a bid 
or an ask (for instance, a 100 Lot indicates a bid, whereas a -100 Lot indicates an ask). A 
single order is a price and quantity schedule determined by the bidder. Basically, the bidders 
tell the auctioneer the price-quantity pair they are willing to trade for a particular hour of the 
next day. Table 6.1 demonstrates two single orders by a bidder for the first two periods of 
the day.  
 
TABLE 6.1: An example for single orders 
 
Hour 
Price (TRY)/MWh 
0 50 80 120 200 2000 
0 – 1  600 400 0 -200 -500 -1000 
1 – 2  300 300 200 0 -2000 -2000 
… … … … … … … 
 
For instance, in period 1, the bidder is willing to sell 200 MWh if the clearing price 
is above 120 TRY/MWh; and willing to buy 400 MWh if the clearing price is below 50 
TRY/MWh. Each time period corresponds to an hour in the Turkish market. Single hourly 
orders have a maximum of 64 steps which contain 32 bids and 32 asks. The prices of single 
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hourly orders must be listed in ascending order. In a single price step there cannot be valid 
single hourly orders for both bid and ask. During the formation of the supply-demand curve, 
the linear interpolation method is employed to interpolate values between two consecutive 
price/quantity steps. Minimum and maximum price limits are determined by the auctioneer 
and settled in the Turkish market as 0 TRY and 2,000 TRY respectively. Depending on 
changing market circumstances, the auctioneer can update the minimum and maximum price 
limits and announce them to bidders. Minimum and maximum bid quantities are determined 
by the market operator as ±100.000 Lot.  
6.4. Empirical Strategy 
We use a unique and complex data set from Turkey EDA auctions which contains details of 
hourly single orders each bidder submits to the EDA auctions from January 2, 2011 to March 
31, 2012 (90 auction days). Details of the raw data set can be seen in Table 6.2. In total we 
have 9,170 hourly forward transactions, corresponding to 89,243 single hourly orders. There 
are 721 registered bidders in the Turkish EDA auctions of which 252 are active of which 
132 give regular hourly bids during our empirical time framework. 
 
Table 6.2: Raw data for bidder-5B78C87D1D37958150FBEXSTSJDSAP for hour-17  
on January 27, 2012 
 
Date Hour  Bidder ID Order 
Type 
Ask 
Price 
Bid Price Quantity 
27-1-2012 17 5B78C87D1D37958150FBEXSTSJDSAP Hourly 0 1010 0 
27-1-2012 17 5B78C87D1D37958150FBEXSTSJDSAP Hourly 0 1010 109 
27-1-2012 17 5B78C87D1D37958150FBEXSTSJDSAP Hourly 0 510 109,01 
27-1-2012 17 5B78C87D1D37958150FBEXSTSJDSAP Hourly 0 510 110 
27-1-2012 17 5B78C87D1D37958150FBEXSTSJDSAP Hourly 0 0 110,01 
27-1-2012 17 5B78C87D1D37958150FBEXSTSJDSAP  Hourly 0 0 128,99 
27-1-2012 17 5B78C87D1D37958150FBEXSTSJDSAP Hourly 240 0 129 
27-1-2012 17 5B78C87D1D37958150FBEXSTSJDSAP Hourly 240 0 154,74 
27-1-2012 17 5B78C87D1D37958150FBEXSTSJDSAP Hourly 1020 0 154,75 
27-1-2012 17 5B78C87D1D37958150FBEXSTSJDSAP Hourly 1020 0 2000 
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6.4.1. Schematic Evidence on Bidder Heterogeneity 
 
 
Analysing bidders’ shapes of bids can give important insights about their approximate 
marginal cost and market and revenue expectations since there is a trade-off between volume 
of generation and MCP. As can be clearly observed from Figure 6.1, there are significant 
differences in bidding strategies of large portfolio bidders. Five of the bidders (bidders 3, 4, 
5, 11, and 16) commit all their capacities at very low price bands, indicating that they are 
following an inframarginal strategy. The offer of bidder-5 is even price-independent. The 
number of their bid steps are a few. They are happy to offer all their capacity at whatever 
the market price would be since they do not want to take the risk of being out of the merit 
order curve at the peak hour (when MCP is likely to be highest). The strategies of two state-
owned utilities seem to be very similar. The number of their order steps is highest, indicating 
their strategic sophistication. Bidders 2, 7, and 14 follow a physical withholding strategy in 
which they withhold approximately 40% of their capacity to commit at very high price bands 
(MCP+700 TRY).  
Table 6.3 presents representative order books submitted by a sample of individual 
(not portfolio) bidders with different generation technologies; fuel oil, natural gas, canal type 
hydropower, hydro dam, wind, imported coal, and lignite. We use the word ‘representative’ 
on purpose in the previous sentence since large proportion of bidders does not change their 
bidding strategies for the whole month as also observed in Zhang (2009) in Australian EDA 
auction bidders. There can be two possible explanations for this persistent behaviour 
(Heckman, 1981): (1) bidders’ past bidding behaviour can have a direct effect on current 
bidding behaviour, that is, if a bidder tests a certain strategy for a time and finds out that it 
is a profitable one, then he/she can keep the same strategy as long as expected market 
conditions are the same; and (2) bidders’ bidder-specific and time-invariant heterogeneity 
can lead to spurious state dependence.  
 
6.4.2. Identification of Strategic Variables: A Conceptual 
Perspective 
 
Unlike Bapna et al. (2004), we cannot observe when a bidder enters an auction and drops 
out since EDA auctions are hourly and they are conducted one day before the physical 
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delivery day. Each bidder is free to give bid/ask orders anytime until 11:00 on the physical 
delivery day. Therefore the time of the order (TOE in Bapna et al., 2004) is not a strategic 
decision for bidders. Instead, since electricity is a good with very limited storage capability 
and electricity wholesale markets are sequential auctions, one of key decisions in the EDA 
auction is to decide how much to bid/offer to the market. If, for example, a bidder offers all 
their hourly available capacity to the EDA auction and the outcome price is very low, then 
the bidder would lose the opportunity to bid in the balancing market in which the system 
marginal price could be higher. Another example could be given for a hydro dam bidder 
which have a fixed water storage capacity and water value. This type of bidder is a flexible 
one and can give more opportunistic orders to maximize value of its water. Further EDA 
auctions are double sided in which a bidder can give bid and ask orders in the same function. 
That is we can observe willingness to sell (WTS) as well as willingness to pay (WTP). Also 
due to being a multi-unit auction, bidders can give different ask prices for different quantity 
levels of the good. That is a bidder’s WTS price may be very low (even zero), but their price 
ladder above the WTS price may be opportunistic. Therefore for an EDA bidder, 
determining the withholding ratio and average ask price is one of the key decisions. These 
variables are also very important for revealing/monitoring EDA bidders’ strategies. 
 
115 
 
 
Fig. 6.1: Bid functions of large portfolio bidders on day X at hour 17:00 [Note: Y-axis: Ratio 
of ordered capacity is calculated as (order quantity/installed capacity)/ (DAM max. offer 
capacity on day X at hour 17:00)] 
 
As a result, we introduce five hourly classification variables- number of orders, 
willingness to pay, willingness to sell, ask price and withholding ratio- to characterize 
bidders’ behaviour in double sided multi-unit auctions. Note that the introduction of these 
hourly classification variables is a novel contribution to the characterization of bidding 
strategies in multi-unit auctions. Given that bidders participating in EDA auctions differ with 
respect to their size, forward commitment, generation technology and portfolio diversity; 
our novel classification variables can help better relate the observed bidding behaviour with 
the business profiles and needs of different bidders. In this section, we describe how we 
construct each of these classification variables. 
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Number of orders (NOO) 
NOO is the total number of orders a bidder submits hourly. With the existence of bidding 
and monitoring costs in the auction setting, NOO is an indicator of bidder’s sophistication 
(Bapna et al., 2004). In EDA auctions, there is no cost for bidding; that is, a bidder is not 
paying more when he increases his number of orders. Thus NOO is related only to 
monitoring costs by which we mean the money spent by bidders to understand the auction 
pricing mechanism such as hiring market analysts, subscribing to large energy databases in 
order to be able reach private information and/or buying expensive forecast software or 
consultancy. Therefore we take it as a proxy for the value of bidders’ sophistication.  
 
Willingness to pay (WTP) 
WTP is the highest price that a buyer (i.e., bidder) is willing to pay for a good/part of a good. 
This corresponds to the standard economic view of buyer reservation price. It is usually 
referred to simply as the bid price or bid in Internet auctions and stock exchanges. According 
to the constructive preference view, consumer WTP is a context-sensitive construct, that is, 
a consumer's maximum WTP for a product depends on the concrete decision context. Many 
methods to measure WTP are presented in the literature (Breidert et al., 2006). The 
approaches to measure WTP differ according to whether they measure WTP directly or 
indirectly and whether they measure hypothetical or actual WTP (Miller et al., 2011). In 
practice, some researchers favour the direct approach, asking consumers directly to state 
their WTP for a specific product through, for example, an open-ended question format. 
Others prefer an indirect approach, such as choice-based conjoint analysis, in which WTP is 
calculated on the basis of consumers' choices among several product alternatives and a 
‘none’ choice option. However, neither method is fool proof. A direct approach to elicit 
actual WTP is a mechanism that Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) propose (Becker–
DeGroot–Marschak method), in which a participant is obligated to purchase a product if the 
price drawn from a lottery is less than or equal to his or her stated WTP (Wertenbroch and 
Bernd, 2002). However, an actual WTP generated with these methods may not always be 
accurate, because it may differ from the WTP shown in real consumer purchases. In EDA 
auctions context, bidders WTP mostly depends on the optimal bidding strategies. That is, an 
EDA bidder can pay for electricity as long as its generation cost is higher than the WTP 
price. Therefore, minimum ask price can be taken as the actual WTP in EDA auctions. 
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TABLE 6.3: Representative order books submitted by individual bidders. Note: IC is the installed capacity of the 
related bidder, P is the MCP at hour 17:00 on the day these order books submitted. 
 
Bidder Type Hour Order Type Ask Bid Price 
Bidder X 
Fuel Oil 
(only seller) 
17 Hourly 0 0 0 
17 Hourly ICX 0 P+190 
17 Hourly ICX 0 2000 
 
 
Bidder Y 
Imported Coal 
(only seller) 
17 Hourly (0.52) ICY 0 0 
17 Hourly (0.52) ICY 0 P-40 
17 Hourly (0.52) ICY 0 P-25 
17 Hourly (0.52) ICY 0 P-15 
17 Hourly (0.93) ICY 0 P-10 
17 Hourly (0.93) ICY 0 2000 
 
 
 
Bidder Z 
Hard Coal 
(both buyer and seller) 
17 Hourly 0 (0.10) ICZ 0 
17 Hourly 0 (0.10) ICZ P-60.01 
17 Hourly 0 0 P-60 
17 Hourly 0 0 P-30.01 
17 Hourly (0.14) ICZ 0 P-30 
17 Hourly (0.14) ICZ 0 2000 
Bidder T 
Lignite (only seller) 
17 Hourly (1.40) ICT 0 0 
17 Hourly (1.40) ICT 0 2000 
 
Bidder K 
Natural Gas  
(both buyer and seller) 
17 Hourly 0 (0.05) ICK 0 
17 Hourly 0 (0.05) ICK P-31 
17 Hourly (0.25) ICK 0 P-30.01 
17 Hourly (0.93) ICK 0 P-25.01 
17 Hourly (0.93) ICK 0 2000 
Bidder L 
Canal type bidder (only seller) 
 
17 Hourly (0.85) ICL 0 0 
17 Hourly (0.85) ICL 0 2000 
Bidder M 
Hydro bidder (only seller) 
17 Hourly (0.90) ICM 0 0 
17 Hourly (0.90) ICM 0 2000 
 
 
Bidder N 
Dam Hydro bidder  
(both buyer and seller) 
17 Hourly 0 (0.40) ICN 0 
17 Hourly 0 (0.40) ICN P-65.37 
17 Hourly (0.08) ICN 0 P-65.36 
17 Hourly (0.08) ICN 0 P+40.16 
17 Hourly (0.60) ICN 0 P+40.17 
17 Hourly (0.60) ICN 0 2000 
Bidder U 
Wind (only seller) 
 
   17 Hourly (0.85) ICU 0 0 
   17 Hourly (0.85) ICU 0 2000 
 
 
Bidder V 
Portfolio  
(only buyer) 
   17 Hourly 0 (0.60) ICV 0 
   17 Hourly 0 (0.40) ICV P-10.01 
   17 Hourly 0 (0.40) ICV P-10 
   17 Hourly 0 (0.20) ICV P+19.99 
   17 Hourly 0 (0.20) ICV P+20 
   17 Hourly 0 (0.10) ICV  2000 
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Willingness to sell (WTS) 
WTS is the lowest price a seller (i.e., bidder) is willing to accept for a good/part of a good. 
It is usually referred to simply as the ask price or ask in single-unit Internet auctions and 
stock exchanges. In the general auction literature, WTS is defined as the opportunity cost of 
producing that unit of output, since sellers would not sell that unit below the cost of 
producing it, but would sell if the price was greater than their marginal cost. That is, WTS 
is usually taken as a proxy for the seller’s marginal cost which includes the supplier’s 
marginal production cost, but also includes opportunity costs, such as the sale into a higher 
priced market. Since electricity is sold in a sequence of related markets, the opportunity costs 
are especially important and give the bidders bid above marginal cost a supplier decides to 
produce less than is economically feasible at a given price level, because the higher price 
level associated with the lower output maximizes the supplier’s profits (Cramton, 2004). 
This is an indicator for economic withholding. Further, being a uniform price auction market, 
bidders have an incentive to bid 'untruthfully' by overstating their costs (Wilson, 1979; 
Ausubel and Cramton, 2002).  
   
Ask price (ASKP) 
A multi-unit auction allows participants to partially fulfil their orders, for accepted orders 
that are below MCP. Thus each bid is not an `all-or-nothing' proposition, but rather will have 
portions that are accepted and rejected. Therefore almost all equilibriums in a multi-unit 
auction contain some strategic bidding (Wang and Zender, 2002). Each rational bidder in 
multi-unit auctions sets the offer at each quantity at the point where the marginal gain from 
offering a little bit more (a higher price on the quantity sold) exactly balances the marginal 
loss (failure to get the spread between the offer and marginal cost on the expected available 
quantity that will go unsold as a result of the higher bid). This introduces non-convexities in 
the supplier’s cost function that it is unable to express in its offer function (Cramton, 2004) 
and leads to physical withholding behaviour in EDA auctions. To capture this behaviour, we 
adopted a bid price formula used by the UK National Grid Company in order to calculate 
the bid price as a function of output from the unit. This bid price is also commonly used in 
the empirical literature starting from Wolfram (1998) and using the UK Pool data. We 
modified the above formula as presented in Equation (1): 
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𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  
𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑙𝑏𝑜𝑤𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 (𝑀𝑎𝑥. 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦)
 
 
Where 𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 is the quantity (Lot=0.1 MW) offered at the WTP price; 
𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖  is the offer price in TRY/Lot of the 𝐸𝑙𝑏𝑜𝑤𝑖  and 𝐸𝑙𝑏𝑜𝑤𝑖 is the Lot (0.1 MW) 
offer of 𝐸𝑙𝑏𝑜𝑤𝑖 . Our definition of 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 can be thought as a weighted average of ask 
prices multiplied by the corresponding increments in quantity offered.  
 
Withholding ratio (WR)  
We define a bidder’s WR as follows in Equation (2): 
 
 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡(𝑀𝑎𝑥. 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦) − 𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 (𝑀𝑎𝑥. 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦)
 
 
where 𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 is the quantity (0.1 MW) offered at the WTP price. This ratio 
indicates the percentage of quantity that the bidder withholds for strategic bidding after 
guaranteeing to sell the 𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 at WTS price. 
 
6.4.3. Classification Methodology 
 
We use an efficient K-means clustering algorithm developed by Hartigan and Wong (1979). 
A key factor in choosing this method was its proficiency in handling large data sets like ours. 
Our bidder data point is a vector of five variables: NOO, WTP, WTS, ASKP and WR. If 
heterogeneity exists along these five dimensions, we expect the data vectors to form several 
clusters in the five-dimensional space. Well-formed clusters are characterized by small intra-
cluster distance and large inter-cluster distance. The algorithm aims to partition the points 
into K disjoint groups such that the sum of squares from points to the assigned cluster centres 
is minimized. At the minimum, all cluster centres are at the mean of their Voronoi sets (the 
set of data points which are nearest to the cluster centre). A potential limitation of this 
approach is the a priori specification of the number of clusters, K. In our context, we do not 
know in advance how many different bidding strategies exist.  
(1) 
(2) 
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Given the exploratory nature of this research, we followed the procedure suggested 
by Koehly (2001) and started with a hierarchical clustering to examine the cluster structure 
at different levels. Next, we repeated K-means clustering with a range of different values of 
K (Kmin = 2, Kmax = 10). According to the Calinski-Harabasz criterion (Milligan and 
Cooper, 1985), the optimal number of clusters is five. We compared the cluster centres under 
hierarchical clustering and K-means clustering (K = 5), and found the results were very 
consistent. Note that good scores on an internal criterion (e.g. Calinski-Harabasz criterion) 
do not necessarily translate into the effectiveness of K-means clustering. An alternative, and 
perhaps better evaluation, is to look at the interpretability of the clustering results. This is 
often referred to as external validity. In our case, we used ANOVA to test whether there are 
significant differences between the cluster centroids. As shown in Table 6.4 the differences 
between the five clusters from K-means clustering are statistically significant. 
 
TABLE 6.4: ANOVA results for each cluster 
 
Variable Cluster 
Mean Square 
Error 
Mean Square 
F Significance 
NOO 6122.9 28.8 212.42 .000 
WTP 236391961 208279 1135 .000 
WTS 408190 9741 41.91 .000 
ASKP 4361454 13770 316.7 .000 
WR 2.8361 0.0906 31.3 .000 
 
Further, we also conducted a robustness test on the clustering results using cross 
validation. Specifically, we randomly split the observations into two parts, one with two 
thirds of the observations (training set) and the other with one third of the observations (test 
set). We applied K-means clustering (K = 5) to the training set and used the identified cluster 
centres to label the observations from the test set. We then checked whether the labels of the 
observations in the test set are the same as the ones resulting from the K-means clustering 
on the whole data set. We repeated this process 100 times and found that 99.9 percent of the 
observations from the test set have the same label. This confirms that our clustering results 
are very stable. 
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6.4.4. Bidder Strategy Analysis 
 
This section discusses the strategic implications of different bidder behaviours as 
represented by the five clusters. Table 6.5 contains the classification results. The values 
present mean of the data in each cluster. We name each class of bidders based on the unique 
characteristics conveyed by the corresponding parameter values.  
 
TABLE 6.5: Cluster Centres 
 
 
Cluster Name 
Cluster Dimension 
NOO WTP WTS ASKP WR 
Inframarginal 2.52 7.95 1.92 1.92 0 
Physical Withholder 2.87 0 0.05 180.83 0.18 
Economic Withholder 8.34 64.87 148.62 163.19 0.31 
Opportunists 5.44 6.85 332.52 504.11 0.24 
Risk Averse 2.2 2000 0 0 0 
 
The first cluster is inframarginal. These bidders mostly place price independent ask 
orders (that is minimum ASKP is zero) with only two order steps, reflecting their willingness 
to offer to the spot market at any price. Their WTP is very low near to zero. Such low prices 
have not been observed in the Turkish EDA market indicating that these bidders give bid 
orders near to zero only for a hypothetical situation. We can say that bidders in this cluster 
are only sellers. Another interesting thing is that their WR is zero reflecting their aversion to 
strategic bidding. The second cluster is physical withholders who are only sellers (since 
WTP is zero) with a WTS close to zero. This cluster differs from inframarginals in terms of 
its ASKP which indicates that although these bidders are willing to guarantee selling a part 
of their supply, they withhold on the average 0.18% of their supply for strategic bidding. In 
fact the difference between ASKP and WTS also reflects the steepness of these bidders’ bid 
function. The third cluster is economic withholders which have the highest number of orders 
indicating they are the most sophisticated bidder type. They are able to construct 
(sophisticated) profit maximizing bid functions. Also they give both bid and ask orders that 
is they are both buyers and sellers. They have the highest WR but this cluster differs from 
physical withholders in that their average WTS is 148 compared to physical withholders’ 
zero WTS, reflecting the less steep supply function of economic withholders. The fourth 
cluster is opportunists with the highest WTS and ASKP. Their WR is also one of the highest. 
122 
 
Bidders in this group may have the highest marginal costs, therefore they have to operate at 
only peak hours (even mostly in crisis times, their annual working hours are very low). The 
last cluster is risk averse bidders who only buy from the spot market to close their positions 
in the forward market. Their WTP is at the market price cap 2,000 TL reflecting their 
eagerness to buy from the spot at any price. Their WTS and ASKP is zero indicating that 
they do not offer to the spot market. Given that all bidders in the EDA auctions are 
professionals and have more than sufficient bidding experience, the existence of these 
distinctive bidding strategies challenges the popular view that bidders’ strategies will 
converge as they gain experience. 
 
6.4.5. Determinants of Bidders’ Strategy Choice 
 
Drawing upon prior literature, we identify four bidder-level factors that are critical to 
bidders’ strategic choices: forward commitment, size, type and diversity.  
 
Forward commitment 
Institutional complexities in electricity wholesale markets make the incentives for bidding 
in day-ahead auctions more complicated. In electricity wholesale markets, most of the 
electricity is traded through bilateral forward contracts between producers and users of 
electricity. These contract obligations determine the bidders’ net buy or net sell positions in 
the spot market, and therefore affect bidding incentives (Hortacsu and Puller, 2008). Since 
a bidder with a high forward commitment ratio has to supply a large proportion of its 
maximum available capacity to its retail customers, it has an effectively smaller position on 
the spot market and less incentive to give high offer prices (Bushnell et al., 2008). Similarly, 
the findings of Allaz and Vila (1993) lead to the expectation that with greater forward 
commitments, we would see lower spot prices, at least in a short run. Wolak (2003) analyses 
the Australia NEM1 day-ahead auctions to find the impact of forward contracts on bidding 
behaviour. He shows that if a bidder’s forward contract quantity is a large enough fraction 
of this bidder’s expected offer quantity into the market, this can cause this bidder to find it 
optimal to offer at low prices. Consistently, the risk-neutral generators modelled by 
Sioshansi and Oren (2007) and Hortaçsu and Puller (2008) submit offer prices closer to 
marginal costs, the larger their forward commitments. Wolak (2000) and Bushnell et al. 
123 
 
(2008) also point out that forward contract positions are important determinants of bidding 
behaviour. Many other industries, in the presence of long-term fixed- price contracts, are 
likely to influence the bidding strategies in the spot market. This raises the question of why 
some companies have larger forward commitments than others. The agent-based simulation 
analysis by Sanchez et al. (2009), allowing learning and risk aversion in a supply function 
competition model, shows that the larger players prefer to exercise market power in the 
balancing market, while smaller companies prefer the security of contracting forward. This 
suggests an indirect effect of bidder’ size on offer strategies. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
H1a: Bidders with high forward commitment ratios are more likely choose the 
inframarginal strategy over the physical withholding strategy (Allaz-Villa Hypothesis)  
H1b: Bidders with high forward commitment ratios are more likely choose the 
inframarginal strategy over the economic withholding strategy (Supply Function Gaming) 
H1c: Bidders with high forward commitment ratios are more likely to choose the 
risk averse strategy over other strategies. 
 
Size 
Size is the available offer capacity which a company can bring to the spot market at short 
notice. It is expected to be associated with market power and market leadership. Wolfram 
(1998) found that larger bidders submited higher offer prices (corresponding to ASKP in the 
present research) for similar plants. Bunn et al. (2015) find that the mean of the smallest 
bidders offer prices (corresponding to WTS in the present research) were significantly lower. 
The largest one, a portfolio company, gave higher offer prices. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
H2a: Large bidders are more likely choose the economic withholding strategy over 
either the inframarginal or risk averse strategy.  
H2b: Large bidders are more likely choose the physical withholding strategy over 
other strategies.  
 
Hortacsu and Puller (2008) find that large firms in the balancing market performed 
close to the theoretical benchmark of static profit maximization. However, smaller firms 
submitted excessively steep offer functions significantly deviating from this benchmark and 
resulting in a very high surplus. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
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H2c: Small bidders are more likely choose the opportunist strategy over other 
strategies.  
 
Type 
Type of a bidder is the generation technology written in its generation license. There are 
generally six types of bidders in day-ahead auctions, namely natural gas, hydro dam, canal, 
wind, conventional and portfolio. The institutional complexity of electricity wholesale 
markets and heterogeneity in marginal costs of different types of bidders affects bidders’ 
strategy choice. One of the most important institutional complexities in electricity wholesale 
markets is the sequential clearing of related markets which raises opportunity costs for 
bidders with storage capacities. For a hydrodam bidder, fed from a limited pool of water, 
offering in the day-ahead market today can imply less available offer capacity for tomorrow 
or for the balancing market. Therefore, even if today’s price is above the hydroelectric 
generator’s variable cost (zero), the generator has an incentive to bid at least their 
opportunity cost based on their prediction of future and balancing prices. Therefore, we 
hypothesize:  
H3a: Hydrodam bidders are more likely to choose the physical withholding 
strategy over other strategies.  
Since bidders without storage capacities (and with marginal cost near to zero) do 
not have any opportunity costs for trading in the sequential markets, most optimal strategy 
for them would be to follow either the price independent offer (inframarginal) or risk averse 
strategy. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
H3b: Canal and wind bidders are more likely to choose either the inframarginal or 
risk averse strategy over other strategies.  
Conventional bidders (hard coal, imported coal and fuel oil) have high marginal 
costs thus they are more likely to offer at peak hours with high prices. Therefore, we 
hypothesize:  
H3c: Conventional bidders are more likely to choose the opportunist strategy over 
other strategies.  
One of the merits of day-ahead auction mechanism is letting bidders make portfolio 
bidding (the opportunity to submit bids/offers on a portfolio basis) so that bidders can 
balance their own portfolios before the trading day starts so that they have an incentive to 
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follow less aggressive strategies in day-ahead market like inframarginal or risk averse 
strategies. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
H3d: Portfolio bidders are more likely to choose either the inframarginal or risk 
averse strategy over other strategies. 
 
Diversity 
Bidders with more diversified portfolios can take advantage of short-term inelasticities in 
the supply and demand schedules to earn greater profits (EFET, 2010). Therefore, we 
hypothesize:  
H4: More diversified bidders are more likely to choose physical withholding, 
economic withholding and opportunist strategies over inframarginal and risk averse 
strategies.  
 
6.4.6. Explanatory Model of Bidders’ Choice of Bidding 
Strategies 
 
To test our hypotheses, we develop an explanatory model of bidders’ strategic choices, using 
MNL, which has been used to model individual choice in a variety of social, economic, and 
political contexts (Greene, 2008). The MNL model relies on the assumption of independence 
of irrelevant alternative (IIA), which could be troublesome in practice, especially if some of 
the choices are close substitutes (McFadden, 1973). However, since the five identified 
bidding strategies form a partition of bidders’ strategic choice space, IIA is less of an issue 
in our case. In our case, we model the log odds of a bidder choosing strategy i relative to a 
baseline strategy on a given day as a linear combination of four explanatory variables that 
reflect bidders’ forward commitment, size, type, and diversity. The generic model is 
specified as follows in Equation (3):  
 
𝒍𝒐𝒈 (
𝒑 (𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒚 = 𝒊)
𝒑 (𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒚)
)
= 𝜷𝟎,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏,𝒊𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐,𝒊𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 + 𝜷𝟑,𝒊𝑻𝒚𝒑𝒆 +  𝜷𝟒,𝒊 𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 
 
In Equation (3), 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 is a numeric variable which is calculated 
by dividing the bidder’s forward committed quantity over its installed capacity. 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 is a 
(3) 
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categorical variable which takes the value 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 for bidders corresponding to very 
small (x<10 MW), small (10 MW <x<50 MW), medium (50 MW <x<150 MW), large (150 
MW <x<300 MW), or very large (x>300 MW). 𝑻𝒚𝒑𝒆 is a categorical variable which takes 
the value 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 corresponding to auctions of natural gas, hydro dam, canal, wind, 
conventional (hard coal, imported coal, fuel oil), portfolio. 𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 is a categorical 
variable which takes the value 1, 2, or 3 corresponding to bidders who are undiversified (has 
one type of utility), semi-diversified (has up to three types of utilities), or highly diversified 
(has more than three types of utility). The coefficients 𝜷𝟎,𝒊 , 𝜷𝟏,𝒊 , 𝜷𝟐,𝒊 , 𝜷𝟑,𝒊 , 𝜷𝟒,𝒊 can be 
interpreted as the increase in log odds of choosing strategy i over the reference strategy 
resulting from a one-unit increase in 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆, 𝑻𝒚𝒑𝒆 and 𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 
respectively, given the other variables are held constant. We run the MNL model with 
different reference strategies. The parameter estimates are reported in Table 6.6.To begin 
with, we can see that when a bidder has a high forward commitment ratio, he/she is more 
likely to choose the risk averse strategy over other strategies (estimates coefficients are 
17.846, 15.462, 19.521, 16.472 for inframarginal, physical withholding, economic 
withholding and opportunist), while other conditions are kept constant. This finding supports 
H1b and H1c. H1a is not supported since bidders with high forward commitments are more 
likely to adopt physical withholding over the inframarginal strategy. This finding can be 
explained by the indirect effect of size on forward commitment ratio as stated by Sanchez et 
al. (2009) who find that smaller companies prefer the security of contracting forward more 
than large ones.  
Further we find that, compared to very small sized bidders, very large sized bidders 
(bidders with market power) are more likely to choose the physical and economic 
withholding strategies over the inframarginal strategy which supports H2a, H2b, and H2c. 
The least preferred strategy by this type of bidders is the risk averse strategy, indicating that 
these bidders try to exercise their power in the spot market rather than in the forward market. 
However, large sized bidders, compared to very small sized firms, are more likely to adopt 
the risk averse strategy over other strategies. This indicates that although these bidders are 
large, since they do not have any power on the market they prefer safer bilateral agreements. 
Medium sized bidders, compared to very small sized bidders, are more likely to choose the 
physical withholding strategy over other strategies similar to the very large sized bidders. 
Small sized bidders, compared to very small sized bidders, are more likely to adopt the 
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opportunist strategy over other strategies (risk averse, inframarginal, economic withholding, 
and physical withholding), supporting H1c. 
To begin with, we can see that when a bidder has a high forward commitment ratio, 
he/she is more likely to choose the risk averse strategy over other strategies (estimates 
coefficients are 17.846, 15.462, 19.521, 16.472 for inframarginal, physical withholding, 
economic withholding and opportunist), while other conditions are kept constant. This 
finding supports H1b and H1c. H1a is not supported since bidders with high forward 
commitments are more likely to adopt physical withholding over the inframarginal strategy. 
This finding can be explained by the indirect effect of size on forward commitment ratio as 
stated by Sanchez et al. (2009) who find that smaller companies prefer the security of 
contracting forward more than large ones.  
Further we find that, compared to very small sized bidders, very large sized bidders 
(bidders with market power) are more likely to choose the physical and economic 
withholding strategies over the inframarginal strategy which supports H2a, H2b, and H2c. 
The least preferred strategy by this type of bidders is the risk averse strategy, indicating that 
these bidders try to exercise their power in the spot market rather than in the forward market. 
However, large sized bidders, compared to very small sized firms, are more likely to adopt 
the risk averse strategy over other strategies. This indicates that although these bidders are 
large, since they do not have any power on the market they prefer safer bilateral agreements. 
Medium sized bidders, compared to very small sized bidders, are more likely to choose the 
physical withholding strategy over other strategies similar to the very large sized bidders. 
Small sized bidders, compared to very small sized bidders, are more likely to adopt the 
opportunist strategy over other strategies (risk averse, inframarginal, economic withholding, 
and physical withholding), supporting H1c. 
We also find that hydro dam bidders, compared to natural gas bidders are more 
likely to adopt the physical withholding strategy over other strategies, supporting H3a. We 
can also see that log odds of a bidder choosing the risk averse strategy over physical 
withholding increases significantly if moving from type=natural gas to type=canal. Canal 
type bidders are more likely to adopt the risk averse strategy over other strategies. Log odds 
of a bidder choosing the inframarginal strategy over risk averse increases significantly if 
moving from type=natural gas to type=wind. Wind type bidders are more likely to adopt the 
inframarginal strategy over others. Conventional bidders are more likely to adopt the 
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opportunist strategy over the inframarginal strategy compared to natural gas bidders. 
Portfolio bidders are more likely to use the inframarginal and risk averse strategies over the 
physical withholding, economic withholding and opportunist strategies compared to natural 
gas bidders.  
Further we find that log odds of a bidder choosing the physical and economic 
withholding strategies over other strategies increases significantly if moving from an 
undiversified to semi-diversified bidder. Similarly, highly diversified bidders are more likely 
to adopt the physical withholding and economic withholding strategies over other strategies 
compared to undiversified bidders. Table 6.7 provides a summary of our findings.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6.6: Parameter Estimates 
 
 
 
Strategy 
 
 
Variable 
Reference Strategy 
Inframarginal Physical 
Withholders 
Economic 
Withholders 
Opportunists 
 
P
h
y
si
c
a
l 
W
it
h
h
o
ld
e
r
s 
Intercept -2.858***    
ForwardCR 2.383***    
Size2 (small) -0.370    
Size3 (medium) 0.467*    
Size4 (large) -1.214***    
Size5(very large) 3.270***    
Type2(HydDam) 34.775***    
Type3(Canal) 2.363***    
Type4(Wind) -34.507***    
Type5(Conv) -21.713***    
Type6(Portfolio) -26.288***    
Diversity2 1.381***    
Diversity3 24.462***    
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 
W
it
h
h
o
ld
e
r
s 
Intercept 2.083*** 4.941***   
ForwardCR -1.674*** -4.058***   
Size2 (small) -0.439** -0.068   
Size3 (medium) -0.226 -0.694**   
Size4 (large) 0.667** 1.881***   
Size5(very large) 3.668*** 0.398***   
Type2(HydDam) 30.665*** -4.110   
Type3(Canal) -30.836*** -46.800   
Type4(Wind) -45.743 -6.731   
Type5(Conv) -2.868*** 33.836***   
Type6(Portfolio) -2.474*** 20.235   
Diversity2 0.538* -0.611   
Diversity3 0.560* -20.322   
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O
p
p
o
r
tu
n
is
ts
 
 
Intercept -18.668*** -16.773*** -27.163***  
ForwardCR 1.373* -1.010* 3.048***  
Size2 (small) 16.549*** 17.882*** 23.400***  
Size3 (medium) -4.842*** -0.613*** -5.642***  
Size4 (large) -1.874** 2.710*** -13.577***  
Size5(very large) -4.743*** -11.812*** -14.796***  
Type2(HydDam) 32.971*** -1.803*** 2.306***  
Type3(Canal) -16.844*** -17.511*** -9.309***  
Type4(Wind) -26.980*** 5.350*** -1.791***  
Type5(Conv) 2.924*** 39.629*** 5.793***  
Type6(Portfolio) -16.295 4.298* -20.257***  
Diversity2 0.721 -1.267 -2.997***  
Diversity3 16.386*** -7.527*** 12.041***  
R
is
k
 A
v
e
r
se
 
 
Intercept -47.961*** -49.871*** -63.474*** -37.942*** 
ForwardCR 17.846*** 15.462*** 19.521*** 16.472*** 
Size2 (small) -0.102 0.268 0.337 -17.006*** 
Size3 (medium) -22.598*** -17.752*** -25.733 -28.053*** 
Size4 (large) 2.934*** 4.149*** 2.267** 7.749*** 
Size5(very large) -17.764*** -27.483*** -20.251*** -8.362*** 
Type2(HydDam) 43.484*** -8.487 11.288*** 4.627*** 
Type3(Canal) 34.676*** 37.082 70.661*** 71.024*** 
Type4(Wind) -7.328*** 35.862*** 42.850 36.287*** 
Type5(Conv) 15.791 62.278*** 8.011*** 1.814 
Type6(Portfolio) 30.316*** 57.795 46.220*** 71.610*** 
Diversity2 -0.421 -1.571** -0.960* 0.558** 
Diversity3 -11.817*** -27.966 -10.587*** -29.446 
 
6.5. Discussion 
6.5.1. Analysis of Winning Percentage  
 
We first determine whether the strategies differ in the winning percentage they yield to their 
adopters. To do so, we tested the following hypothesis using single-factor ANOVA with five 
levels representing the different types of bidders. 
H1: All bidding strategies have similar likelihoods of winning, as reflected in the 
proportion of winners versus losers.  
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TABLE 6.7: Summary of Hypothesis Test 
 
  
HYPOTHESIS 
 
Result 
H1a Bidders with high forward commitment ratios are more likely to choose the 
inframarginal strategy over the physical withholding strategy (Allaz-Villa 
Hypothesis) 
H1a is not 
supported 
H1b Bidders with high forward commitment ratios are more likely to choose the 
inframarginal strategy over the economic withholding strategy (Supply 
Function Gaming) 
H1b is supported 
H1c Bidders with high forward commitment ratios are more likely to choose the 
risk averse strategy over other strategies. 
H1c is supported 
H2a Large bidders are more likely to choose the economic withholding strategy 
over either the inframarginal or risk averse strategy. 
H2a is supported 
H2b Large bidders are more likely to choose the physical withholding strategy 
over other strategies 
H2b is supported 
H2c Small bidders are more likely to choose the opportunist strategy over other 
strategies. 
H2c is supported 
H3a Hydro dam bidders are more likely to choose the physical withholding 
strategy over other strategies. 
H3a is supported 
H3b Canal and wind bidders are more likely to choose either the inframarginal 
or risk averse strategy over other strategies. 
H3b is supported 
H3c Conventional bidders are more likely to choose the opportunist strategy over 
other strategies. 
H3c is supported 
H3d Portfolio bidders are more likely to choose either the inframarginal or risk 
averse strategy over other strategies. 
H3d is supported 
H4 More diversified bidders are more likely to choose physical withholding, 
economic withholding and opportunist strategies over inframarginal and 
risk averse strategies. 
H4 is supported 
 
Table 6.8 displays the summary results from the ANOVA test. The significant F-
values indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of equality of mean winning percentage 
among the different bidder classes.  
TABLE 6.8: ANOVA-Winning Proportions 
 
Source of Variation SS Df MS F Significance 
Between Groups 38.122 4 9.5304 177.6 .000 
Within Groups 171.018 3187 0.0537   
 
Subsequently, to compare the bidding strategies with each other, we performed 
pairwise hypothesis tests on the differences between winning proportions. To deal with the 
inflation problem associated with pairwise comparisons, we used the Bonferroni adjustment. 
Table 6.9 summarizes the results of hypothesis tests. Values of .000 imply that the null 
hypothesis of equality of two means is rejected with a p-value of zero (for value 1, vice 
versa). The average winning percentage indicates what fraction of a certain bidding strategy 
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resulted in a win. Inframarginal and physical withholders have significantly higher winning 
proportions than economic witholders, opportunists and risk averse.  
 
TABLE 6.9: Pairwise Comparison - Difference of winning proportions 
 
 Cluster Name 
  
(Average Winning Percentage 
%) 
 
Risk Averse 
(100%) 
 
Economic 
withholders 
 
Inframarginal 
Physical 
Withholders 
Economic withholders (86%) .000 - - - 
Inframarginal (99%) 1 .000 - - 
Physical Withholders (98%) 1 .000 1 - 
Opportunists (45%) .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
6.5.2. Analysis of Productive Efficiency  
 
In auction markets, bidders develop offer curves, which normally have higher prices bid for 
higher quantities of output offered. These bidders will choose their offer curves so as to 
maximize their profits, which will entail making independent decisions trading off marginal 
gains from a higher bid curve against marginal losses from foregone output. This is the 
essential profit maximizing decision expected of each supplier acting independently in bid-
based electricity markets. This profit maximizing behaviour results in offer curves above 
marginal cost, some supply being unsold.  
We calculate a bidder’s surplus as in Equation (4): 
 
𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 =  
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡(𝑀𝑎𝑥. 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦) − 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑀𝐶𝑃
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 (𝑀𝑎𝑥. 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦)
 
 
The analysis is similar to the analysis of winning percentage. We use ANOVA to 
test the overall equality of means. If ANOVA suggests significant differences in the mean 
loss of surplus, we conduct pairwise tests to compare the bidder classes with each other. Our 
initial hypothesis is  
H2: All bidding classes have the same level of loss of surplus.  
Table 6.10 presents the summary results from a single-factor ANOVA. As before, 
the single factor has five levels representing the different types of bidders. There is a 
significant difference in the mean residual surplus among the five bidding strategies. 
(4) 
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TABLE 6.10: ANOVA- Surplus 
 
Source of Variation SS Df MS F P-value 
Between Groups 77.847 4 19.4618 244.94 .000 
Within Groups 253.222 3187 0.0795   
 
Subsequently, to compare the bidding strategies with each other, we performed 
pairwise hypothesis tests on the differences between surpluses. To deal with the inflation 
problem associated with pairwise comparisons, we used the Bonferroni adjustment. Table 
6.11 summarizes the results of hypothesis tests. Values of .000 imply that the null hypothesis 
of equality of two means is rejected with a p-value of zero (for value 1, vice versa). The 
average surplus percentage indicates what fraction of a certain bidding strategy resulted in a 
surplus. 
TABLE 6.11: Pairwise Comparison- Difference of surplus 
 
 Cluster Name 
Average 
Surplus % 
Risk Averse 
(0%) 
Economic  
Withholders 
Inframarginal Physical 
Withholders 
Economic Withholders (27%) .000 - - - 
Inframarginal (2%) 1 .000 - - 
Physical Withholders (16%) .000 .000 .000 - 
Opportunists (70%) .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
The results indicate that inframarginal bidders and risk averse are best at 
minimizing surplus. However, the interpretation for risk averse is different in terms of 
surplus, such that; since risk averse do not offer to the spot market, they do not have any 
spot market-surplus. Since inframarginal traders offer their supply at very low prices, they 
are able to sell all their supply reserved for the spot market. The next best are physical 
withholders, followed by economic withholders. On average, opportunists have the largest 
losses of surplus.  
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In sum, we propose a research model as presented in Figure 6.2.  
 
Fig. 6.2. A Research Model of Bidders’ Strategy and Outcome Analysis 
6.6. Conclusions 
We have empirically analysed an oligopolistic multi-unit auction for electricity. Our analysis 
is motivated by important market surveillance issues that have been introduced by large and 
complex trading data sets at the bidder level which brings challenges, particularly for the 
auctioneers, on profiling traders, and understanding the determinants and productive 
efficiency of observed trading behaviour/strategy. Electricity auctions are regulated and they 
have detailed market surveillance rules that must be approved, with the auctioneer specifying 
precisely how MCPs are determined and defining the feasible set of market participant 
behaviour. The behavioural analytics approach we proposed and empirical results presented 
are useful to address the cognitive and computational limitations of MSC members in their 
detection of manipulative behaviour. In fact the results of our work are being considered by 
the Turkish government to facilitate and improve the daily operations of MSCs and evaluate 
the potential changes to the auction clearing price determination algorithm. Our analysis 
highlights the importance of considering the bidders’ strategic behaviour and their market 
positions when detecting manipulative behaviour and evaluating the intent behind it. Using 
a unique and extensive data set from Turkish electricity auctions, we apply a three-stage 
analysis approach.  
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Firstly, we introduce five novel classification variables- NOO, WTP, WTS, ASKP 
and WR; and through applying a clustering algorithm, we find five different strategic 
behaviours: inframarginal; economic withholding; physical withholding; opportunist; and 
risk averse.  
Secondly, we explain why bidders choose different strategies through using an 
econometric model. We identify four bidder-level factors that are critical to bidders’ 
strategic choices: forward commitment, size, type and diversity. Using a multinomial logistic 
regression model, we demonstrate that bidders with high forward commitment ratios are 
more likely choose the inframarginal strategy over economic withholding and opportunist 
strategies, however not over physical withholding. They are also more likely to choose the 
risk averse strategy over other strategies. On the one hand, larger bidders are more likely 
choose the economic witholding strategy over either the inframarginal or risk averse 
strategy. They are also more likely choose the physical withholding strategy over other 
strategies. On the other hand, small bidders are more likely choose the opportunist strategy. 
Hydro dam bidders are more likely to choose the physical withholding strategy over other 
strategies. Canal and wind bidders are more likely to choose either the inframarginal or risk 
averse strategy over other strategies. Conventional bidders are more likely to choose the 
opportunist strategy. Portfolio bidders are more likely to choose either the inframarginal or 
risk averse strategy over other strategies. More diversified bidders are more likely to choose 
physical withholding, economic withholding and opportunist strategies over inframarginal 
and risk averse strategies.  
In the last stage, we show that different strategies, in aggregate, lead to different 
winning likelihoods and productive efficiency. Inframarginal and physical withholders have 
significantly higher winning proportions than economic withholders, opportunists and risk 
averse. Our results show that the inframarginal bidders and risk averse are best at minimizing 
surplus. The next best are physical withholders, followed by economic withholders. On 
average, opportunists have the largest losses of surplus.  
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6.7. Policy Implications and Future Research 
Our approach to examining bidder behaviour in online auctions reveals significant empirical 
regularities, which lead to our taxonomy of bidding behaviour. The taxonomy identifies five 
distinct bidding strategies in electricity auctions. This result can be viewed as a micro-
segmentation of bidder strategies in these oligopolistic auction settings and has interesting 
practical applications in improving decision-making process of MSCs who are responsible 
for the surveillance of these auctions. In addition, knowledge of any domain-specific strategy 
dominance can be embedded within policy simulation platforms. 
At the time of writing this Chapter, the Turkish MSC was attempting to identify 
possible market manipulators manually and to introduce some MCP mitigation procedures 
considering the specific supply stack characteristics of the Turkish market. In particular, they 
were revising the Market Surveillance Regulation and they were seeking systematic, 
evidence-based approaches to identify market manipulation and measure its effect on the 
clearing price before the announcement of the final MCP at 14:00. Since there is only one 
hour between the interim MCP and final MCP, it was impossible to ex-ante evaluate the 
effect of withholding bidders on the final MCP. With our approach they can find the 
economic/physical withholders and opportunists in milliseconds and evaluate the level of 
artificial price increase caused by these bidders and make informed decisions which in the 
end effect social welfare of all consumers.  
In the end, we have proposed a behavioral analytics framework (Figure 6.3) to 
automate detection, investigation and analysis of potentially abusive or disorderly trading, 
to help improve the overall efficiency of the surveillance operations and reduce cost, even 
as market complexity and new regulations increase. 
136 
 
 
Fig. 6.3: A behavioural analytics framework for surveillance of complex auction markets 
 
 The identification of distinctive strategic behaviour in the EDA auction challenges 
the conventional view that bidders’ strategies will converge as they gain experience from 
repeated participation in the competition. Thus it calls for a dynamic behavioural view in 
developing agent-based models (e.g. Power TAC, Ketter et al., 2013). There is a substantial 
modelling risk due to the possible lack of realism in definitions of the players, their potential 
strategies, the ways in which they interact, and the set of payoffs (Weron, 2014). In this 
sense, our findings, which map bidders’ choices of strategies to their bidder-level 
(demographic) characteristics, indicate the average winning percentage and surplus (i.e., risk 
of the strategy) could provide valuable inputs for developing more realistic multi-agent 
models for policy simulations of power markets. We are now working on integrating our 
findings to Power TAC competitive simulation platform.  
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Chapter 7  
 
Conclusions, Implications, 
and Limitations 
 
In this Chapter, we first summarize the findings from the four specific studies and then 
continue with a discussion of their theoretical contributions and managerial implications. 
Finally, we reflect on the limitations of the current research and present an outline for future 
work.  
7.1. Main Findings 
Our central research question is how to leverage the power of data analytics to improve 
surveillance of complex auction markets. We address this question by systematically 
examining the interplay of different informational, strategic, technological and regulatory 
factors in four specific studies.  
 
7.1.1. Market Efficiency 
 
In Chapter 3 we analyse the fractal dynamics of day-ahead electricity prices by using 
parametric and semiparametric approaches for each time zone in a multi-time tariff setting 
in the framework of bidding strategies, market efficiency and persistence of exogenous 
shocks. On the one hand, we find that electricity prices have long-term correlation structure 
for the first and third time zones indicating that market participants bid hyperbolically and 
not at their marginal costs, the market is not weak form efficient at these hours and 
exogenous shocks to change the mean level of prices will have a permanent effect and be 
effective. On the other hand, for the second time zone we find that the price series does not 
exhibit long-term memory. This finding suggests the weak form efficiency of the market in 
these hours and that marginal bidders bid at their marginal costs. Furthermore this indicates 
that exogenous shocks will have a temporary effect on prices in these hours.  
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7.1.2. Price Predictability  
 
Despite the great diversity of spot price forecasting methods, due to the unique 
characteristics of electricity as a commodity, there are still three key forecasting challenges 
that a market participant must take into account: risk of selection of an inadequate 
forecasting method; transparency level of the market (availability level of public data); and 
country-specific multi-seasonality factors. In Chapter 4, we address these challenges by 
using detailed market-level data from the Turkish Electricity Day-Ahead (EDA) auctions, 
which is an interesting research setting in that it presents a number of challenges for 
forecasting. We reveal the key distinguishing features of this market quantitatively which 
then allow us to propose individual and ensemble forecasting models that are particularly 
well suited to it. We compare the performance of the models according to three criteria. 
According to Criteria-3, which is the most realistic decision-making setting of the three, we 
find that using ensemble models increases price forecast accuracy significantly in 30% of 
the cases. In the remaining 70% of the cases, there is no statistically significant difference 
between forecast accuracies of best individual model and the best ensemble model. Thus our 
findings support the additional benefits of ensemble forecasts especially according to an ex-
ante (more realistic) decision-making setting and in line with previous findings indicating 
ensemble modeling is less uncertain and more accurate than the ex-ante best individual 
model. 
 
7.1.3. Information Feedback Mechanisms 
 
In Chapter 5 we aim to understand how attitude and trading behaviour of bidders effect their 
price expectations in online double auctions in the existence of forward trading. We develop 
a research model that empirically tests the impact of bidders’ attitudes on their price 
expectation through their trading behaviour. Using a unique and extensive data set, we tested 
our hypotheses on real ex-ante forecasts, evaluated ex-post, in an EDA auction context. We 
find that the informational role of forward trading is the most important factor that decreases 
bidders’ expectation biases. More information does not always lead to more rational (less 
biased) expectations. Risk aversion does not play a major role in trading decisions of power 
141 
 
bidders. In addition, our control variables, including bidder type and strategic positioning in 
the market, had significant impacts, particularly on forecast accuracy and forward trading.  
 
7.1.4. Bidder Heterogeneity  
 
Traditionally, auctions have largely been studied from the game-theoretic perspective and 
bidders are assumed to be homogeneous. The availability of bidder-level big data sets have 
made this assumption questionable and highlights the necessity of developing more realistic 
models to explain real-life bidding behaviour. In Chapter 6, we use an inductive, data-driven 
approach to characterize bidder heterogeneity in oligopolistic multi-unit auctions. We 
introduce five hourly classification variables- number of orders (for both bid and ask), 
maximum bid price, minimum ask price, ask price, and supply withholding ratio, and find 
five distinct bidding behaviours: inframarginal, physical withholding, economic 
withholding, opportunists and risk averse. This result can be viewed as a micro-segmentation 
of bidder strategies in these oligopolistic auction settings and has interesting practical 
applications in improving decision-making process of Market Surveillance Committees 
(MSCs) who are responsible for the surveillance of these auctions. In addition, knowledge 
of this domain-specific strategy dominance can be embedded within policy simulation 
platforms. 
 
7.1.5. Productive Efficiency 
 
In Chapter 6 we focus on a multi-unit uniform-price auction setting in a centralized product 
market and show that different bidding strategies, in aggregate, lead to different winning 
likelihoods and productive efficiency. Specifically, we find that the inframarginal and 
physical withholding strategy have significantly higher winning proportions than the 
economic withholding, opportunist and risk averse. This result reflects that opportunist and 
economic withholding strategies have brought less profit to their adopters. Our results show 
that the inframarginal bidders and risk averse are best at minimizing surplus. For the 
inframarginals since they offer their supply at very low prices, they are able to sell all their 
supply reserved for the spot market. Next best are physical withholders, followed by 
economic withholders. On average, opportunists have the largest losses of surplus. 
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Overall, we have illustrated and quantified the benefits of using data analytics to improve 
surveillance of complex auction markets.  
7.2. Scientific Contributions 
This dissertation makes valuable contributions to the surveillance of complex auction 
markets. First of all, the four specific studies (Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6) together have greatly 
improved our understanding of evidence-based policy development in complex auction 
markets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research that systematically examines 
the interplay of informational and strategic factors in oligopolistic multi-unit auctions.  
 Further, it contributes to the literature of smart markets (Bichler et al., 2010). In 
particular, the analysis approach proposed in Chapter 3 serves as a useful tool for monitoring 
market efficiency and ex-post evaluation of policies on predictability of prices and 
aggregate-level bidder strategy. In addition, ensemble models developed in Chapter 4 can 
be used by the auctioneer to understand the transparency level of prices using only publicly 
available data which can be very useful for agent-based simulation models. Moreover, in 
Chapter 5 we developed a qualitative monitoring framework to understand determinants of 
bidders’ price expectation bias which is a prerequisite for the customization of information 
feedback mechanisms in smart markets. Chapter 6 presents a micro segmentation of bidders 
which serves as a useful starting point for the development of real-time decision support 
systems for policy-makers.  
 Finally, our research makes an important methodological contribution. 
Specifically, in Chapter 3 we extended the existing market monitoring and surveillance 
methodologies by using a long memory (fractal) model to measure the efficiency level of 
the market. In Chapter 4, we used long-term seasonal models ensemble with econometric 
and machine learning methods in order to manage price modeling risk, especially in semi-
transparent settings. In Chapter 5, we developed a qualitative market monitoring 
methodology to be able to measure the effect of bidders’ attitude and trading behaviour on 
their price expectations. In Chapter 6 we introduced a novel market surveillance method 
(combining machine learning techniques with statistical methods) to monitor oligopolistic 
auction markets. 
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7.3. Policy Implications 
Our research demonstrates the merits and great promise of data analytics to facilitate the 
surveillance and monitoring of complex auction markets. In order to address the cognitive 
and computational limitations of MSCs in their ex-ante and ex-post decision-making 
process, we suggest: 
 
 Considering the fractal dynamics of spot prices is an effective way to monitor 
market efficiency in terms of the aggregate-level bidding behavior of the marginal 
bidders in complex auction markets. 
 In semi-transparent markets, using ensemble forecasts can be effective in managing 
market price modelling risk.  
 The informational role of forward trading is a factor that decreases bidders’ 
expectation biases in complex auction markets.  
 More information does not always lead to more rational (less biased) expectations. 
Therefore auctioneers have to be careful when deciding on the information 
transparency level of the market.  
 Bidders in oligopolistic auctions adopt trading strategies with respect to their size, 
type, forward commitment, and portfolio diversity. These strategies lead to 
different productive efficiencies in the market. Big data and advances of data 
analytics will lead to more accurate description and prediction of participants’ 
behaviour and intent under different market settings. 
 While theory provides useful principles to understand market performance in 
different auction settings, we need data-driven (evidence-based) approaches for 
surveillance of complex auction markets.  
As a result, we propose to augment expert judgement with data analytics insights which is 
presented as a Market Monitoring and Surveillance Framework in Figure 7.1 where bidder 
attitude, such as risk aversion, is a learned tendency to evaluate things in a certain way. 
Bidder type is strategic position of the bidder in market, for example, size, portfolio 
diversity, and technology. Bidder expectation is the price expectation of the bidders. Market 
outcome refers to the transactions that result from the market process. Information feedback 
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mechanisms include transparency and forward/over the counter trading platforms. Auction 
design parameters include regulations such as price caps, bid types, bid increments, time 
delays between sequential auctions etc. Data analytics refers to the practice of collecting, 
evaluating and analysing data to inform decision makers. 
7.4. Limitations and Future Work 
In Chapter 3, developing approaches that are more robust to skewed distributions for the 
conditional mean would provide an opportunity on relaxing the normality assumption. 
Developing new electricity market monitoring indexes considering the time zones would 
result in interesting policy implications. Furthermore considering the fractal dynamics of 
electricity prices at different time scales, one would reduce the prediction confidence 
intervals. 
In Chapter 4, most emerging markets are semi-transparent since market data is very 
limited for price forecasting. Market participants tend to use international data provider 
consultancy firms to get information which is not public. The type of data they seek for is 
usually on the planned generation schedules of large firms, dam level of some state-owned 
hydropower plants (for Turkey case), primary resource-based available installed capacity 
and final daily production program (firm-level) and matching quantities(ex-post) on the 
hourly merit order curve. We call this type of data private, rather than insider, since it does 
not include any firm-level confidential data. Since most of the market participants do not 
have this information, the ones that have it can make a more fundamental analysis of the 
market, improve their forecast accuracies and beat the market. Based on this point of view, 
it would be interesting to examine the worth of this information to market participants 
considering the improvement in the forecast accuracy of individual and ensemble models.  
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Fig. 7.1: A conceptual model of data-driven surveillance of complex auction markets 
 
In Chapter 5, as with all empirical research, there are questions of generalizability 
and replication. Whilst the details and control variables have been specific to an electricity 
market, the conceptual model can in principle be applied to other smart markets. The key 
elements of forecast accuracy, forward contracting, market informedness, and risk aversion 
are quite general. 
In Chapter 6, the identification of distinctive strategic behaviour in the EDA auction 
challenges the conventional view that bidders’ strategies will converge as they gain 
experience from repeated participation in the competition. Thus, it calls for a dynamic 
behavioural view in developing agent-based models (ABM) (e.g. Power TAC, Ketter et al., 
2013). In this sense, our findings, which map bidders’ choices of strategies to their bidder-
level (demographic) characteristics; average winning percentage and surplus (i.e., risk of the 
strategy) could provide valuable inputs for developing more realistic multi-agent models for 
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policy simulations of power markets. We are now working on integrating our findings to 
Power TAC competitive simulation platform.  
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Summary 
 
As technology advances, the past two decades have seen an explosion of digital data and 
every sector of the global economy is being changed by the large amount of data available. 
This has enabled a different way of making decisions that involves more empirical evidence 
rather than personal experience, intuition, or belief. In this thesis we focus on the merits of 
using data analytics for decision making in complex auction markets from the perspective 
of policy-makers. More specifically we propose a Data-Driven Market Surveillance 
Framework enabling Market Surveillance Committees to establish recommendations or 
assessments by processing information from relevant data using appropriate tools to make 
important inferences and discover useful insights. 
 
In first study (Chapter 3) we examine the fractal dynamics of spot market prices by 
using parametric and semiparametric approaches in a multi-time tariff setting. We find that 
that prices have long-term correlation structure for the first and third time zones indicating 
that marginal bidders bid hyperbolically and not at their marginal costs, market is not weak 
form efficient at these hours and exogenous shocks to change the mean level of prices will 
have permanent effect and be effective. On the other hand, for the second time zone we find 
that price series does not exhibit long-term memory. This finding suggests the weak form 
efficiency of the auction in these hours and that marginal bidders bid at their marginal costs. 
Furthermore this indicates that exogenous shocks will have temporary effect on prices in 
these hours. These findings constitute an important foundation for MSCs to understand level 
of market efficiency for specific trading periods, develop appropriate monitoring indexes 
and conduct ex-ante impact assessment. 
 
In the second study (Chapter 4) we address three key forecasting challenges; risk 
of selection of an inadequate forecasting method and transparency level of the market 
(availability level of public data) and market-specific multi-seasonality factors in complex 
auction markets; and reveal the key distinguishing features of this auction quantitatively 
which then allow us to propose individual and ensemble forecasting models that are 
  
particularly well suited to it. We find that using ensemble forecasts can be useful to manage 
market price modelling risk in semi-transparent market settings. 
 
In the third study (Chapter 5), we demonstrate how attitude and trading behaviour 
of bidders effect their price expectations in complex auction markets with the existence of 
forward trading. We develop a research model that empirically tests the impact of bidders’ 
attitudes on their price expectation through their trading behaviour. Using a unique and 
extensive data set, we tested our hypotheses on real ex-ante forecasts, evaluated ex-post. 
This study is the first to take an information-based view to investigate price expectation of 
bidders through their behaviour; with results that suggest a re-consideration of some of the 
conventional concepts. 
 
In the fourth study (Chapter 6), we investigate characterization, determinants, and 
efficiency of bidding in an oligopolistic multi-unit auction.  We find that there is significant 
heterogeneity across bidders in terms of bidding behaviour. Through introducing novel 
classification variables, we identify five distinct bidding strategies. Then we demonstrate 
bidder’s choice of these strategies is associated with their forward commitment, size, 
generation technology, and diversity. In addition, we show that different strategies, in 
aggregate, lead to different winning likelihoods and productive efficiency. Finally, we 
demonstrate how our analysis approach and findings can be used to enhance behavioural 
monitoring of Market Surveillance Committees. 
 
Overall, we have illustrated the merits of data analytics to improve the operations 
of Market Surveillance Committees in complex auction markets. 
 
 
 
  
Nederlandse Samenvatting 
(Summary in Dutch) 
Mede door de continue ontwikkeling van technologie heeft er in de laatste twee decennia 
een explosie van digitale data plaatsgevonden en elke sector van de wereldeconomie is aan 
het veranderen door de grote hoeveelheid van beschikbare data. Dit heeft het mogelijk 
gemaakt om op een andere manier beslissingen te nemen; op basis van empirisch bewijs in 
plaats van persoonlijke ervaring, intuïtie, of overtuiging. In deze dissertatie richten we ons 
op de voordelen van het gebruik van data analytics voor het nemen van beslissingen in 
complexe veilingen vanuit het perspectief van beleidsmakers. Specifiek presenteren wij een 
raamwerk voor data gedreven market toezicht dat markttoezicht commissies in staat zal 
stellen om aanbevelingen en inschattingen te geven door informatie uit relevante data te 
verwerken, gebruikmakend van de juiste hulpmiddelen, om daarmee belangrijke conclusies 
te trekken en nuttige inzichten te ontdekken. 
 
In de eerste studie (Hoofdstuk 3) onderzoeken we de fractal dynamica van spot 
market prijzen  door gebruik te maken van parametrische en semi-parametrische 
benaderingen in een multi-tijdzone  tarief context. We vinden dat prijzen een lange termijn 
corrlatie structure hebben voor de eerste en derde tijdzone, wat aangeeft dat marginale 
bieders hyperbolisch bieden en niet gebaseerd op hun marginale kosten. De markt heeft niet 
een zwakke vorm of efficiency tijdens deze uren en de exogene schokken die de gemiddelde 
prijsniveaus veranderen zullen permanente effecten hebben en effectief zijn. Daarentegen 
vinden we voor de tweede tijdzone dat prijsreeksen geen lange-termijn geheugen vertonen. 
Deze bevinding geeft aan dat de veiling in deze uren een zwakke vorm van efficiency hebben 
en dat marginale bieders hun marginale kosten bieden. Tevens geeft dit aan dat exogene 
schokken een tijdelijk effect op prijzen zullen hebben in deze uren. Deze bevindingen 
vormen een belangrijke basis voor MSCs om het niveau van markt efficiëntie te begrijpen 
voor specifieke handelsperioden, passende monitoring indexen te ontwikkelen en ex-ante 
effectinschattingen uit te voeren. 
 
  
In de tweede studie (Hoofdstuk 4) adresseren we drie belangrijke 
voorspellingsuitdagingen (het risico van het selecteren van een ontoereikende 
voorspellingsmethode, het transparantie niveau van de markt (mate van beschikbaarheid van 
publieke data) en markt-specifieke seizoensfactoren in complexe veilingen) en leggen we 
kwantitatief de belangrijkste onderscheidende kenmerken van deze veilingen bloot. Het stelt 
ons vervolgens in staat stelt om individuele en ensemble voorspellingsmodellen te 
ontwikkelen voor te stellen die goed bruikbaar zijn. We vinden dat het gebruik van ensemble 
voorspellingen nuttig kan zijn om market prijs risico’s te modelleren en te managen in semi-
transparante markten. 
 
In de derde studie (Hoofdstuk 5) demonsteren we hoe attitude en handelsgedrag 
van bieders effect hebben op hun prijsverwachtingen in complexe veilingen met voorwaartse 
handel. We ontwikkelen een onderzoeksmodel dat empirisch de invloed test van de attitude 
van bieders op hun prijsverwachtingen door middel van hun handelsgedrag. Gebruikmakend 
van een unieke en uitgebreide dataset, testen we onze hypotheses op echte ex-ante 
voorspellingen die ex-post geëvalueerd worden. Dit is de eerste studie die een informatie-
gebaseerde benadering gebruikt om prijsverwachtingen van bieders te onderzoeken door te 
kijken naar hun gedrag. De resultaten suggereren dat sommige traditionele concepten 
heroverwogen dienen te worden. 
 
In de vierde studie (Hoofdstuk 6) onderzoeken we de karakteristieken, 
determinanten en efficiëntie van biedprocessen in een oligopolische multi-unit veiling. We 
vinden dat er een significante heterogeniteit is onder bieders met betrekking tot hun 
biedgedrag. Door middel van het introduceren van nieuwe classificatie variabelen 
identificeren we vijf unieke biedstrategieën. Vervolgens demonstreren we dat de 
strategiekeuze van bieders gerelateerd is aan hun voorwaartse commitment, grootte, 
generatie technologie en diversiteit. We laten ook zien dat verschillende strategieën, over 
het geheel genomen, leiden tot verschillende winkansen en productieve efficiëntie. Tot slot, 
demonstreren we hoe onze analyse aanpak en bevindingen gebruikt kunnen worden om het 
gedrag te monitoren door markttoezicht commisies te verbeteren. 
 
  
Gezamenlijk hebben we met deze studies de voordelen geïllustreerd van data 
gedreven besluitvorming om de werkzaamheden van markttoezicht commisies in complexe 
veilingen te verbeteren.  
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The dissertation consists of four essays that investigates the merits of big data-driven decision-making in 
the surveillance of complex auction markets. In the first essay, Avci and her co-researchers examine the 
aggregate-level bidding strategies and market efficiency in a multi-time tariff setting by using parametric 
and semi parametric methods. In the second essay, they address three key forecasting challenges; risk of 
selection of an inadequate forecasting method and transparency level of the market and market-specific 
multi-seasonality factors in a semi-transparent auction market.  In the third essay, they demonstrate the 
effect of information feedback mechanisms on bidders’ price expectations in complex auction markets 
with the existence of forward contracts. They develop a research model that empirically tests the impact 
of bidders’ attitudes on their price expectation through their trading behavior and tested their hypotheses 
on real ex-ante forecasts, evaluated ex-post. In the fourth essay, they investigate characterization of 
bidding strategies in an oligopolistic multi-unit auction and then examine the interactions between 
different strategies and auction design parameters. This dissertation offers important implications to 
theory and practice of surveillance of complex auction markets. From the theoretical perspective, 
this is, to our best knowledge, the first research that systematically examines the interplay of different 
informational and strategic factors in oligopolistic multi-unit auction markets. From the policy perspective, 
Avci’s research shows that integration of big data analytics and domain-specific knowledge improves 
decision-making in surveillance of complex auction markets.  
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